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CHAPTER 1 Introduction 
“Qualified, committed, independent and tough-minded audit committees represent 
the most reliable guardians of the public interest. Sadly, stories abound of au-
dit committees whose members lack expertise in the basic principles of finan-
cial reporting as well as the mandate to ask probing questions. In fact, I’ve 
heard of one audit committee that convenes only twice a year before the regu-
lar board meeting for 15 minutes and whose duties are limited to a perfuncto-
ry presentation. Compare that situation with the audit committee which meets 
twelve times a year before each board meeting; where every member has a fi-
nancial background; where there are no personal ties to the chairman or the 
company; where they have their own advisers; where they ask tough questions 
of management and outside auditors; and where, ultimately, the investor in-
terest is being served.” 
 
 
Arthur Levitt (former Chairman of the SEC) speech at New York University 
about “The Numbers Game” – September 28, 1998. 
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In a much-publicized speech, former Chairman of the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) Arthur Levitt classified audit committees as the most reliable 
guardians of the public interest. At the same time, he expressed anecdotal concerns 
about their state of expertise, mandate and diligence. While these statements un-
derscore the apparent importance of my dissertation topic, they also raise a num-
ber of questions. What are audit committees and why are they considered to be so 
important for the public interest? Further, what are these committees doing to 
guard the public interest and what do we know or not know about their effective-
ness? In the following, I will briefly elaborate on these questions. 
 An audit committee is a specialized sub-committee of the board of directors or 
supervisory board in a two-tier board system (e.g., as in Germany and the Nether-
lands), consisting in majority or entirely of independent outside board members 
and charged with specific oversight responsibilities.1 Audit committees are consid-
ered important for the public interest, because they are expected to enhance the 
quality of board oversight and thereby contribute to corporate legitimacy and in-
vestor confidence in financial markets. The main areas of audit committee over-
sight include financial reporting, external auditing, internal auditing, internal con-
trol, and more recently also risk management matters. 
 The first accounts of audit committees date back to the birth of US industrial 
capitalism in the 19th century and the separation of ownership from management. 
As pointed out by the distinguished business historian Alfred Chandler, Jr., the 
separation of ownership and management became necessary in the US at that time 
due to the massive investments required to construct new railroads and telegraph 
systems and the complexity of these operations. According to Chandler (1990: 1), 
“the enlarged enterprise came to be operated by teams of salaried managers who 
had little or no equity in the firm. The owners, numerous and scattered, were in-
vestors with neither the experience, the information, nor the time to make the 
myriad decisions needed”. However, even though salaried managers are expected 
to possess the expertise to run complex organizations, they cannot be expected to 
watch over the firm’s assets with the same anxious vigilance with which the part-
ners in a private co-partnership watch over their own (Smith, 1776). Hence, pro-
fessional managers (the agents) will not always act in the best interest of a firm’s 
owners (the principals) and from time to time engage in activities that reduce ra-
ther than increase firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
 It is precisely the aforementioned agency problem which helps to explain why 
audit committees are considered so important for the public interest. When own-
ership is separated from control in public firms, independent audit committees can 
provide the necessary oversight and assurance to protect the principals (i.e. share-
holders) from the aberrant activities of agents (i.e. salaried managers). Investors, 
                                                                  
1 An independent outside board member is a non-executive director appointed to serve on the board of 
an organization, who has no meaningful connection to the organization other than serving on the board 
and the board’s committees. 
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who financed the expansion of the US railroad in the 19th century, for example, 
required the formation of an audit committee to inspect the company’s accounts 
and expenditures on a quarterly basis and to resolve unprecedented control and 
responsibility issues (Flesher et al., 2005). This illustrates that audit committees 
are mechanisms for strengthening investor confidence in corporate governance. 
Investor confidence in corporate governance and capital markets, in turn, is a pre-
requisite for widely available sources of funding which played a key role in the 
evolution of capitalism and the prosperity of the modern world (Bernstein, 2004). 
 During the 20th century, audit committees evolved into mandatory corporate 
governance mechanisms with the rise of world capital markets (especially stock 
markets). In 1977, the US was the first country to adopt a requirement that each 
domestic company with common stock listed on the NYSE must establish an audit 
committee comprised solely of independent directors as a condition of listing. By 
the early 21st century, audit committee formation had become a standard practice 
for publicly held firms in just about all of the 30 largest economies by GDP. The 
implicit assumption behind audit committee formation is that a smaller group 
comprised of independent directors and charged with a narrower field of respon-
sibilities will be more effective than the entire board, which is also comprised of 
executives and handles a broader array of topics. Bédard and Gendron (2010) 
show that prior research finds positive associations between audit committee 
formation and the quality of corporate governance and that the dominant theory 
which has been guiding this stream of research is agency theory (Jensen and Meck-
ling, 1976). 
 However, the wide-scale proliferation of audit committees first in the US and 
then on a global scale cannot be explained solely on the basis of agency theory and 
efficiency considerations. In the US, the expanding role of audit committees can be 
linked directly to landmark corporate governance scandals that prompted regula-
tors to strengthen the role of independent audit committees as a way to restore 
investor confidence in public companies and financial markets (Vanasco, 1994). In 
continental Europe, in turn, audit committee formation was rather rare, until the 
EU Eighth Directive on Company Law (2006) required their formation for entities 
operating in the public interest. The point here is that the institutional environ-
ment has a strong influence on the development of formal governance structures 
in organizations, such as the formation and design of audit committees (Cohen et 
al., 2008). Thus, explanations for the popularity and design of audit committees 
may also be found in their ceremonial function, which validates corporate legiti-
macy and enables access to resources for survival and growth rather than enhanc-
ing the effectiveness of corporate governance (Spira, 1999). 
 With this as a background, the question emerges: what do we know or not 
know about the design and effectiveness of audit committees? A number of schol-
ars, including DeZoort et al. (2002), Bédard and Gendron (2010), and Carcello et al. 
(2011), have conducted comprehensive reviews of the audit committee literature 
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in order to identify systematic associations between audit committee characteris-
tics and measures of audit committee effectiveness. Next, I will briefly summarize 
the main input and output factors that have been used in empirical research on 
audit committee effectiveness. Subsequently, I will point out three research gaps 
that will be addressed in the course of this dissertation. Each of these gaps is 
grounded in the aforementioned literature reviews and has been identified as an 
important area for further research by the corporate governance community 
(Ahrens et al., 2011). 
 On the input side, five factors have been predominantly used in empirical re-
search to study cross-sectional variations in audit committee effectiveness. Ac-
cording to Bédard and Gendron (2010), the factors that have been found to be 
most frequently correlated with measures of effectiveness are the responsibilities 
assigned to the audit committee by means of a written charter, the degree of audit 
committee independence, and the competencies of audit committee members. 
Comparatively few studies, in turn, report evidence on associations between com-
mittee meeting frequency and size and audit committee effectiveness. 
 On the output side, prior studies have focused on measures of audit committee 
effectiveness in one of the following oversight areas: financial reporting, external 
auditing, internal control, as well as on investor perceptions. In the area of finan-
cial reporting, effective audit committees have been found to constrain earnings 
management (Bédard et al., 2004), reduce the occurrence of misstatements in fi-
nancial reports (Abbott et al. 2004), increase the level of voluntary disclosure (Kel-
ton and Yang, 2008), and improve the accuracy of earnings forecasts (Karamanou 
and Vafeas, 2005). In terms of raising the quality of the external audit process, 
audit committees have been found to impact the selection of the auditor (Abbott 
and Parker, 2000), the level of external audit work (Bédard and Johnston, 2004), 
and the independence of the external audit process (Ng and Tan, 2003). Effective 
audit committees have also been found to constrain internal control weaknesses 
(Zhang et al., 2007). Finally, empirical evidence suggests that investors react favor-
ably when firms establish an audit committee that meets certain criteria consid-
ered best practice (Anderson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005: Farber, 2005). 
 In terms of research gaps in the existing audit committee and corporate gov-
ernance literature, I would like to point out three areas that constitute the point of 
departure for the three studies that form my dissertation. These gaps and the cor-
responding studies are closely related to the three themes by which Ahrens et al. 
(2011) describe the contemporary research frontier in corporate governance. 
Theme number one is the interplay between national institutions, audit committee 
design and committee effectiveness. Theme number two is based on a more practi-
cal understanding of what audit committees are responsible for and actually do. 
Theme number three, in turn, encompasses the role of audit committees in a peri-
od of economic distress, such as the financial crisis that took hold in 2007-2008. 
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1.1 Audit committee design 
To begin with, the extant audit committee literature is based by and large on in-
sights derived from studying firms listed in the US. Studies that combine agency 
with institutional theory have shown, however, that differences in national institu-
tions can impact the setup and efficacy of corporate governance mechanisms at 
firm level (Denis and McConnell, 2003; Aguilera et al., 2008). Consequently, it is 
important to better understand the role that institutional considerations play in 
the design of audit committees outside the North American domain. By drawing on 
institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983), my first study sheds light on the 
degree of differentiation and isomorphism in audit committee design standards 
across six continental European countries. I define audit committee design as the 
implementation and stipulation of audit committee characteristics that are thought 
to contribute to audit committee effectiveness or institutional legitimacy. 
 More specifically, the study presented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation sheds 
light on the design of audit committees in continental Europe by analyzing the 
contents of the Eighth EU Company Law Directive, European codes of governance 
and corporate audit committee charters. The countries featured in this study are 
Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. The objectives are 
twofold. First, I assess whether different regulatory regimes in continental Europe 
favor the establishment of audit committee design standards that are commonly 
recognized as making a difference in terms of audit committee effectiveness. 
Thereby, I aim to enrich the scant knowledge about audit committees outside the 
Anglo-Saxon domain and contribute to a better understanding of the commonali-
ties and differences in corporate governance among members states of the Euro-
pean Union (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 2002). Second, I study the effectiveness of the 
EU Eighth Directive and national codes in creating isomorphism in audit commit-
tee design at the corporate level by providing evidence for convergence in content 
and language of audit committee charters as proxies for coercive and mimetic iso-
morphism, respectively. Thereby, I provide evidence for a strong interplay be-
tween national institutional forces and audit committee design throughout the EU. 
 The results presented in Chapter 2 reveal noticeable differences in audit com-
mittee design standards among EU Member States. These differences concern the 
scope of responsibilities assigned to audit committees, the competencies that audit 
committee members should possess, and the proportion of independent directors 
serving on the committee. Standards related to audit committee size and meeting 
frequency, in turn, are fairly isomorphic across my sample. At the corporate level, I 
find high levels of implementation of the Eighth Directive and the national code in 
the Netherlands, intermediate levels in Belgium and Spain, and low levels in 
France, Germany, and Italy. These results suggest that one avenue for ironing out 
inconsistencies in audit committee design among EU Member States is to mandate 
the disclosure of complete audit committee charters. 
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 However, regulators should carefully evaluate this step. Consistent with prior 
literature, I observe that regulatory pressure leads to an increase in the percentage 
of unoriginal content in audit committee charters. By passing audit committee 
charters through software to detect plagiarism in narrative documents, I detect an 
elevated percentage of unoriginal content in the charters of firms listed in a strin-
gent disclosure environment on audit committee charters. These results suggest 
that regulation leads to ´copy-and-paste´ or ´box-ticking´ approaches when devel-
oping corporate narrative documents. Given that audit committee charters are 
meant to provide firm-specific information to the investing public and strengthen 
audit committee effectiveness, these results may not be in the best interest of 
standard setters and investors. 
1.2 The role of audit committee charters 
One of key findings of my first study is that regulatory pressure to disclose an audit 
committee charter will increase the degree of mimetic isomorphism in these char-
ters. This indicates that a disclosure regime may turn audit committee charters of 
different firms into boilerplate copies of each other, describing the same set of 
roles and responsibilities (cf. Forster et al., 2009; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012). 
Extant literature also indicates that firms decouple actual organizational practices 
from publicly available codes and charters once the disclosure of these documents 
turns from voluntary to coercive and then mandatory (Harvard Law Review, 
2003). Accordingly, there is evidence to suggest that the value added of audit 
committee charters for the investing public and audit committee effectiveness 
diminishes perversely in those institutional settings characterized by a stringent 
disclosure regime. 
 In order to investigate whether the aforementioned concerns are justified, I 
examine associations between the scope of responsibilities set forth in audit com-
mittee charters and measures of actual audit committee activity in different disclo-
sure regimes in my second study, presented in Chapter 3. The analysis presented 
in Chapter 3 is based on a thorough content analysis of the distinct responsibilities 
disclosed in publicly available audit committee charters from firms listed on Anglo-
Saxon and continental European stock exchanges. I first investigate whether the 
number of responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters differs signifi-
cantly and systematically among firms that operate under similar disclosure re-
gimes. Subsequently, I test whether measures of actual audit committee activity 
can be associated with the nominal scope of responsibilities set forth in the char-
ters. The key question addressed here is whether audit committees actually do 
what is promised in publicly available audit committee charters. 
Interestingly, I document statistically significant associations between the scope of 
responsibilities set forth in audit committee charters and the level of audit com-
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mittee activity for firms with a primary listing in Anglo-Saxon countries (stringent 
disclosure regime) and an absence thereof in continental Europe (voluntary dis-
closure setting). These results suggest that the audit committee charters of firms 
listed in institutional settings with a stringent disclosure regime seem to contain 
more substantive instead of symbolic firm-specific content, and vice versa for audit 
committee charters from voluntary disclosure settings. 
 I consequently argue that audit committee charters that are being voluntarily 
disclosed seem to function primarily as vehicles used by firms to gain external 
legitimacy via front-stage impression management, but not as a means of inform-
ing legitimate interest groups about the committees’ actual responsibilities, nor of 
directing the internal work program of audit committees. In coercive or mandatory 
disclosure regimes, in turn, the professed activities of audit committees seem to be 
more closely related to their actual work. Implications for regulators on both sides 
of the Atlantic are discussed in the concluding part of Chapter 3. For my own re-
search, these results indicate that it would be worthwhile to study cross-sectional 
variations in the responsibilities set forth in audit committee charters of firms 
operating in a mandatory disclosure environment, such as the US. I take up this 
point in Chapter 4, which focuses on the role of US audit committees with respect 
to overseeing risk management.  
1.3 Audit committees and firm performance during a financial crisis 
Can audit committees mitigate the impact of severe adverse economic events, such 
as the recent financial crisis, on firm performance? A number of papers provide 
empirical evidence suggesting that they can (e.g., Yeh et al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 
2012). According to Yeh et al., independent directors on audit committees affected 
the level of risk-taking and subsequent performance of the 20 largest financial 
institutions from G8 countries during the global financial crisis which took hold in 
2007. The authors argue that firms with more independent directors on their audit 
committees performed better during 2007-2008, because independent directors 
curb excessive managerial risk-taking and have incentives to provide their expert 
prestige and monitoring power in a crisis period leading, in turn, to better firm 
performance. 
 As far as the US is concerned, however, listed firms were already required to 
maintain a fully independent audit committee several years before this financial 
crisis took hold, according to Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act (SOX) of 2002. 
This casts doubt on the proposition that audit committee independence moved the 
needle in terms of audit committee effectiveness and firm performance for US 
listed firms during the financial crisis. Consequently, the question emerges, which 
factors can determine the effectiveness of fully independent audit committees to 
safeguard firm performance during a crisis period? 
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 To address this question, I follow a novel approach by applying a three-
dimensional framework established by Hollenbeck et al. (2012) and published in 
the Academy of Management Review to audit committees of S&P 500 firms during 
the financial crisis that took hold in 2007. The three dimensions are authority dif-
ferentiation, skill differentiation and temporal stability. For the purpose of this 
study, and in light of the existing audit committee literature, I define them as fol-
lows: authority differentiation is the degree to which audit committees are charged 
with substantial authority to oversee risk management; skill differentiation relates 
to the financial, governance, and firm-specific expertise of audit committee mem-
bers; and temporal stability is the turnover among audit committee members. 
 In the study presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation, I provide to the best of 
my knowledge the first empirical evidence for positive relationships between the 
extent of audit committee authority to oversee risk management and subsequent 
firm performance during a period of financial crisis. To substantiate my hypothesis 
that independent audit committee can safeguard firm performance during a crisis 
period by overseeing risk management, I run an additional analysis looking into 
the relation between within-firm performance variability and the three audit 
committee characteristics extracted from Hollenbeck et al.’s framework. The em-
pirical results show a negative relation between firm performance variability dur-
ing the financial crisis studied here and the degree of audit committee authority to 
oversee risk management. Based on these results, the concluding part of Chapter 4 
discusses the promising role of audit committees in the context of enterprise risk 
management. 
1.4 Contributions 
The first study of this dissertation, presented in Chapter 2, contributes to the exist-
ing literature in several ways. First and foremost, it addresses the numerous calls 
that have been raised within the corporate governance community to study audit 
committees outside the Anglo-Saxon domain (DeZoort et al., 2002; Carcello et al., 
2011). Continental Europe constitutes an interesting domain for studying the im-
plementation of audit committee design standards in different institutional set-
tings which fall under the common roof of the Eighth EU Directive on Company 
Law. The ongoing discussion about the convergence of corporate governance prac-
tices in the EU attracts considerable attention from practitioners and researchers 
(e.g., Becht and Meyer, 2004; Collier, 2007). There is a tremendous interest on 
behalf of European issuers and investors, member states and the European Com-
mission in understanding the commonalities and differences among national cor-
porate governance practices (Weil, Gotshal & Manges, 2002). As far as the audit 
committee is concerned, a number of these commonalities and differences are 
presented in Chapter 2. Further, Chapter 2 adds to research that analyses the in-
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terplay between the contents of corporate narrative documents and institutional 
pressure for public disclosure (Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012). Finally, the first 
study presented in this dissertation reinforces the merit of institutional theory and 
the proposition that agency theory alone may be insufficient to explain the popu-
larity and effectiveness of audit committees in different countries and institutional 
settings (Cohen et al., 2004). 
 The second study presented in Chapter 3 contributes to the literature on audit 
committees, disclosure and the effectiveness of regulation in three ways. First, it 
provides countervailing evidence to the conclusions of Carcello et al. (2002). By 
studying the relationship between audit committee charters and reports, the 
aforementioned authors find that what audit committees say they are doing differs 
from what the charters say the committee should be doing. My study, however, 
shows significant associations between the information disclosed in audit commit-
tee charters and measures of actual audit committee activity. Second, Chapter 3 
extends the literature on the determinants of audit committee diligence, which has 
so far not taken into account cross-sectional variations in audit committee scope 
(Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 2009). Third, the results show that 
professed audit committee responsibilities are more closely related to the commit-
tees’ actual work in stringent disclosure regimes. Such evidence is important for 
informing policymakers and investors about the effectiveness of regulation and the 
informativeness of audit committee charters. 
 The final and third study presented in Chapter 4 makes two major contribu-
tions to the existing audit committee literature. First, it corroborates mounting 
empirical evidence suggesting that effective audit committees can mitigate the 
impact of significant adverse economic events, such as a financial crisis, on firm 
performance (Yeh et al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 2012). Second, it shows the merit of 
combining two strands of research that have hitherto been undertaken mostly 
separate from each other. The existing audit committee literature is dominated by 
agency theory which dictates that the degree of independence is the primary de-
terminant of audit committee effectiveness. However, in a setting like the US, 
which mandates that all audit committee members need to be independent from 
management and the company’s affairs, agency theory alone may be insufficient to 
explain variations in audit committee effectiveness. By drawing from the literature 
on team effectiveness published in the realm of organizational studies and social 
psychology, Chapter 4 provides new insights and evidence regarding the factors 
that may determine the effectiveness of audit committee staffed exclusively with 
independent directors. 
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1.5 Outline of the dissertation 
The following three chapters provide new insights into audit committee design 
and effectiveness. Figure 1.1 illustrates the research framework followed in this 
dissertation, using the Input-Process-Output (I-P-O) model to study team effec-
tiveness (McGrath, 1984; Hackman, 1987). Input factors are audit committee de-
sign components that contribute to audit committee effectiveness and that can be 
made explicit, i.e. the responsibilities or size of the audit committee. Processes, in 
turn, relate to the actual work done by audit committees. Finally, output factors are 
measures of audit committee effectiveness, such or improved information quality, 
stronger internal controls, or higher levels of investor confidence. Each chapter is 
focused on one element of the I-P-O model. I draw on the information set forth in 
publicly available audit committee charters in each chapter. 
 In Chapter 2, I study audit committee charters as an instrument used by regu-
lators to establish audit committee design standards (i.e. input factors). In Chapter 
3, I investigate if the actual work of audit committees is related to what is prom-
ised in the charters (input  process). In Chapter 4, I study the relationship be-
tween the mandate defined in audit committee charters to oversee risk manage-
ment and firm performance during a financial crisis (input  output). 
 
 
Figure 1.1 Overview of research framework based on an input-process-output model of audit commit-
tee effectiveness (see also: DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard and Gendron, 2010). 
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CHAPTER 2 The Design of Audit Committees 
in Continental Europe2 
Abstract: In this study we shed light on the design of audit committees in conti-
nental Europe by analysing the contents of the Eighth EU Company Law Directive, 
European codes of governance, and corporate audit committee charters. Our re-
sults show substantial cross-national differences in the scope of responsibilities to 
be addressed by audit committees, in the competences required of committee 
members, and the proportion of independent committee members. The extent of 
differentiation comes as a surprise in light of prevailing pressures for isomorphism 
in the design of audit committees. A closer analysis of publicly available audit 
committee charters shows that compulsory disclosure requirements can increase 
the effectiveness of coercive isomorphism, but, consistent with prior literature, can 
also increase the percentage of unoriginal content in corporate documents. Our 
results contribute to the scant knowledge about audit committees outside the An-
glo-Saxon domain and inform practice about implementing audit committee design 
standards in the EU. 
 
  
                                                                  
2 This chapter is based on Böhm, Bollen, and Hassink (2013), published in the International Journal of 
Auditing under the title “Spotlight on the Design of European Audit Committees: A Comparative De-
scriptive Study. 
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2.1 Introduction 
The European Parliament and Council amended the Eighth Directive on Company 
Law in 2006, requiring entities operating in the public interest to establish an audit 
committee (henceforth AC). The EU Eight Directive highlights that ACs have 
evolved from a virtually unheard and purely voluntary initiative (Vanasco, 1994), 
into an essential and mandatory element in the continental European system of 
corporate governance. Consequently, the question that corporate governance 
committees, boards of directors and supervisory boards in Europe face today is not 
whether ACs should be established, but how to design an effective and efficient 
AC.3 It is of importance to address this question, because competent and independ-
ent ACs can strengthen and maintain investor confidence in financial information 
and markets (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005). Since investor confidence 
in capital markets is a prerequisite for widely available sources of funding and the 
evolution of capitalism and prosperity (Bernstein, 2004), European policymakers 
and firms should have a keen interest in specifying AC design standards that 
strengthen AC effectiveness and corporate legitimacy. 
 However, relatively little is known about the way ACs are designed in conti-
nental Europe. The vast majority of published AC research focuses on ACs within 
Anglo-Saxon corporate governance environments (Bédard and Gendron, 2010).4 
Since interdependencies between organizations and their environments may lead 
to variations in the effectiveness of governance practices (Denis and McConnell, 
2003; Aguilera et al., 2008), it cannot be assumed without further evidence that an 
effective and efficient AC in continental Europe should be designed in the same 
way as for example in the US, UK, or Australia. On the contrary, research indicates 
that parties having a say on AC design should be careful when mimicking AC design 
standards, because cross-national differences have been found to impact the rela-
tionship between AC characteristics and AC effectiveness. In other words, ACs do 
not operate in a vacuum and they cannot be designed and studied properly with-
out regard to the institutional and organizational context in which they function 
(Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
 Europe constitutes an interesting area for studying ACs, because the EU Eighth 
Directive mandates AC formation for listed companies without setting stringent 
rules on how ACs should be designed. Furthermore, the Eighth Directive does not 
indicate how AC design standards should be implemented at the national level. 
Thus, national governance committees and corporate boards enjoy considerable 
                                                                  
3 We define AC design as the implementation and stipulation of AC characteristics that are thought to 
contribute to the committees’ effectiveness or institutional legitimacy. Guzo and Dickson (1996: 334) 
suggest that the design of a group is one out of three primary points of leverage for intervening to 
enhance team effectiveness, the other two points being team processes and context. 
4 The literature review of Bédard and Gendron (2010) shows the research gap regarding ACs in conti-
nental Europe. Out of 103 studies reviewed by the authors, 86 have been conducted in an Anglo-Saxon 
context (Australia, Canada, UK, US, New Zealand), and merely six in a continental European setting.  
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leeway in implementing and extending the standards set by the Eighth Directive. 
Because the historic reliance on ACs as well as the environments in which ACs 
work differ from one country to another in continental Europe, it is interesting to 
study the ebb and flow of differentiation and isomorphism in AC design standards. 
 Specifically, we examine the extent to which the design of corporate ACs in 
continental Europe is driven by regulatory regimes, which foster the establishment 
of isomorphic AC design standards, versus firm- or country-specific forces that 
lead to differentiation in AC design in order to enhance the effectiveness of the 
committee within a specific national or corporate context. By analysing the con-
tents of corporate AC charters and national codes of governance in a multiple 
country setting, we shed light on the way ACs have been designed at the national 
and corporate level in continental Europe after the EU Eighth Directive came into 
effect. Thereby, we provide empirical evidence for isomorphism and differentia-
tion in AC design standards across the EU, on whether coercive pressures for iso-
morphism enacted by the EU Eighth Directive and national codes have been effec-
tively implemented in AC charters, and whether the AC charters contain significant 
boilerplate language as a proxy for mimetic isomorphism. 
 The results presented in this study address calls for AC research outside the 
Anglo-Saxon domain (e.g., DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Carcel-
lo et al., 2011) and contribute to a better understanding of the commonalities and 
differences between governance practices in EU Member States (Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges, 2002). The ongoing discussion about the convergence of corporate gov-
ernance practices in (continental) Europe attracts considerable attention from 
practitioners as well as from the academic community (Becht and Mayer, 2004; 
Collier, 2007; Enriques and Volpin, 2007). By studying the contents of corporate 
AC charters we inform research and practice about firm level convergence in AC 
design and the effectiveness of coercive pressures enacted by the EU Eighth Di-
rective and national codes to establish isomorphism in AC design at the firm level.5 
 Our sample includes the most recent governance codes from six continental 
European countries and the AC charters of 157 firms with a primary listing on the 
respective stock exchanges. The countries featured here are Belgium, France, Ger-
many, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands. To focus our study on relevant AC design 
factors, we make use of AC specific literature reviews by DeZoort et al. (2002) and 
Bédard and Gendron (2010). Both studies identify five potential input factors for 
AC effectiveness: (1) the responsibilities assigned to the AC, (2) the competence of 
                                                                  
5 Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) convincingly argue that it is not enough to study institutional conver-
gence. It is also important to investigate firm-level convergence as well as the relationship between 
institutional and firm-level convergence, in particular in civil law countries, where governance codes 
tend to be more lenient. 
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committee members, (3) the independence of committee members, (4) the size of 
the committee and (5) the meeting frequency of the committee.6 
 This chapter is organized as follows. The next two sections provide infor-
mation on AC design, the institutional setting in continental Europe, and our re-
search questions. Thereafter, we outline the sample and data collection procedures 
employed, followed by content analysis of the EU Eighth Directive, national codes, 
and AC charters. We conclude this chapter with a discussion of the main findings, 
and of the limitations and implications of the study at hand. 
2.2 Designing an audit committee 
Addressing the question of how an AC should be designed has become a central 
theme of corporate governance reform and research. Regulatory authorities on 
both sides of the Atlantic attribute a key role to ACs when it comes to safeguarding 
high quality financial reporting, external auditing and internal control, thereby 
contributing to the perception of ACs as ´guardians of public interest´ (Levitt, 1998; 
Bolkenstein, 2004). Consequently, it does not come as a surprise that ACs may 
serve as a common denominator for investors assessing corporate governance 
quality (Hopt and Leyens, 2004). 
 Due to the importance attributed to ACs for safeguarding investor confidence 
in financial information and markets, parties that have a say on audit committee 
responsibilities, compositions and working procedures should have a keen interest 
in specifying standards that are thought to contribute to committees’ effectiveness 
and to investor confidence in the work of the committee. Prior research shows that 
setting AC standards matters, because differences in AC characteristics may impact 
direct measures of AC performance, like preventing fraud in financial statements 
or the aggressive management of earnings, (e.g., Beasley et al., 2000; Bédard et al., 
2004; Lin and Hwang, 2010), but also choices of participants in the financial mar-
ket (Davidson et al., 2004; DeFond et al., 2005). 
 DeZoort et al. (2002) as well as Bédard and Gendron (2010) have reviewed the 
literature on ACs with the objective of summarizing the input factors of effective 
ACs. Both studies identify five AC characteristics that have been used predomi-
nantly to study AC effectiveness: (1) responsibilities granted to the AC, (2) the 
competences of committee members, (3) AC members’ independence from man-
agement and the company’s affairs, (4) the number of members serving on the AC, 
and (5) the frequency of AC meetings. Bédard and Gendron show that the first 
three AC characteristics have been found to be correlated quite frequently with 
                                                                  
6 Even though in the main the first three input factors have been found in literature to be frequently 
correlated with measures of AC effectiveness, we do not exclude AC size and frequency of meetings 
from our study. The reason is that these findings are based on US data and to date have not been con-
firmed internationally. 
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measures of AC effectiveness, while empirical evidence is less convincing for a 
correlation between AC size or meeting frequency and effectiveness. Regarding AC 
size, Bédard and Gendron find that the proportion of studies finding a negative 
relation to AC effectiveness is almost as high as the proportion reporting a positive 
relation. Consequently, we would expect that parties that have a say on AC design 
place particular emphasis on AC responsibilities, competences and independence 
and are less stringent in setting standards for AC size and meeting frequency. 
 However, setting standards for AC responsibilities, competences and inde-
pendence that can make a difference in terms of AC effectiveness or efficiency is 
neither a simple nor tautological matter. It is not a simple matter because it re-
quires precise answers about the scope of responsibilities to be delegated from the 
board to the AC and the corresponding tasks the committee should assume in ful-
filling these responsibilities; answers are also required about the competences that 
AC members need to bring with them and the number or proportion of committee 
members who should possess these respective competences, and about the num-
ber or proportion of AC members who should be independent from the company’s 
affairs and the criteria used in designating these members as independent. 
 Due to the evolving role of ACs in the corporate governance mosaic, expecta-
tions regarding the scope of responsibilities to be addressed by ACs, as well as 
exigencies regarding AC competences and independence have increased consider-
ably over time (Cohen et al., 2004). ACs have been under constant pressure to in-
crease the scope of their oversight work (Zaman, 2001; Beasley et al., 2009). How-
ever, given the limited time and resources available to ACs, it is critical to deter-
mine the scope of their responsibilities, while keeping in mind that the set of re-
sponsibilities should have an impact on the competences that AC members should 
possess, as well as on the size and meeting frequency of the committee (Lee and 
Stone, 1997; Verschoor, 2008). Moreover, corporate governance scandals have 
increased demand for more independent ACs, leaving standard setters with the 
challenging task of defining the level of AC independence (Bronson et al., 2009). 
 So far, regulators, practitioners and researchers around the world have not yet 
agreed on a generally accepted specification of the five AC design factors described 
here, pointing to the fact that after all, designing an AC is not a tautological matter. 
Evidence from the field of comparative corporate governance indicates that inter-
dependencies between organizations and their environments lead to variations in 
the effectiveness and legitimacy of governance mechanisms and practices (e.g., 
Denis and McConnell, 2003; Khanna et al., 2006; Aguilera et al., 2008). Thus, par-
ties that have a say on AC design should be careful when mimicking AC design 
standards across institutional settings (Bédard and Gendron, 2010). For AC re-
search, this implies that ACs cannot be designed and studied properly without 
regard to the institutional and organizational context in which they function 
(Turley and Zaman, 2004). 
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2.3 The institutional setting in continental Europe 
2.3.1 Audit committees in continental Europe 
In the US, mandating the formation of ACs for listed companies and extending the 
committees’ roles and responsibilities has been an integral part of corporate gov-
ernance reform since the 1940s. In continental Europe, on the other hand, ACs did 
not play an important role in the governance of publicly held companies for most 
of the twentieth century. In 1994, Vanasco published an article entitled ´The Audit 
Committee: An International Perspective´. The article outlines that ACs had become 
important features of publicly owned corporations not only in the US, but also 
internationally. By the early 1990s, ACs were required by statute for public com-
panies in Canada, Israel, and Singapore and were gaining broad acceptance in inter 
alia Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, and the UK. By contrast, in continental 
Europe ACs were still rare at that time (Vanasco, 1994: 23). 
 Shortly after the publication of Vanasco’s article, corporate governance reports 
were issued in France (Viénot, 1995) and the Netherlands (Peters Report, 1997), 
recommending the formation of ACs for listed companies. Sparked by the promo-
tion of the AC concept in France and the Netherlands, the impact of international 
market forces and the increasing interest of authorities and regulators in govern-
ance issues (PriceWaterhouse, 1997), the AC concept gained momentum in conti-
nental Europe. By 2003, the vast majority of corporate governance codes issued in 
Europe included a recommendation for listed companies to establish an AC (Collier 
and Zaman, 2005). 
 However, due to the non-binding nature of these corporate governance codes, 
AC formation remained voluntary for companies listed on continental European 
stock exchanges. Data gathered between 2001 and 2003 in Belgium, France, and 
Spain shows that voluntary AC formation rates were between 50 and 63% 
(Willekens et al., 2004; Piot and Janin, 2007; Ruiz-Barbadillo et al., 2007). Köhler 
(2005) finds higher AC formation rates in Germany, as 29 out of 30 companies 
quoted on the DAX and 39 out of 50 companies quoted on the MDAX had estab-
lished an AC by 2003.7 These numbers illustrate that unlike in many Anglo-Saxon 
countries, establishing an AC was not a standard board practice in Europe at that 
time. 
 This was due to change when the EU Eighth Directive came into effect 17 May 
2006. According to Borchardt (2010, 90), EU directives aim to gradually iron out 
inconsistencies between national regulations so that, as far as possible, the same 
material conditions exist in all member states; this is generally seen as a prerequi-
                                                                  
7 The German Cromme Commission Code, issued in 2002, already required DAX and MDAX constituents 
to disclose, on a ‘comply or explain’ basis, whether they have established an AC. The respective Belgian, 
French and Dutch codes in existence at that time ‘only’ encouraged voluntary disclosure of AC for-
mation. 
25 
site in order to establish a single European market.8 The EU Eighth Directive de-
fines statutory auditing standards for EU Member States. Implementing the stand-
ards defined by the EU Eighth Directive is important for the establishment of a 
single European capital market, because we are concerned with 7,000 listed com-
panies and the need for improving and harmonizing the approximately two million 
statutory audits conducted annually in the EU (Braiotta and Zhou, 2008). 
 One of the key standards stipulated by the EU Eighth Directive is the require-
ment that all public interest entities establish an AC. Interestingly, Article 41 of the 
Eighth Directive requires member states to make sure that listed companies estab-
lish an AC, but it does not set stringent standards on how ACs should be designed 
(see Appendix for excerpts from the EU Eighth Directive). The rationale of the Eu-
ropean Commission for taking this approach is based on the premise that a de-
tailed pan-European corporate governance code that fits well with the varying 
legal frameworks in Europe is more likely to express a negotiated ‘lowest’ common 
denominator of ‘acceptable’ practice, rather than true ‘best practice’ (Weil, Gotshal 
& Manges, 2002: 7). Resulting from the European Commission’s approach of man-
dating AC formation without setting stringent AC design standards, national stand-
ard setters and corporate boards enjoy considerable leeway in defining more 
stringent AC design standards. 
 At the national level in Europe, corporate governance committees provide 
recommendations, in the form of corporate governance codes, regarding the way 
the ACs in the respective country should be designed. Collier and Zaman (2005) 
have analyzed the AC design recommendations of 20 European corporate govern-
ance codes, before the EU Eighth Directive came into effect. Their results show that 
European codes were not consistent in the specification of AC design in terms of 
membership, independence, financial qualification and frequency of meetings. 
Similarly, the ACs’ wider role in financial reporting, external auditor selection, 
internal control, and risk assessment was not always explicitly stated in the codes. 
The authors conclude that the AC concept has been widely accepted in Europe, but 
that there is limited consistency in AC design recommendations at an operational 
level. 
 However, the insights presented by Collier and Zaman concern AC design rec-
ommendations provided by codes of good governance, which are not legally bind-
ing. Since corporate governance codes are non-binding sets of principles, stand-
ards or best practices, adopting their recommendations at firm level is voluntary. 
                                                                  
8 Borchardt (2010: 90) outlines that EU directives are binding on Member States as regards to the 
objectives to be achieved but leave it up to national authorities to decide on how the agreed objective is 
to be incorporated into their domestic legal systems. Thus, EU directives do not supersede national 
laws, but place Member States under the obligation to adapt their laws accordingly. The judgments on 
Francovich and Bonificaci in 1991 shows that the Court of Justice of the European Union does not toler-
ate disadvantages accruing to EU citizens due to non-implementation of EU directives. Both cases were 
brought against Italy for failure to transpose a Directive on the protection of employees in the event of 
the employer’s insolvency. 
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Thus, boards of directors or supervisory boards might decide to design ACs in a 
different manner; that is they have the freedom to specify more stringent, less 
stringent, or different AC design standards than those recommended by the re-
spective code of governance. Willekens et al. (2004) for example find that a sub-
stantial number of Belgian-listed companies did not follow the recommendations 
of the Brussels stock exchange, and Talaulicar and Werder (2008) point out that 
companies can deviate from the recommendation of corporate governance codes 
in order to better incorporate sector and industry-specific requirements. There-
fore, we agree with Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009) that it is important to comple-
ment corporate governance research at the institutional (national) with corporate 
(firm) level studies. 
2.3.2 Isomorphism and differentiation in audit committee design 
One of the key debates in corporate governance research concerns the question 
whether corporate governance practices are becoming homogenous, or whether 
they remain differentiated across countries and firms (Jeffers, 2005; Khanna et al., 
2006; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). The concept that best captures the process 
of homogenization in corporate governance is called isomorphism, which can be 
defined as a constraining process that forces one unit in a population to resemble 
other units that face the same set of environmental conditions (Hawley, 1968). 
 Continental Europe constitutes an interesting setting for studying isomor-
phism in corporate governance practices due to the diversity in institutional set-
tings combined with the common umbrella of the EU and its goal of establishing a 
single European market. In a study conducted on behalf of the European Commis-
sion, the law firm Weil, Gotshal & Manges (2002: 1) outlines that: “The adoption of 
a common European currency, the freer flow of capital, goods, services and people 
across EU borders, the competitive pressures of globalisation, the growth and dif-
fusion of shareholding, and increased merger activity among large European cor-
porations and stock exchanges, all create tremendous interest on behalf of Europe-
an issuers and investors, Member States and the European Commission in under-
standing the commonalities and differences between national corporate govern-
ance practices, and any related barriers to the development of a single EU capital 
market”. Consequently, we study the following research question regarding the 
degree of isomorphism and differentiation in AC design standards in continental 
Europe: 
RQ1a: To what extent are AC design standards as set in corporate governance codes 
and AC charters isomorphic and to what extent differentiated in continental 
Europe? 
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In searching for theories that can explain the degree of differentiation and isomor-
phism in AC design standards, we find that most scholars refer to efficiency and 
institutional theory when explaining the adoption of new practices within a social 
system (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Tolbert and Zucker, 1983; Strang and Macy, 
2001). Efficiency theory considers organizations as rational actors, and points to 
the gains in effectiveness or efficiency following the adoption of a new practice 
(Thompson, 1967). Institutional theorists, in turn, outline that organizations com-
pete not just for resources and customers, but also for political power and legiti-
macy and consequently become captives of the institutional environment in which 
they exist (Carroll and Delacroix, 1982; Zattoni and Cuomo, 2008). 
 In their seminal paper on what makes organizations similar, DiMaggio and 
Powell (1983) establish three kinds of institutional isomorphic change: coercive, 
mimetic, and normative isomorphism.9 Coercive isomorphism comes about as the 
result of external regulatory-type pressures for organizational convergence (Cohen 
et al., 2008). Coercive isomorphism pressures in Europe primarily stem from EU 
bodies and national corporate governance committees aiming to harmonize gov-
ernance practices on a pan-European and on a national level, respectively. If these 
pressures are strong enough, we would expect that national corporate governance 
committees and boards of directors implement the minimum AC design require-
ments set by the EU Eighth Directive and that boards of directors follow the rec-
ommendations of the respective governance code. To study the degree to which 
coercive pressures from the European Commission and national corporate gov-
ernance committees are effective, we address the following research questions: 
RQ2a: Are AC design requirements of the EU Eighth Directive implemented in na-
tional corporate governance codes (coercive isomorphism: Eighth Directive – 
CG codes)? 
RQ2b: Are AC design recommendations provided by the EU Eighth Directive imple-
mented in corporate AC charters (coercive isomorphism: Eighth Directive – AC 
charters)? 
RQ2c: Are AC design recommendations given by national codes of governance im-
plemented in corporate AC charters (coercive isomorphism: CG codes – AC 
charters)? 
However, not only coercive forces shape the adoption of organizational practices, 
but also pressures for mimetic isomorphism. Uncertainty and goal ambiguity is a 
                                                                  
9 Normative pressures for institutional isomorphism primarily stem from professional associations 
(Galaskiewicz, 1985). We do not study the degree of normative isomorphism in the context of AC design 
standards in continental Europe, due to the absence of professional associations like the American 
Institute of CPAs (AICPA) or the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW). 
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powerful force for imitation and mimetic isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell, 
1983). Since ACs have historically been an Anglo-Saxon corporate governance 
mechanism, not firmly established in continental Europe, we expect certain levels 
of uncertainty regarding AC design. The aim of the EU Eighth Directive is to set 
minimum AC design standards and leave member states and corporate boards 
considerable leeway to develop AC design standards that reflect national institu-
tional as well as firm-specific considerations. As a response to uncertainty and AC 
goal ambiguity, corporate governance committees and corporate boards in conti-
nental Europe may model themselves and follow a ‘copy and paste’ approach to AC 
design. Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012) point out that unoriginal material in form 
of boilerplate information in codes and charters is a natural response to uncertain-
ty and mimetic isomorphism.10 Thus, convergence in the language used in corpo-
rate AC charters can be seen as a sign of mimetic isomorphism. In order to study 
the presence of mimetic isomorphism in AC design across continental Europe, we 
investigate whether boilerplate language is used when setting AC design stand-
ards. 
RQ3: Do corporations in continental Europe resort to unoriginal, boilerplate type 
language in AC charters consistent with mimetic isomorphic pressures (mi-
metic isomorphism)? 
By addressing these research questions we aim to contribute to academic litera-
ture and inform practice by shedding light on the establishment of AC design 
standards in continental Europe. We add to literature in the field of comparative 
corporate governance by providing evidence for differentiation and isomorphism 
in relevant AC design standards throughout continental Europe. For parties that 
have a say on AC design, we offer interesting evidence whether the coercive pres-
sures of the EU Eighth Directive and national codes have been effectively imple-
mented in corporate AC charters. We complete our analysis regarding AC design 
standards in continental Europe by providing evidence for the degree of boiler-
plate language in AC charters as a proxy for mimetic isomorphism. 
2.4 Methodology 
In order to study the way ACs are designed in continental Europe and to address 
the research questions we analyze the contents of the EU Eighth Directive, corpo-
rate governance codes and corporate AC charters. We analyze publicly available, 
front-stage information regarding AC design matters, because structural parame-
ters can play a major role in shaping the authority, composition and practices of 
                                                                  
10 “Boilerplate” is defined by the American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language as “inconse-
quential, formulaic, or stereotypical language”. 
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ACs. After all, empirical and anecdotal evidence suggests that society cannot rely 
solely on market mechanisms and that some form of regulation is necessary (Kirk-
bride and Letza, 2004). AC charters indicate how corporations have formally 
adopted authoritative guidance in designing their AC. Although these documents 
do not necessarily reflect actual AC activity, they can provide power and legitimacy 
to AC members and signal the committees’ responsibilities to external parties 
(Greene and Falk, 1979; Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993). Thus, AC charters constitute 
relevant data for researchers (Bédard and Gendron, 2010) and for the objectives of 
the study at hand. 
 For comparative purposes, we limit the scope of this study to the following six 
continental European countries: Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the 
Netherlands.11 Continental Europe constitutes an interesting setting for studying 
the adoption of AC design standards outside the Anglo-Saxon corporate govern-
ance domain, due to the dichotomy between the two institutional settings in terms 
of corporate governance systems and practices (e.g., Becht and Mayer, 2003; 
Clarke, 2007). Accordingly, we exclude the UK and Ireland from the scope of this 
research. We retrieved the latest corporate governance codes issued in the six 
countries selected for the purpose of this study from the ECGI website 
(http://www.ecgi.org). Table 2.1 details the codes analyzed. We outline per code: 
the type of issuer, the compliance mechanism used, whether the code requires or 
recommends that companies disclose an audit committee charter. 
 As specified in Table 2.1, five out of the six codes featured here rely on a man-
datory disclosure requirement to encourage compliance. The so-called “comply or 
explain” principle used by these codes implies that companies falling within the 
scope of the code are required to publicly explain non-compliance with the codes’ 
recommendations. However, the comply or explain principle does not apply to all 
recommendations given by the respective codes. The word “shall” implies that 
companies need to publicly explain deviations from the respective code recom-
mendation, while the term “should” means they can deviate from the recommenda-
tion without further explanation. The Belgian and Spanish codes state that compa-
nies should disclose an AC charter, while the Dutch code requires that companies 
shall make an AC charter available on their website. The French, German, and Ital-
ian codes give no recommendations for establishing an AC charter at the time of 
this study. 
 In order to study the contents of corporate AC charters, we selected the main 
stock market index of the countries featured in this study as our sample. Conse-
quently, our primary research population for conducting a content analysis of cor-
porate AC charters constitutes all corporations included in the following stock 
market indices: BEL20, CAC40, DAX30, FTSE MIB40, IBEX-35 and AEX25. This 
provided an initial sample of 190 corporations. We excluded all corporations with 
                                                                  
11 These countries are selected based on the number of constituents in the FTSE EURO 100 index and 
represented 93% of the index constituents at the time of this study.  
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a cross listing either in the UK or US due to the specific requirements regarding AC 
design for corporations cross-listed on Anglo-Saxon stock exchanges. Moreover, 
double counting of European cross listings was prevented. The final sample con-
tained 157 corporations.12 In June 2010, we retrieved the most recent AC charters 
from the respective corporate websites, and annual or corporate governance re-
ports. 
 To address our research questions, we apply content analysis techniques to the 
EU Eighth Directive, national corporate governance codes and corporate AC char-
ters. This allows us to study the degree of isomorphism and differentiation in AC 
design standards throughout continental Europe (RQ1) as well as the effectiveness 
of the coercive pressures for isomorphism enacted by the Eighth Directive (RQ2a & 
RQ2b) and national corporate governance codes (RQ2c). To analyze the degree of 
unoriginal language in AC charters we employ content analysis software designed 
to discriminate between original and unoriginal material in narrative documents. 
In line with Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012) we use the web-based artificial intelli-
gence program SafeAssign (2011) to address RQ3.13 
 
  
                                                                  
12 For the content analysis regarding AC responsibilities we used ‘human-scored schemes’. A drawback 
compared to ‘word-count’ or ‘artificial intelligence measurement of disclosure’ based approaches is that 
human scoring requires considerable effort, and thus limits our sample size to 157 observations. How-
ever, we chose this approach as it provides comparatively high validity in the context of this research 
(e.g., Conway, 2006). 
13 Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012) used the predecessor of SafeAssign called Mydropbox to analyze the 
level of boilerplate language in codes of ethics. The analysis is based on a comparison of a given docu-
ment with a database composed of publicly available Internet documents and body of literature indexed 
by the ProQuest ABI/Inform database, institutional documents archives, and a Global Reference Data-
base (see www.safeassign.com). Thus, sample charters are compared against the text indexed by these 
sources, as well as the charters that were submitted for all other sample firms. 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
1:
 In
for
ma
tio
n s
ou
rce
s a
nd
 sa
mp
le 
AC
 de
sig
n l
ev
el:
Pa
n-
Eu
ro
pe
an
 le
ve
l
N
at
io
na
l l
ev
el
 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
le
ve
l 
In
fo
rm
at
io
n 
so
ur
ce
: 
Th
e 
Ei
gh
th
 E
U 
Co
m
pa
ny
 L
aw
 D
ir
ec
tiv
e
Co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 co
de
 (y
ea
r)
[Is
su
er
, c
om
pl
ia
nc
e 
m
ec
ha
ni
sm
, d
isc
lo
su
re
 o
f A
C 
ch
ar
te
r]
 
Co
rp
or
at
e 
AC
 ch
ar
te
rs
 
Sa
m
pl
e:
 In
de
x 
 
(c
on
st
itu
en
ts
/o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
) 
Be
lgi
um
Eu
rop
ea
n U
nio
n E
igh
th 
Co
mp
an
y L
aw
 
Dir
ect
ive
, D
ire
cti
ve
 20
06
/4
3/
EC
 of
 th
e 
Eu
rop
ea
n P
arl
iam
en
t a
nd
 Co
un
cil
 (2
00
6)
 
Th
e B
elg
ian
 Co
de
 on
 Co
rp
ora
te 
Go
ve
rn
an
ce 
(20
09
) 
- P
riv
ate
 fo
un
da
tio
n, 
co
mp
ly 
or
 ex
pla
in 
 
- A
C c
ha
rte
r: R
eco
mm
en
de
d (
‘sh
ou
ld’
), i
nc
l. d
isc
los
ur
e 
BE
L (
20
/1
7)
Fra
nc
e
Co
rp
ora
te 
Go
ve
rn
an
ce 
Co
de
 of
 lis
ted
 Co
rp
ora
tio
n (
20
08
) 
- F
ren
ch
 Bu
sin
ess
 Co
nfe
de
rat
ion
, vo
lun
tar
y d
isc
los
ur
e 
- A
C c
ha
rte
r: N
ot 
rec
om
me
nd
ed
 
CA
C (
40
/3
5)
Ge
rm
an
y
Ge
rm
an
 Co
rp
ora
te 
Go
ve
rn
an
ce 
Co
de
 (2
01
0) 
- G
ov
ern
me
nta
l C
om
mi
ssi
on
, co
mp
ly 
or 
ex
pla
in 
 
- A
C c
ha
rte
r: N
ot 
rec
om
me
nd
ed
 
DA
X (
30
/2
4)
Ita
ly 
Co
rp
ora
te 
Go
ve
rn
an
ce 
Co
de
 (2
00
6)
- C
om
mi
tte
e r
ela
ted
 to
 st
oc
k e
xch
an
ge
, co
mp
ly 
or
 ex
pla
in 
 
- A
C c
ha
rte
r: N
ot 
rec
om
me
nd
ed
 
FT
SE
 M
IB 
(40
/3
5)
Sp
ain
 
Un
ifie
d G
oo
d G
ov
ern
an
ce 
Co
de
 (2
00
6)
- G
ov
ern
me
nta
l C
om
mi
ssi
on
, co
mp
ly 
or 
ex
pla
in 
 
- A
C c
ha
rte
r: R
eco
mm
en
de
d (
‘sh
ou
ld’
) 
IBE
X (
35
/3
3)
Th
e N
eth
erl
an
ds
Du
tch
 Co
rp
ora
te 
Go
ve
rn
an
ce 
Co
de
 (2
00
8) 
- G
ov
ern
me
nta
l C
om
mi
ssi
on
, d
isc
los
ur
e (
ap
ply
 or
 ex
pla
in)
,  
- A
C c
ha
rte
r: R
eq
uir
ed
 (‘s
ha
ll’)
, in
cl. 
dis
clo
su
re 
AE
X (
25
/1
3)
35 
32 
2.5 Empirical findings 
The following discussion of the empirical results is based on the five AC character-
istics that have been studied predominantly by prior research about audit commit-
tee effectiveness (DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard and Gendron, 2010). For each char-
acteristic, we provide a comparative discussion about the requirements of the EU 
Eighth Directive, the recommendations of national corporate governance codes, 
and the contents of the sample AC charters. At the end of each sub-section we 
briefly summarize the main findings. 
2.5.1 Audit committee responsibilities 
When it comes to AC design, it is important to decide what scope of responsibilities 
should be delegated from the board to the AC, and which tasks the AC should per-
form to effectively discharge these responsibilities. Defining the responsibilities of 
the AC in the form of a charter is viewed as being important, because AC members 
demand clarity about the scope of responsibilities they need to address and the 
power to carry out these responsibilities (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; DeZoort, 
1997). Bédard et al. (2004) and Abbott et al. (2007) provide empirical evidence 
that inscribing responsibilities in AC charters can contribute to AC effectiveness. 
Besides contributing to committee effectiveness, accurate AC charters enable the 
public to form expectations about what the AC can accomplish (Greene and Falk, 
1979). 
 Table 2.2 summarizes the contents of the EU Eighth Directive, continental Eu-
ropean corporate governance codes and AC charters regarding the responsibilities 
to be addressed by ACs. First, we list a total of seven responsibilities that, accord-
ing to the Eighth Directive should be addressed by every AC in the EU. For each 
country featured in this research we indicate whether the latest corporate govern-
ance code recommends that ACs assume the respective responsibility (demarcated 
by ‘X’) and the percentage of AC charters that were analyzed stating that the AC 
addresses the respective responsibility (noted by ‘%’). 
 By analyzing the contents of the governance codes and AC charters in our 
sample, we identified an extended number of AC responsibilities that were not 
explicitly mentioned by the EU Eighth Directive, but in one or more corporate gov-
ernance codes and AC charters. For illustrative purposes we classified these re-
sponsibilities into the more general fields of activity ‘external audit and reporting’, 
‘internal audit’, and ‘compliance and governance related’. These categorisation 
schemes follow prior clustering of AC responsibilities used in audit committee 
literature (e.g., Wolnizer; 1995; DeZoort, 1997; Carcello et al., 2002). 
 We show additional descriptive figures at the bottom of Table 2.2. First, we 
outline per country the total number of AC responsibilities recommended by the 
respective corporate governance code as well as the average number of responsi-
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bilities disclosed in the AC charters studied. We also show the average disclosure 
rate in AC charters for the responsibilities required by the Eighth Directive and for 
those responsibilities recommended by the applicable governance code. These 
figures indicate the scope of responsibility assigned to ACs in the respective coun-
tries as well as the degree of implementation of the Eighth Directive and of nation-
al corporate governance provisions in AC charters. 
 A number of key findings can be derived from the results presented in Table 
2.2. First, when comparing these responsibilities with prior research on AC re-
sponsibilities conducted in an Anglo-Saxon context (Green, 1994; Carcello et al., 
2002; Walker, 2004), we find that the responsibilities assigned to continental Eu-
ropean ACs closely resemble those identified by prior studies focusing on the An-
glo-Saxon context. We can also confirm the observation of prior research that the 
scope of AC oversight has expanded well beyond oversight over external reporting 
and the external auditing process, towards more oversight responsibilities in the 
area of internal governance of corporations (e.g., Beasley et al., 2009). 
 Second, the scope of responsibilities assigned to ACs in continental European 
differs substantially between the countries studied. Our results indicate that ACs of 
Belgian, Spanish and Dutch-listed corporations are directed to address significant-
ly more responsibilities than their French, German and Italian counterparts. The 
differences in the scope of responsibilities assigned to ACs between the six coun-
tries are most evident when contrasting the findings of the German with the Dutch 
sub-sample. We identify a total of 20 separate AC responsibilities in the Dutch code 
and the average number of responsibilities disclosed in the AC charters is 17.5. For 
Germany, in turn, we find that the German code recommends 11 separate AC re-
sponsibilities and the average number of disclosed responsibilities in AC charters 
is 7.4. 
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The differences in AC scope between the two groups of countries is primarily driv-
en by the fact that ACs of Belgian, Spanish and Dutch-listed corporations are ex-
pected to address more responsibilities in the areas of internal auditor oversight 
as well as compliance and governance related responsibilities. More specifically, 
the Spanish and Dutch corporate governance codes recommend an extended set of 
AC responsibilities, including for example oversight over compliance with internal 
policies, whistleblowing arrangements, IT/IS security and corporate tax planning. 
From the content analysis data presented in Table 2.2 we conclude that four years 
after the EU Eighth Directive came into effect, authoritative opinion about the 
scope of responsibilities to be addressed by ACs differs throughout Europe. The 
differences in the recommended scope of AC responsibilities given by the national 
codes are reflected in the responsibilities formally assigned to ACs by means of 
their charter. 
 Third, we can compare the required responsibilities as stated in the EU Eighth 
Directive and the recommended responsibilities of the corporate governance 
codes with the disclosure rate in AC charters. By comparing the average disclosure 
rates in AC charters with the respective governance code and the Eighth Directive 
we analyse the effectiveness of the coercive pressures for isomorphism in AC de-
sign enacted by pan-European and national standards. We find comparatively high 
average disclosure rates for the seven responsibilities stipulated by the Eighth 
Directive for AC charters from the Netherlands (91%), Belgium (82%) and Spain 
(78%). For the German, French and Italian charters we find lower average disclo-
sure rates of 59% to 61%. The disclosure rates of the AC responsibilities recom-
mended by the national corporate governance codes featured in this research in 
corporate AC charter range from 83% for the Netherlands to 54% for the French 
and Italian sub-samples. 
 To summarize, we find that the scope of responsibilities formally assigned to 
audit committees varies substantially in continental Europe, at both the national 
and corporate level. Corporate governance codes issued in Spain and the Nether-
lands recommend that audit committees address a relatively broad scope of re-
sponsibilities. Codes recently issued in France, Italy and in particular Germany, in 
turn, indicate fewer responsibilities that should be addressed by audit committees. 
The average number of responsibilities disclosed in the charters show that inter 
country differences in AC scope also hold at the corporate level. The requirements 
given by the EU Eighth Directive regarding the responsibilities to be addressed by 
audit committees have been implemented in the corporate governance codes. 
However, the average disclosure rates in the audit committee charters for the re-
sponsibilities required by the Eighth Directive and for those recommended by the 
respective codes are, with the exception of the Netherlands, fairly low in most of 
the countries. This holds in particular for the French, German and Italian sub-
samples, with disclosure rates ranging from 54% to 61%. 
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2.5.2 Competences required of audit committee members 
The qualifications of AC members should follow logically from their assigned re-
sponsibilities (Pomeranz, 1997). In light of the expanding scope of responsibilities 
to be addressed by ACs, it is interesting to see which competences are required 
from AC members. Regulation and research on AC competences differentiates be-
tween AC members having sufficient knowledge in terms of financial literacy vs. AC 
members who are financial experts (Bédard et al., 2004). Furthermore, prior re-
search shows that not only functional knowledge of financial reporting or account-
ing, but also corporate governance experience as well as firm-specific knowledge 
can contribute to AC effectiveness (e.g., DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Carcello and 
Neal, 2003; Bédard et al., 2004). 
 We have analysed the EU Eighth Directive, the governance codes and the AC 
charters in our sample regarding the level of competence required from AC mem-
bers, the area in which the competence should be, as well as the proportion of AC 
members who should hold the respective competence. When studying the level of 
competence we differentiate between financial literacy vs. being a financial expert 
and the proportion of AC members who should possess the respective competence 
level (all; majority; minority). Concerning the scope of competence required from 
AC members, we distinguish between AC charters indicating that the AC should 
possess functional competence in finance, accounting or auditing and those requir-
ing additional competences in compliance, risk management or internal control, 
governance experience, and industry/firm-specific knowledge. 
 The EU Eighth Directive states that at least one member of the AC should have 
competence in accounting and/or auditing. Table 2.3 outlines the recommenda-
tions of the corporate governance codes we have analyzed. Continental European 
corporate governance codes define AC competence as expertise in financial mat-
ters (Belgium); competence in finance or accounting (France); specialist 
knowledge and experience in the application of financial accounting principles and 
internal control processes (Germany); relevant experience in accounting and fi-
nance (Italy); knowledge and background in accounting, auditing and risk man-
agement (Spain); and being a financial expert (the Netherlands). 
 As expected, the recommendations of the different national codes are not com-
pletely different from each other. However, when taking a closer look it becomes 
clear that both level of competence (background, knowledge, experience, expertise 
or being an expert) as well as the competence subject (accounting, auditing, fi-
nance, internal control, and risk management) differ among the six corporate gov-
ernance codes. The recommendations given by the codes also differ on another 
dimension, namely the number of AC members who should possess the relevant 
competence. The German, Italian and Dutch corporate governance codes recom-
mend that at least one member possesses the relevant competence. According to 
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the German code, this should be the chairman. The French and Spanish codes, in 
turn, recommend that all members bring with them the indicated competences. 
 We also analysed the contents of the AC charters in our sample regarding the 
competences that committee members should possess. As outlined in Table 2.4, 
the number of charters that require AC members to possess additional competenc-
es, on top of finance, accounting and auditing is limited. 30% of the Spanish and 
13% of the German charters we analyzed require competence in risk management 
and in internal control processes, respectively. Experience in corporate govern-
ance or firm-specific knowledge is mentioned in only three of the 157 charters we 
have analyzed as a prerequisite for serving on the AC. 
 Table 2.4 shows that a large percentage of the charters studied here do not 
disclose any competence requirements. This is striking given the requirement of 
the EU Eighth Directive and the recommendations of national codes that one or 
more AC members need to possess certain competences, and evidence from prior 
research about the importance of AC competences for AC effectiveness (Bédard 
and Gendron, 2010; Lin and Hwang, 2010). 
 In summary, we find that the requirement of the EU Eighth Directive that one 
AC member should possess relevant competences has been implemented in the six 
corporate governance codes studied. However, the codes differ in content when it 
comes to spelling out the required competences to serve on the AC and how many 
members should posses the respective competences. Most striking, we find that an 
elevated percentage of the corporate charters studied do not disclose any compe-
tence specifications for AC members at the time of this study. This holds in particu-
lar for the French and German sub-samples. 
2.5.3 Audit committee independence 
When AC members are independent, chances are higher that they will carry out 
their responsibilities in an unbiased manner and critically review results present-
ed to them (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). In line with prior studies we analyse the 
degree of independence of individual AC members and the proportion of inde-
pendent members on the AC (see Bédard and Gendron, 2010). We differentiate 
between non-executive directors (NEDs) and independent non-executive directors 
(INEDs). Concerning the proportion of NEDs/INEDs, we distinguish between ‘all 
members’, ‘the majority’ or the ‘minority’ being independent. Due to the specific 
role of the chairman of the AC, we also analyse whether the chairman of the AC 
should be a non-executive or an independent non-executive director. 
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Table 2.4: AC charter analysis 
Country 
Observations 
Belgium
17 
France
35 
Germany
24 
Italy
35 
Spain 
33 
Netherlands 
13 
Competences 
Expert 
 All members 
 Majority 
 One member 
 Not disclosed 
 
Knowledge/ experience 
 All members 
 Majority 
 One member 
 Not disclosed 
 
Competence domain 
 Finance, accounting, auditing  
  and additional competences*  
  and governance expertise 
  and firm-specific knowledge 
 Not disclosed 
 
 18%  
 6% 
 18% 
 59% 
 
 
 47%  
 18%  
 12%  
 24% 
 
 
 82% 
 12% 
 6%  
 0%  
 18% 
 
 0% 
 0% 
 9% 
 91% 
 
 
 31% 
 3% 
 0% 
 66% 
 
 
 23% 
 0% 
 0% 
 0% 
 77% 
  
 0%  
 0%  
 29%  
 71% 
 
 
 25%  
 0%  
 0%  
 75% 
 
 
 21% 
 13% 
 0% 
 0% 
 79% 
  
 0% 
 6%  
 20%  
 74% 
 
  
 40% 
 3% 
 14% 
 43% 
 
 
 37% 
 3% 
 3% 
 0% 
 63% 
  
 0% 
 0% 
 30%  
 70% 
 
  
 55% 
 0%  
 12%  
 33% 
 
 
 52% 
 30% 
 0% 
 3% 
 48% 
 
  
 0% 
 0%  
 42% 
 58% 
 
  
 100%  
 0% 
 0%  
 0% 
 
 
 100% 
 8%  
 0% 
 0% 
 0% 
 
Independence 
INEDs 
 All members INEDs 
 Majority INEDs 
 Minority INEDs 
 Not disclosed 
 
NEDs 
 All members NEDs 
 Majority NEDs 
 Not disclosed 
 
Chairman 
 Independent 
 Non-executive chairman 
 Not disclosed 
  
 12% 
 41% 
 29%  
 18% 
 
 
 82%  
 0%  
 18% 
 
 
 29%  
 53% 
 18% 
  
 0% 
 46%  
 0%  
 54% 
 
 
 6%  
 0% 
 94% 
 
 
 6% 
 0% 
 94% 
  
 4% 
 4% 
 0% 
 92% 
 
 
 4% 
 0%  
 96% 
 
 
 8%  
 4% 
 88% 
  
 17% 
 34% 
 0% 
 49% 
 
 
 54% 
 9% 
 37% 
 
 
 34% 
 26% 
 40% 
  
 12% 
 27%  
 33% 
 28% 
 
 
 79%  
 21%  
 0% 
 
 
 67%  
 33%  
 0% 
 
  
 38% 
 62%  
 0% 
 0% 
 
 
 38% 
 62% 
 0% 
 
 
 0% 
 100%  
 0% 
Size 
 Min. 2 members 
 Min. 3 members 
 Min. 4 members 
 Min. 5 members 
 Min. 6 or more 
 Min. not disclosed 
 
 Max. 5 members 
 Max. 6 or 7 members 
 Max. not disclosed 
 0%  
 65% 
 18% 
 0% 
 0% 
 18% 
 
0% 
 0% 
 100% 
 0% 
 29% 
 11% 
 3% 
 0% 
 57% 
 
 0%  
 6% 
 94% 
 0%  
 0% 
 17%  
 25%  
 17%  
 42% 
 
 0%  
 0% 
 100% 
 0% 
 43%  
 6% 
 6% 
 3%  
 43% 
 
 0% 
 0%  
 100% 
 0% 
 91%  
 9%  
 0%  
 0% 
 0% 
 
 55%  
 24%  
 21% 
 
 31% 
 69% 
 0% 
 0% 
 0% 
 0% 
 
 0%  
 0% 
 100% 
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Country 
Observations 
Belgium
17 
France
35 
Germany
24 
Italy
35 
Spain 
33 
Netherlands 
13 
Meeting 
 Frequency 
 Min. of 2 meetings 
 Min. of 3 meetings 
 Min. of 4 meetings 
 Min. of 5 or 6 meetings 
 Not disclosed 
 
 Private meetings 
 External/ internal auditor  
 Not disclosed 
  
 0% 
 24%  
 65% 
 0% 
 12% 
 
 
 77%**
 23% 
  
 9%  
 3% 
 20% 
 3%  
 65% 
 
 
 80%**
 20% 
 
0% 
0% 
13% 
 0% 
 87% 
 
 
 11%** 
 89% 
  
 6%  
 3% 
 23%  
 9% 
 59% 
 
 
 49%** 
 51% 
  
 3%  
 3%  
 70%  
 0%  
 24% 
 
 
 0% 
 100% 
 
  
 23%  
 15% 
 62% 
 0% 
 0% 
 
 
 100% 
 0% 
* Compliance, or internal control, or risk management. 
** AC may hold private meetings with the external or internal auditor if deemed necessary. 
 
According to the EU Eighth Directive, at least one member of the AC must be inde-
pendent. The corporate governance codes studied here have adopted this pan-
European requirement, but differ in their recommendations on how many AC 
members should be non-executives and how many independent. The German code 
specifies that the chairman of the audit committee should be independent and not 
chair the supervisory board. All other codes give more stringent recommendations 
regarding AC independence. The Belgian and French codes state that all AC mem-
bers should be non-executive and the majority of them independent. The Spanish 
code gives the same recommendations regarding the number of non-executives on 
the AC and notes that at least the chairman of the audit committee should be inde-
pendent. The Dutch code states that one member may not be independent. The 
recommendations given on the matter of AC independence by European codes, 
thus, can be contrasted with the NYSE listing rules (2003) and the UK Combined 
Code (2003), which require and recommend that all AC members be independent 
directors. 
 Regarding the AC charters analyzed, a large percentage do not contain any 
requirements regarding the independence of AC members. This holds in particular 
for the sample firms from Germany (92% non-disclosure), France (54% non-
disclosure) and Italy (49% non-disclosure). Non-disclosure rates for Spanish and 
Belgian charters are considerably lower, with 28% and 18%, respectively. Only the 
sub-sample from the Netherlands stands out with a 100% disclosure rate regard-
ing AC independence. 38% of the Dutch charters stated that all AC members should 
be INEDs, while the remaining 62% required that the majority of the AC should be 
INEDs. In the other countries, fewer or no charters indicate that all AC members 
should be independent (< 20% in Italy, Belgium, Spain; 4% in Germany; 0% in 
France). In addition to the large proportion of charters with non-disclosure on the 
issue of independence of AC members, we find that most charters (except those 
from France and Germany) require that the majority of AC members are NEDs. 
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To summarize, we find substantial variation in the stipulations given by the six 
corporate governance codes on how many AC members should be independent. 
The same holds for the AC charters studied. Dutch corporations require that either 
the majority or all AC members are independent. Approximately one-third of the 
Belgian and Spanish-listed corporations studied only require the minority of AC 
members to be independent. Once again, it is most striking that the requirements 
of the EU Eighth Directive have effectively been implemented in corporate govern-
ance codes, but not in the AC charters for some of the countries studied. Specifical-
ly, we find an elevated percentage of charters from German, French and Italian 
firms not disclosing any independence requirements for AC members. 
2.5.4 Audit committee size 
The benefits of larger ACs in terms of additional expertise and manpower should 
be weighed against the incremental costs of poorer communication, coordination, 
and decision-making associated with larger groups (Bédard and Gendron, 2010). 
Consequently, the answer to the question of how many members should serve on 
an AC is dependent on a trade-off between more resources and poorer coordina-
tion. After all, one of the primary advantages behind forming specialized board 
sub-committees is that certain issues can be addressed more effectively and effi-
ciently in smaller, more specialized teams. Board sub-committees can act more 
swiftly than an entire board of directors or supervisory board (McMullen, 1974). 
 Prior research indicates that regulators should be careful in specifying strin-
gent AC size standards, due to empirical evidence for a negative relation between 
AC size and measures of AC effectiveness (e.g., Karamanou and Vafeas. 2005). Con-
sequently, regulators typically set a minimum AC size, instead of determining ex-
actly how many members should serve on the AC. The benchmark seems to be 
three members, which is the minimum AC size recommended by most European 
codes studied by Collier and Zaman (2005). 
 Our content analysis shows that neither the Eighth Directive nor the German, 
French or Dutch corporate governance codes specify or recommend how many 
members should serve on an AC. The Belgian, Italian and Spanish governance 
codes, in turn, recommend that the AC should be composed of at least three mem-
bers. Most AC charters in our sample do not set an exact AC size, but set a mini-
mum of three or four members. Interestingly, we find 31% of the Dutch AC char-
ters in our sample set the minimum AC size at two members, while 42% of the 
German AC charters stipulate that the minimum AC size should be five or six mem-
bers, which is clearly above what is generally considered to the norm, but related 
to the German system of co-determination and the requirement of having employ-
ee representatives on the AC. Furthermore, we find that 79% of Spanish AC char-
ters set a maximum size of five to seven AC members, which reflects research evi-
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dence about an inverted U-shaped relations between group size and effectiveness 
(Cohen and Bailey, 1997). 
2.5.5 Audit committee meetings 
Even though prior research indicates that the frequency of AC meetings can be 
associated with AC effectiveness (Abbott et al., 2004), it is not clear how often ACs 
should meet (Sharma et al., 2009). Sharma et al. observe that corporate govern-
ance guidelines are by and large silent on the issue of AC meeting frequency. As 
Collier and Zaman (2005) point out in their study of European governance codes, 
75% of the codes they analyzed did not give any guidance on how often the AC 
should meet per year. Our analysis shows that this situation has not changed. The 
EU Eighth Directive does not state how often ACs should meet. The only corporate 
governance code in our sample that does specify the number of AC meetings is the 
Belgian corporate governance code, which recommends that the AC should meet at 
least four times per year. The content analysis of the AC charters in our sample 
shows that a minimum of four meetings per year is set in most Belgian, Spanish 
and Dutch AC charters. As outlined in Table 2.4, we find a high percentage of non-
disclosure in the German, French and Italian AC charters - 87%, 65% and 59%, 
respectively. 
 In addition to meeting frequency, we have also analyzed whether the AC 
should hold any private or special meetings with the external auditor. Meetings 
between the AC and the external and internal auditor without management being 
present are increasingly seen as ‘best practice’, at least in the US (e.g., Raghunan-
dan et al., 2001; Carcello et al., 2002). Table 2.3 outlines that three of the six gov-
ernance codes studied recommend some sort of private AC meetings. However, the 
Dutch code is the only governance code, which explicitly states that the AC meets 
privately with the external auditors. The Belgian code recommends that the AC 
meet at least twice a year with the external and internal auditors, but does not 
explicitly state that these meeting should take place without management. 
 The codes’ recommendations (or absence of recommendations) are reflected 
in the AC charters we studied. All Dutch charters state that private meetings be-
tween the AC and the external auditor must take place at least once a year. We also 
find a high percentage of Belgian and French ACs, which may hold private meetings 
with the external or internal auditor without the management being present. Most 
German and Spanish AC charters do not disclose whether the AC should meet with 
the external or internal auditor in private meetings. 
2.5.6 Mimetic isomorphism in audit committee charters 
To provide evidence for mimetic isomorphism in AC charters we study the per-
centage of unoriginal content in AC charters. Table 2.5 shows the percentage of 
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unoriginal content in a sample of 78 European AC charters as detected by the pro-
gram SafeAssign.14 A number of key findings can be derived from Table 2.5. 
 
Table 2.5: Percentage of AC charters composed of boilerplate 
Observations Total sample Belgium France Germany Italy Spain Netherlands 
 78 13 13 13 13 13 13 
Mean 41% 33% 37% 39% 29% 38% 69% 
Median 31% 26% 23% 40% 28% 35%  72% 
Minimum 8% 19% 8% 12% 10% 12% 20% 
Maximum 100% 100% 100% 88% 62% 87% 100% 
66% - 100% 15 1 2 3 0 2 7 
 
First, the average percentage of unoriginal content in 78 AC charters detected by 
the program SafeAssign is 41%.15 However, the AC charters in our sample exhibit 
high variability in unoriginal content, ranging from just 8% to 100%. Table 2.5 
outlines that 15 AC charters display high levels of boilerplate language (66% - 
100%). Of these, seven are from the Dutch sub-sample. When comparing the aver-
age percentage of boilerplate language in AC charters among the six countries 
studied, it can be seen that the Dutch sub-sample shows significantly more evi-
dence for convergence in language than do the other five countries featured in this 
research. The average percentage of unoriginal language in the charters from the 
Netherlands is 69%, compared with 29% to 39% in the other countries studied. 
 Thus, AC charters from the Dutch sub-sample display the highest level of im-
plementation of AC design standards given by the Eighth Directive and the respec-
tive national code, while also containing the most unoriginal content. In fact, the 
Dutch corporate governance code is the only code studied that requires companies 
to publish an AC charter on their corporate website on a ´comply or explain´ basis. 
This implies that firms listed in the Netherlands need to justify in public when they 
do not publish an AC charter. As shown in Table 2.1, the Belgian and Spanish codes 
recommend the disclosure of an AC charter without requiring an explanation for 
non-disclosure. The German, French, and Italian codes, in turn, do not provide a 
recommendation for the public disclosure of AC charters. 
 Collectively, our findings indicate that mandatory disclosure increases the 
level of compliance and coercive isomorphism in AC charters (Weil, Gotshal & 
Manges, 2002), but also the amount of unoriginal boilerplate language and the 
degree of mimetic isomorphism. These findings confirm empirical evidence and 
                                                                  
14 For comparability reasons we limited the analysis with SafeAssign to 78 AC charters. We passed 13 
random charters through the software for each country in order to prevent inflating the results.  
15 At first sight, this is a surprisingly low result given that Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012) detect 
around 90% of unoriginal content in a sample of 66 codes of ethics. The reason may be that, in contrast 
to the codes of ethics studied by Holder-Webb and Cohen, the disclosure of AC charters is voluntary for 
most firms in our sample. 
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theoretical reasoning that unoriginal content of corporate codes and charters is a 
predicted and rational response to regulation (e.g., Edelman, 1999; Holder-Webb 
and Cohen, 2012). In particular, moving from a state where companies can deviate 
from code recommendations without disclosure (Belgium, Spain) to a state where 
companies are required to publicly disclose non-compliance (the Netherlands), 
seems to elevate the degree of unoriginal language in AC charters. 
2.6 Discussion and conclusions 
In this study we shed light on the way ACs are designed in continental Europe by 
applying content analysis methods to the EU Eighth Directive, national codes of 
governance and corporate AC charters. We systematically analyse the extent to 
which different regulatory regimes in continental Europe have established AC 
design standards that are generally thought to contribute to AC effectiveness. In 
this manner, we address three related research questions about the degree of iso-
morphism and differentiation in AC design standards (RQ1); whether coercive 
pressures for isomorphism enacted by the Eighth Directive and national codes 
have been implemented effectively in AC charters (RQ2); and whether the AC char-
ters contain significant boilerplate language as a proxy for mimetic isomorphism 
(RQ3). 
 The results presented in this paper show that AC design standards set in cor-
porate governance codes and AC charters are mostly differentiated, rather than 
being isomorphic throughout continental Europe (RQ1). Differences in AC design 
standards between countries and companies primarily concern the scope of re-
sponsibilities assigned to ACs, the competences that AC members should possess, 
and the proportion of independent members. Standards relating to committee size 
and meeting frequency, in turn, are fairly isomorphic across our sample. Interest-
ingly, the AC standards that remain differentiated are precisely those that have 
been found to be frequently associated with AC effectiveness. We conclude that 
four years after the Eighth EU Company Law Directive came into effect, authorita-
tive opinions about the way ACs should be designed differ between EU member 
states. The extent of differentiation in AC design at the institutional and firm level 
comes as a surprise in light of antecedents for coercive and mimetic isomorphism 
in AC design across the EU. 
 According to the results presented here, coercive pressures for isomorphism in 
AC design enacted by the EU Eighth Directive and national codes of governance 
have been only partly successful in ironing out inconsistencies in AC design stand-
ards between EU member states. We show that AC design standards provided by 
the Eighth Directive have been effectively implemented on the level of national 
codes (RQ2a), but not on the level of individual firms’ AC charters (RQ2b). The 
reason is that to a large extent, the contents of the 157 AC charters studied here do 
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not resemble the recommendations given by the respective national codes (RQ2c). 
This holds for most of the AC responsibilities, which are required by the Eighth 
Directive. Similarly, we find an extensive number of AC charters that do not con-
tain any specifications about the competences that AC members should possess, 
nor about the percentage of independent members to serve on the AC. 
 However, substantial differences can be observed between the six countries 
studied. We find high levels of implementation of the EU Eighth Directive and the 
national code for Dutch-listed firms, intermediate levels for Belgian and Spanish-
listed firms, and low levels for French, German and Italian-listed firms. We attrib-
ute these differences primarily to the fact that the governance codes in the latter 
group of countries do not recommend or require the disclosure of AC charters. The 
Dutch code (2008), in contrast, states that supervisory boards shall establish a 
terms of reference for the AC and post it on the company’s website, or provide an 
explanation for its absence. Consequently, pressures for coercive isomorphism in 
AC charters are stronger in the Netherlands than in Belgium or Spain, where dis-
closure of AC charters is recommended, but companies do not have to publicly 
explain reasons for non-disclosure. 
 These findings indicate that one possible way to eliminate inconsistencies in 
AC design standards at the corporate level is to establish compulsory disclosure of 
complete AC charters throughout the EU. The content analyses of AC charters from 
firms listed on the Amsterdam Exchange Index suggests that mandatory disclosure 
can lead to high levels of implementation of the stipulations given by the EU Eighth 
Directive and the national code. Yet our findings with respect to mimetic isomor-
phism in AC charters (RQ3) should caution regulators before taking this step. The 
percentage of unoriginal language in AC charters detected by the software 
SafeAssign reveals that AC charters from AEX-listed firms contain considerable 
unoriginal language, both in absolute and relative terms. In line with prior evi-
dence, this suggests that regulation can lead to ´copy-and-paste´ or ´box-ticking´ 
approaches when developing publicly available corporate narrative information 
(Baginski et al., 2002; Carcello et al., 2006; Forster et al., 2009; Holder-Webb and 
Cohen, 2012). 
 Comparing the degree of coercive and mimetic isomorphism in AC charters of 
Belgian and Spanish-listed firms with French, German and Italian firms on the one 
hand, and Dutch-listed firms on the other hand, conveys two important messages. 
First, including a “should” type recommendation to disclose an AC charter in na-
tional codes can increase the effectiveness of coercive pressures for isomorphism 
in AC design standards without significantly raising the level of mimetic isomor-
phism and unoriginal content in publicly available AC charters. Second, moving 
from a “should” to a “shall” type recommendation can further increase the effec-
tiveness of coercive isomorphism, but also the level of mimetic isomorphism and 
as a result the share of unoriginal content in AC charters. Thus, the choice between 
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the two types of recommendations when it comes to AC charters may ultimately 
depend on preferences between conformity in content and originality in language. 
 While prior research indicates that AC charters can have a positive impact on 
AC effectiveness (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Bédard et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 
2007), the need for mandating public disclosure of AC charters is, according to the 
best of our knowledge, not supported by empirical evidence, but is primarily driv-
en by the intention of regulators to restore legitimacy in corporate governance and 
financial markets. After all, conventional reasoning suggests that current and po-
tential shareholders have a genuine interest in knowing who is watching over their 
property or stakes (AC competences, AC independence, AC size) and what these 
guardians are doing to protect it (AC responsibilities, AC meetings). 
 However, mandating the public disclosure of AC charters may lead to mimetic 
isomorphism, up to the point where AC charters of firm listed within one country 
are hardly distinguishable from each other. Two (potential) negative consequences 
can arise from this form of institutionally driven convergence in the content and 
language of AC charters.16 First, given that the organizational and operational ap-
proach followed by an AC should take into account the unique aspects of the organ-
izational and governance structure of the company that the AC serves on (Vera-
Muñoz, 2005), ´copy-and-paste´ type AC charters may lack firm- or industry-
specific content. Second, the degree of unoriginal content and boilerplate language 
in AC charters might be an indication that these documents are developed primari-
ly to gain institutional legitimacy via cosmetic compliance, and not necessarily to 
direct the actual composition and work program of the AC (Krawiec, 2003; Forster 
et al., 2009). We would argue, in line Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012), that this is 
not in the interest of investors and other stakeholders, who may take comfort in 
the knowledge that the board of their company has written an AC charter targeted 
to the firms purposes, without arriving at the awareness of the limitations of the 
content of these charters. 
 In this context, the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC, 2000) out-
lined that: “While it is inevitable that some of the same provisions will appear in 
charters of different ACs, we encourage companies to tailor their charters to their 
specific circumstances”. However, extant research and the results presented in this 
study, indicate that coercive pressures to publicly disclose corporate documents, 
which fulfil the dual purpose of internal organizational direction provision and 
external organizational information provision (e.g., codes of ethics, compliance 
programs, or board committee charters), can led to high levels of unoriginal con-
tent and language in these types of documents, which might not be in the best in-
terest of regulators (Holder-Webb and Cohen 2012).  
                                                                  
16 DiMaggio and Powell (1983) point out two types of isomorphism – competitive and institutional. The 
(potential) negative consequences of unoriginal content in AC charters discussed in the conclusion 
section are related to institutional isomorphism. 
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The EU Eighth Directive aims to establish minimum auditing standards across the 
EU without dictating how these standards have to be implemented at the national 
level. The European Commission has also stressed that the composition and opera-
tion of the board and its committees should be made transparent. The reduction of 
information barriers regarding the composition and operation of board commit-
tees was one of the primary objectives of the 2003 action plan to improve corpo-
rate governance in the European Union (European Commission, 2003: 12). The 
empirical evidence provided in this study, indicate deficiencies in both the imple-
mentation as well as the transparency of AC design standards in continental Eu-
rope, particularly in France, Germany and Italy. 
 We see three primary avenues to address these deficiencies. First, the Europe-
an Commission could consider recommending the disclosure of AC charters, but 
leave it up to national standard setters to decide whether this will be implemented 
by introducing a “should” or “shall” type recommendation in the national code. 
Second, the choice between mandating compulsory disclosure or not is – according 
to extant literature and our results – related to preferences for the effectiveness of 
coercive isomorphism and the originality of AC charters. The cases of Belgium and 
Spain indicate that recommending disclosure of AC charters without legal en-
forcement can improve the implementation of AC design standards without turn-
ing them into boilerplate documents. Third, our results suggest that at least some 
form of standard-setting resistance at the corporate level. To improve the level of 
institutional isomorphism and corporate acceptance of AC design standards, na-
tional expert committees and standard setters could make use of strategies for 
dealing with standard-setting resistance (e.g., Jeppesen, 2010), especially when 
following the route of voluntary disclosure.17 
 For future research on ACs in continental Europe, the question emerges, which 
factors impede convergence of AC design standards throughout continental Eu-
rope. Yoshikawa and Rasheed (2009: 392) outline a number of impediments to 
cross-national convergence in the governance practices of public corporations, 
including, multiple optima, complementarities, path dependence (i.e. different AC 
design standards before the EU Eighth Directive came into effect), rent seeking by 
national interest groups, and lack of consensus on an ideal. Given our results, it 
should be of particular interest to further explore the causes and economic conse-
quences of AC design standards and the lack thereof in France, Germany and Italy. 
 Our findings contribute to academic literature about ACs outside the Anglo-
Saxon domain and inform practice about the effectiveness of the EU Eighth Di-
rective and national codes in ironing out inconsistencies in AC standards through-
out continental Europe. Thereby, we add to prior research in the field of compara-
tive corporate governance by providing evidence for limited convergence in AC 
standards between continental Europe countries, both at the institutional and firm 
                                                                  
17 Jeppesen (2010) discusses five strategies for dealing with standard-setting resistance: alignment of 
interests, representation, due process, soft texts, and reference to ideology. 
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level. As such, we corroborate extant literature pointing to the difficulties involved 
in bringing about convergence in corporate governance practices (Bebchuk and 
Roe, 1999; Gordon and Roe, 2004; Yoshikawa and Rasheed, 2009). 
 Our results should be interpreted with caution, though, given that we have 
merely studied six continental European countries. Furthermore, we see two pri-
mary limitations of this study. First, actual AC activity and design might differ from 
the contents of the charters and corporate governance codes we have analyzed. 
For example, Carcello et al. (2002) find that what ACs say they are doing in their 
reports differs from what their charters say they should be doing. Therefore, we 
encourage future research to assess whether continental European ACs actually 
follow the AC design specifications as outlined in the respective governance code 
and their charter. Second, further input factors to AC effectiveness beyond the five 
AC design factors we have studied surely exist. Externally definable and verifiable 
AC characteristics provide only a partial guide to AC activity and effectiveness. 
They cannot account for informal processes and behavioural effects (Turley and 
Zaman, 2007). Due to the key role that the reflections of individual audit commit-
tee members play in configuring meanings of effectiveness (Gendron and Bédard, 
2006), future studies on AC design in continental Europe should therefore be com-
plemented by qualitative research on the processes that play a role in constructing 
AC effectiveness. 
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Appendix:  Eight EU Directive on Company Law 
Excerpts from: 
DIRECTIVE 2006/43/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL 
of 17 May 2006 on statutory audits of annual accounts and consolidated accounts 
Background on the EU 8th Directive: 
(5) This Directive aims at high-level — though not full — harmonisation of statutory audit require-
ments. A Member State requiring statutory audit may impose more stringent requirements, unless 
otherwise provided for by this Directive. 
Article 41 on Audit Committees: 
1. Each public-interest entity shall have an audit committee. The Member State shall determine 
whether audit committees are to be composed of non-executive members of the administrative 
body and/or members of the supervisory body of the audited entity and/or members appointed by 
the general meeting of shareholders of the audited entity. At least one member of the audit com-
mittee shall be independent and shall have competence in accounting and/or auditing.  
 In public-interest entities Member States may permit the functions assigned to the audit commit-
tee to be performed by the administrative or supervisory body as a whole, provided at least that 
when the chairman of such a body is an executive member, he or she is not the chairman of the au-
dit committee. 
2. Without prejudice to the responsibility of the members of the administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies, or of other members who are appointed by the general meeting of share- 
holders of the audited entity, the audit committee shall, inter alia: 
(a) monitor the financial reporting process; 
(b) monitor the effectiveness of the company’s internal control, internal audit where applicable, 
and risk management systems; 
(c) monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated accounts; 
(d) review and monitor the independence of the statutory auditor or audit firm, and in particular 
the provision of additional services to the audited entity. 
3. In a public-interest entity, the proposal of the administrative or supervisory body for the appoint-
ment of a statutory auditor or audit firm shall be based on a recommendation made by the audit 
committee. 
4. The statutory auditor or audit firm shall report to the audit committee on key matters arising from 
the statutory audit, and in particular on material weaknesses in internal control in relation to the 
financial reporting process. 
5. Member States may allow or decide that provisions laid down in paragraphs 1 to 4 shall not apply 
to any public-interest entity that has a body performing equivalent functions to an audit commit- 
tee, established and functioning according to provisions in place in the Member State in which the 
entity to be audited is registered. In such a case the entity shall disclose which body carries out 
these functions and how it is composed. 
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CHAPTER 3 The Role of Audit Committee 
Charters18,19 
Abstract: In general, it is either required or recommended that listed firms adopt, 
periodically update and publicly disclose a written charter for their audit commit-
tee. The ostensible purpose of audit committee charters is to inform the investing 
public about the role and responsibilities of the audit committee of a given firm 
and to provide authority, direction and discipline for audit committee members. 
However, evidence has indicated that the audit committee charters of different 
firms may be boilerplate copies of each other and that firms deliberately decouple 
actual committee practices from the content of their charters, perversely in those 
institutional settings characterized by a stringent disclosure regime regarding 
audit committee charters. This chapter, on the other hand, provides empirical evi-
dence for a significant relation between the nominal scope of responsibilities set 
forth in audit committee charters and measures of actual audit committee activity 
in institutional settings characterized by stringent disclosure regimes, and an ab-
sence thereof in voluntary disclosure settings. This suggests that in countries 
where the regulatory setting is more stringent, the professed activities of audit 
committees are more closely related to their actual work, relative to voluntary 
disclosure settings. 
 
 
 
  
                                                                  
18 This chapter is based on a paper co-authored with Laury Bollen and Harold Hassink. 
19 I would like to thank the participants of the 8th Workshop on Corporate Governance of the European 
Institute for Advanced Studies in Management (Brussels, May 30-31, 2011), and 33rd Annual Congress 
of the European Accounting Association (Istanbul, May 19-21, 2010) for their valuable comments. 
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3.1 Introduction 
When the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) originally endorsed the audit committee concept in 1940, the 
responsibilities envisioned for these committees were quite narrow, basically be-
ing limited to the nomination of the external auditor and to setting some parame-
ters for the auditor engagement (Verschoor, 2008). More recently, though, the role 
and responsibilities of the audit committee have expanded substantially (Beasley 
et al., 2009) – not only in the US, but also in all of the 30 largest economies. The 
following excerpts from a contemporaneous audit committee charter exemplify the 
range of responsibilities that audit committees are expected to address today. 
“To fulfill its responsibilities the [audit] committee shall: Review with 
management and the external auditor the Group’s financial statements, 
stock exchange and media releases; Review with the external auditor the 
planned scope of their audits and subsequently their audit findings; Re-
view the qualifications, organization, strategic focus and resourcing of 
internal audit; Ensure that the company has an effective risk manage-
ment system and that macro risks are reported at least annually to the 
Board; Address the effectiveness of the Company’s internal control sys-
tem; Review the Group’s insurance cover; Review the Group’s tax plan-
ning and compliance; Review the Group’s whistle-blowing procedures…” 
(Excerpts from the 2010 audit committee charter of Rio Tinto Plc.). 
In spite of the substantial expansion of the role and responsibilities of the corpo-
rate audit committee, empirical evidence is scant on the existence, causes, and 
consequences of cross-sectional variation in the scope of responsibilities set forth 
in audit committee charters (DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard and Gendron, 2010).20 It 
is surprising that academic research on this matter has been limited, given the 
importance that regulators and corporate governance experts attribute to audit 
committee charters as key instruments for providing authority, direction and dis-
cipline to audit committee members and for informing legitimate interest groups – 
i.e. shareholders, creditors, regulatory authorities – about the committees’ role and 
responsibilities at the firm level. According to the SEC (1999), the disclosure of 
audit committee charters should strengthen investor confidence in the integrity of 
financial reporting and contribute to the effectiveness of audit committees. 
 However appealing these benefits may sound, practitioners and scholars alike 
have expressed concerns that placing coercive pressure on firms to publicly dis-
close their audit committee charter may not lead to the desired benefits for two 
reasons. First, institutional pressure to disclose corporate narrative documents 
                                                                  
20 Merely seven out of 103 studies published between 1994 and 2008 and reviewed by Bédard and 
Gendron include the responsibilities addressed by the audit committees under study into their analysis. 
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which fulfill the dual purpose of providing external organizational information as 
well as internal organizational direction can led to high levels of isomorphism in 
the content and language of these documents (Forster et al., 2009; Holder-Webb 
and Cohen, 2012; Böhm et al., 2013). Second, given that it is virtually impossible 
for external parties to observe consistencies between the responsibilities disclosed 
in audit committee charters (the front-stage) and the actual activities of audit 
committees (the back-stage), firms may deliberately decouple actual committee 
practices from the charters content (Osma and Guillamón-Saorín, 2011). 
 To investigate the extent to which the two aforementioned concerns are justi-
fied – i.e. the isomorphism and the decoupling concern – we empirically address 
three research questions in the course of this chapter. First, we investigate wheth-
er the scope of responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters differs signif-
icantly and systematically across firms. If so, we want to test in a second step if 
measures of actual audit committee activity can be associated with the scope of 
responsibilities set forth in audit committee charters, suggesting that the internal 
work program of audit committees is coupled to the charters’ content.21 Finally, we 
examine to what extent the answers to the aforementioned questions depend on 
the level of institutional pressure to publicly disclose an audit committee charter. 
 We find that the scope of responsibilities disclosed in 202 publicly available 
audit committee charters from large-cap firms listed on Anglo-Saxon and continen-
tal European exchanges differs significantly and systematically from one firm to 
another. Further, our analysis suggests that in institutional settings with high lev-
els of coercive pressure to disclose an audit committee charter (Anglosphere), 
measures of actual audit committee activity are significantly and positively related 
to cross-sectional variation in the scope of responsibilities set forth in audit com-
mittee charters. In institutional settings characterized by low levels of coercive 
pressure to disclose an audit committee charter (continental Europe), we find no 
association between proxies for actual audit committee activity and the nominal 
scope of duties disclosed in audit committee charters. 
 This study contributes to the literature on audit committees, disclosure and 
the effectiveness of regulation in three distinct ways. First, we extend Carcello et al. 
(2002), which compared the disclosures in audit committee charters and reports 
and thereby found that what audit committees say they are doing differs from 
what the charters say the committees should be doing. More specifically, Carcello 
et al. show evidence that audit committees are more likely to disclose in their char-
ters what they will do rather than report what they actually did. This raises the 
question whether responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters are not 
being addressed. By using meeting frequency as a proxy for actual audit committee 
                                                                  
21 Thereby, we directly address the call of Kalbers and Fogarty (1993: 45) to investigate the relation 
between organizational types of power (charters) and audit committee diligence. 
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activity, we provide evidence that what audit committees are actually doing may 
well be in line with what the charters say the committees should be doing.22 
 Second, by linking audit committee meeting frequency to the scope of respon-
sibilities set out in audit committee charters, we also extend the literature on the 
determinants of audit committee meeting frequency (Raghunandan and Rama, 
2007; Sharma et al., 2009). Third, we provide novel insights into the interplay be-
tween audit committee disclosure and actual activity across geographic regions 
that vary in regulatory structure. Thereby, we aim to inform policymakers and 
investors about the effectiveness of regulation and the informativeness and value 
relevance of audit committee charters, respectively. 
 The reminder of this chapter is organized as follows. First, we discuss the 
promise and peril of publicly available audit committee charters in light of extant 
literature. Next, we develop hypotheses regarding firm-level determinants of audit 
committee scope, its relation to actual audit committee activity and the role of 
institutional pressure in this context. Thereafter, we present the research design 
and the empirical results of the study at hand. In the concluding section, we discuss 
to what extent audit committee charters should matter to the investing public in-
sofar as these documents contain substantive rather than symbolic content and 
whether they constitute effective instruments from a regulatory point of view. 
3.2 The promise and peril of audit committee charters 
One of the central recommendations given by the Blue Ribbon Committee on Im-
proving the Effectiveness of Corporate Audit Committees (BRC, 1999), is that each 
listed firm should be required to adopt a formal written charter that is approved 
by the full board and that specifies the scope of the audit committee’s responsibili-
ties. Based on this recommendation, the SEC (1999) issued a rule that companies 
disclose in their proxy statements whether their board has adopted an audit com-
mittee charter, and if so, include a copy of the charter as an appendix to the com-
pany’s proxy statements at least once every three years. Ever since, it has become a 
common practice not only for firms listed in the US, but also internationally, to 
disclose an audit committee charter, either directly via their corporate website or 
attached to the annual reporting documents (Walker, 2004; Jiang et al., 2009). 
 With this background, what benefits can the corporate governance community 
in general and the investing public in particular expect from the public disclosure 
                                                                  
22 Due to reputation and liability concerns, audit committee members may be reluctant to disclose 
details about activities actually performed during the year (Cohen et al., 2002; Rowland, 2002). As a 
result, activities disclosed in audit committee reports may not reflect the actual level of committee 
activity. The number of committee meetings, in turn, is considered the only publicly available quantita-
tive signal about the diligence of audit committees (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). The measure has 
been frequently used in audit committee research and is arguably less susceptible to be distorted by 
liability concerns. 
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of written charters detailing the role and responsibilities of corporate audit com-
mittees? The response of the BRC and the SEC is that if a corporation is to be a 
viable attraction of capital, it must ensure disclosure and transparency concerning 
its governance practices including the role and responsibilities of its audit commit-
tee. After all, if audit committees represent most reliable guardians of the public 
interest, as suggested by Levitt (1998), then it is easy to see why investors would 
have a genuine and legitimate interest in the authority and duties of these guardi-
ans. Thus, one benefit expected from the disclosure of audit committee charters is 
to strengthen investor confidence and corporate legitimacy by offering investors 
transparency about the role and responsibilities of the audit committee (Carcello 
et al., 2002). Furthermore, the BRC formulated a second benefit, namely that audit 
committee charters contribute to the role effectiveness of audit committees: 
“Further, the audit committee should self-disclose its self-determined 
role, structure, and practices. Such transparency is at the heart of good 
governance, serves to inform investors, and also acts as a disciplinary 
measure on the committee. It will encourage committees to think about 
their important role, to articulate a clear mission, and then to establish 
appropriate practices and follow them. Disclosure will guide the commit-
tee to responsible practices, as sunlight generally does” (BRC, 1999: 27). 
In addition to this, a number of studies conclude that written charters play a key 
role in equipping audit committees with the necessary internal organizational 
legitimization, authority and power to effectively carry out their designated re-
sponsibilities (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; Golden and Zajac, 2001; Ng and Tan, 
2003). In this context, Bédard et al. (2004) show a positive relation between the 
quality of financial information released by US firms and the presence of a clear 
mandate defining the responsibilities of the audit committee. In a similar vein, 
Abbott et al. (2007) find that formal designation of authority is a prerequisite for 
the audit committee to evaluate internal audit outsourcing options. 
 In summary, the promise of audit committee charters is to inform external 
parties about the role and concrete responsibilities of the audit committee of a 
given firm, and at the same time to provide authority, direction, and discipline to 
that committee (Carcello et al., 2002). The intended purpose of publicly available 
audit committee charters, then, is to strengthen investor confidence in financial 
information and markets, either directly by signaling to shareholders that audit 
committees are responsible for important oversight matters, or indirectly by con-
tributing to the role effectiveness of audit committees. 
 However promising as these benefits sound, there is empirical and anecdotal 
evidence to question their validity, suggesting that in the long run publicly availa-
ble charters might constitute more peril than promise for investor confidence and 
audit committee effectiveness (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Harvard Law Review, 
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2003; Krawiec, 2003; Forster et al., 2009; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012). The 
aforementioned studies point out two reasons why publicly available audit com-
mittee charters might constitute a meaningless or even perilous tool towards 
building investor confidence and audit committee effectiveness: isomorphism in 
the content of audit committee charters up to a point where the charters of differ-
ent firms become indistinguishable from each other, and, second, the deliberate 
decoupling of actual committee practices from the content of these charters.23 
 Regarding the isomorphism concern, the SEC (1999) has pointed out that 
“even though it is inevitable that some of the same provisions will appear in char-
ters of different audit committees, we encourage companies to tailor the charters 
to their specific circumstances”. In other words, audit committee charters should 
contain firm- and industry-specific content. Notwithstanding this call, though, the-
oretical reasoning provided by DiMaggio and Powell (1983, 1991) on isomorphism 
in organizational fields has more recently been matched with empirical evidence 
documenting high levels of isomorphism in corporate documents that fulfill the 
dual purpose of providing both external organizational information and internal 
organizational direction, i.e. codes of ethics and audit committee charters (Forster 
et al., 2009; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012; Böhm et al., 2013). As pointed out by 
Suchman (1995) and Westphal et al. (1997), one reason why audit committee 
charters might lack firm- and industry-specific content is that concerns for institu-
tional legitimacy supersede considerations of firm-level efficiency.24 
 Without discarding the desirability of a certain degree of overlap in the role 
and responsibilities between audit committees of different firms, we argue that at 
some degree of isomorphism in the contents of audit committee charters “form” 
will triumph over “substance” and these documents will become so generic in na-
ture that they become a meaningless or at best ineffective tool for informing the 
public about the committees’ role and responsibilities and for contributing to the 
committees’ effectiveness, respectively (cf. Cohen et al., 2008). 
 However, even in case of significant cross-sectional differences in the scope of 
responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters, the intuitive question 
emerges whether these differences are substantial or merely a result of impression 
management (Goffman, 1959). Existing research demonstrates that organizations 
engage in impression management by creating and maintaining deliberate gaps 
between formal policies and actual organizational practices – a phenomenon called 
decoupling (Meyer and Rowan, 1977; Weaver et al., 1999; Westphal and Zajac, 
                                                                  
23 Decoupling refers to the deliberate manufacture of gaps between actual organizational practices and 
formal policies regarding those practices (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). In the context of this study, we 
focus on gaps between audit committee charters and actual committee practices.  
24 The literature on organizational legitimacy differentiates between strategic legitimacy and institu-
tional legitimacy (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Isomorphism in audit committee charters among firms 
from similar institutional settings should be attributable to institutional legitimacy. 
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2001; Lamertz and Martens, 2011).25 In the context of audit committee charters 
this form of decoupling would imply that firms systematically over-promise on the 
designated role and responsibilities of their audit committee. 
 A number of audit committee studies find affirmative evidence for this propo-
sition, suggesting that the responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters do 
not reflect actual committee practices (DeZoort, 1997; Carcello et al., 2002; Beasley 
et al., 2009). DeZoort (1997) conducted a survey among US audit committee mem-
bers about their assigned and perceived responsibilities. He finds that audit com-
mittee members were not able to recognize their assigned responsibilities as de-
tailed in proxy statements and that much of the audit committees’ work was per-
formed in areas not formally assigned to the committee. Carcello et al. (2002), in 
turn, find substantial inconsistencies between the responsibilities disclosed in 
audit committee charters and those reported in audit committee reports. 
 Against this background, it is important to further investigate the relation be-
tween actual audit committee practices and the contents of audit committee char-
ters. When the responsibilities set forth in audit committee charters are primarily 
the outcome of impression management to gain legitimacy and remain decoupled 
from actual audit committee practices, then these charters would constitute peri-
lous and ineffective tools for strengthening investor confidence and audit commit-
tee effectiveness, respectively (MacLean and Bahnam, 2010).26 
 Interestingly, the Harvard Law Review (HLR), has pointed out that institutional 
pressure in the form of disclosure rules will lead firms to make different decision 
about the information their codes and charters will generate than the decisions 
they would have made before the rules (Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994). The HLR 
(2003: 2140) suggests that when pressured to publicly disclose corporate codes 
and charters, “companies will likely seek to protect themselves [from the risk of 
litigation] by creating nebulous documents that are not illuminating to their own 
management or the public… then the public filing of codes [or charters] will not 
matter because investors will be unable to distinguish one vague, boilerplate code 
from another”. In a nutshell, the HLR suggests that the audit committee charters of 
different firms may be boilerplate copies of each other and that firms deliberately 
decouple actual committee practices from the content of their charters, perversely 
in those institutional settings characterized by a stringent disclosure regime. 
                                                                  
25 Decoupling enables organizations to maintain standardized, legitimating, formal structures while 
their activities can vary in response to practical considerations (Meyer and Rowan, 1977). Decoupling is 
attractive to listed firms, because it is virtually impossible for investors or creditors to directly observe 
consistencies between formal policies and actual organizational activities (MacLean and Behnam, 
2010). 
26 In this scenario, audit committee charters might constitute a perilous tool because legitimacy is a 
social judgement that is ultimately accorded to an organization by its constituents. As pointed out by 
Suchman (1995), when legitimacy is achieved by means of symbolic instead of substantive practices, 
organizations run the risk of “protesting too much”, leading to long-term loss of external legitimacy.  
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 The next section develops hypotheses about firm level determinants of the 
scope of authority disclosed in audit committee charters (audit committee scope), 
its relation to actual committee practices (audit committee activity), and the im-
pact of institutional pressure to disclose an audit committee charter (disclosure 
regime). 
3.3 Development of hypotheses 
3.3.1 Firm level determinants of audit committee scope 
Legitimacy considerations aside, there are two potential advantages of assigning 
additional responsibilities to the audit committee – independent oversight and 
board efficiency (Menon and Williams, 1994). However, audit committees are 
monitoring devices that do not come “for free”, but lead to direct and indirect costs 
for organizations (Eichenseher and Shields, 1985).27 Given that cross-sectional 
differences exist in the benefits and costs associated with audit committee over-
sight, it is important to better understand these differences. For this purpose, the 
first generation of audit committee research investigated firm-level determinants 
of voluntary audit committee formation (Pincus et al., 1989; Bradbury, 1990). 
Since audit committee formation has become a listing requirement on major stock 
exchanges, a number of studies have been published that explore variations in 
audit committee meeting frequency (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007; Sharma et al., 
2009). Based on the aforementioned literature, we will in turn summarize the var-
iables that may help to explain inter-firm differences in the responsibilities set 
forth in audit committee charters. These factors are: firm size, industry, profitabil-
ity, ownership, and board characteristics. 
H1: The scope of responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters is related to 
firm size, industry, profitability, ownership and board characteristics. 
Empirical evidence that firm size is positively related to the demand for audit 
committee oversight is generally explained by agency theory (Fama and Jensen, 
1983) and/or economies of scale (Mautz and Neumann, 1977). Since agency prob-
lems are expected to increase with firm complexity and greater dispersion of 
stockholdings, larger organizations are expected to make more extensive use of the 
audit committee (Sharma et al., 2009). The economies of scale argument, in turn, is 
based on the premise that the net monitoring benefits of audit committees in-
crease with firm size, since monitoring costs are to a certain extent fixed (Pincus et 
                                                                  
27 These costs could include, for example, the expenses incurred per audit committee meeting and the 
preparatory time spend by audit and non-audit committee members outside the official meetings or the 
costs incurred by the audit committee for hiring outside experts. 
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al., 1989). Overall, evidence shows that the demand for audit committee oversight 
increases with firm size (Deli and Gillan, 2000; Fernandéz and Arrondo, 2007). 
 In addition to firm size, audit committee scope might also depend on the type 
of industry in which the firm operates. The demand for audit committee oversight 
seems comparatively high in financial institutions, as a result of the concentration 
of fraud cases and excessive risk-taking in this sector (Beasley et al., 2000). Due to 
the importance attributed to internal auditing and risk management in financial 
institutions, there should be a greater demand for audit committee oversight in 
these areas. Further, it is reasonable to assume that boards of financial institutions 
have expanded the scope of their audit committees as a direct result of the 2008 
financial crisis, which resulted in the collapse of large financial institutions and the 
bailout of banks by national governments (see e.g., Sikka, 2009). 
 Further, firm profitability could impact the demand for audit committee over-
sight. In particular, loss-making firms might place greater demands on internal 
monitoring and consequently also on audit committee oversight (Beasley, 1996; 
Sharma et al., 2009). By increasing the scope of the audit committee, unprofitable 
firms could signal to investors that corrective actions are being taken (Bédard et 
al., 2008). 
 Regarding ownership characteristics, we focus on the degree of leverage and 
ownership concentration. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that agency cost of 
debt increases with leverage due to higher probabilities of wealth transfer from 
debtholders to shareholders. Given the costliness of monitoring compliance with 
covenants written into debt contracts, more extensive audit committee oversight is 
generally viewed as a means to mitigate the cost of debt financing (Collier and 
Gregory, 1999). A broader scope of audit committee oversight might be warranted 
in particular in the areas of internal control and risk management, because highly 
levered firms tend to engage in earnings and asset manipulation (Raghunandan 
and Raman, 2007) and run higher risks of defaulting (Piot, 2004). 
 Berle and Means (1932) vividly describe how diffuse stock ownership creates 
a wide gap between corporate ownership and control and that substantial effort is 
required to bridge that gap and align the interests of principals and agents. In the-
ory, investors with a substantial equity stake in a firm have sufficient financial 
incentives and voting power to bridge the gap and exert pressure to delegate more 
responsibilities to the audit committee (Connelly et al., 2010). Raghunandan and 
Rama (2007) provide empirical evidence suggesting that large shareholders of US 
listed firms pressure boards of directors to raise the level of audit committee activ-
ity. On the other hand, it has been suggested, based on Shleifer and Vishny (1997), 
that large shareholders with a great deal of power might decrease the level of audit 
committee oversight, since an intensive monitoring environment could raise the 
cost associated with extracting private benefits (Greco, 2011). In line with this 
proposition, Fernándz-Mendéz and Arrondo-García (2007) find negative associa-
tions between shareholder concentration and audit committee meetings frequency 
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for a sample of Spanish listed firms. Sharma et al. (2009) and García-Sánchez et al. 
(2012), in turn, fail to provide evidence for an association between shareholder 
concentration and audit committee diligence. 
 Extant literature also shows that characteristics of the entire board impact the 
formation and activity of board committees (Menon and Williams, 1994; Beasley 
and Salterio, 2001). Interdependencies between the board and its committees 
might be considered inevitable, given the fact that committee members are drawn 
from the board and that it is common practice to hold board committee meetings 
immediately before or after a meeting of the entire board (Sharma et al., 2009). 
Consequently, we expect that audit committee scope is related to characteristics of 
the entire board, or what has been termed supply factors (Rainsbury et al., 2008). 
It has also been shown that the chairman of the board impact agenda and composi-
tion of the board and its committees. Based on agency theory, Laux and Laux 
(2009) convincingly argue that CEOs have strong interests in the work of audit 
committees, in particular in the area of financial reporting, and thus might try to 
influence the way responsibilities are allocated between the board and the audit 
committee. Since CEOs are generally prohibited from sitting on the audit commit-
tee, we argue that a CEO serving as chairman of the board will try to limit the scope 
of authority assigned to the audit committee. 
3.3.2 Nominal audit committee scope and actual audit committee activity 
Conventional reasoning and literature from the field of management as well as 
organizational studies indicate that – all other things being equal – workgroups 
facing additional duties need to increase their meeting frequency and/or manpow-
er to discharge them effectively (Marks et al., 2001; Christian et al., 2011). Thus, if 
audit committee charters serve as a means for determining the ‘actual’ work pro-
gram of audit committees and not purely as a means of gaining external legitimacy, 
we expect to find a positive relation between the ‘nominal’ scope of responsibilities 
professed in charters and measures of actual audit committee activity: 
H2: There is a positive relation between the scope of responsibilities disclosed in 
audit committee charter and measures of actual audit committee activity. 
If we find no association between audit committee scope, on the one hand, and 
audit committee meeting frequency, on the other hand, this could be an indication 
that cross-sectional differences in audit committee scope result from impression 
management, whereupon actual committee activities remain decoupled from the 
charters’ content. 
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3.3.3 The impact of institutional pressure on isomorphism and decoupling 
According to literature on organizational responses to institutional pressure (Di-
Maggio and Powell, 1983; Oliver, 1991; Goodstein, 1994; HLR, 2003; Okhma-
tovskiy and David, 2012), the level of institutional pressure exerted on firms to 
publicly disclose an audit committee charter will have an impact on the level of 
isomorphism in the content of these charters and the probability that firms decou-
ple actual committee practices from the charters’ content. 
 In fact, empirical evidence has been found that since US listed firms were re-
quired to disclose a code of ethics according to Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act (2002), most of these codes of ethics have turned into boilerplate copies of one 
another (Murphy, 2005, Forster et al., 2009; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012). In 
their paper titled “The Cut and Paste Society”, Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012: 504) 
emphasize that “codes of ethics that are ostensibly provided to guide the daily 
decision-making activities of employees are instead generic carbon-copies of one 
another, with little or no attempt by most firms to provide any sort of guidance 
tailored to the ethical pressures unique to their organization or industry”. 
 If this is also the case for audit committee charters, then the “good intent” of 
regulators to help shareholders assess the role and responsibilities of audit com-
mittees and to contribute to audit committee effectiveness by recommending or 
even requiring firms to place an audit committee charter on public record might 
have backfired (Arya et al., 2005; Jamal, 2012). Since isomorphism and decoupling 
may constitute predictable and rational responses to a stringent disclosure regime 
(HLR; 2003), we expect that: 
H3: Institutional pressure for the public disclosure of audit committee charters 
irons out inter-firm differences in audit committee scope and fuels the decou-
pling of actual audit committee practices from the nominal responsibilities set 
out in the charters. 
3.4 Research design 
3.4.1 Sample selection and data collection 
In order to test whether audit committee charters exhibit systematic differences in 
content and whether these differences are related to measures of actual activity, 
we study a sample of firms listed on the Anglo-Saxon and continental European 
exchanges. Both institutional setting require listed firms to establish an audit 
committee. Anglo-Saxon firms are chosen for analysis, because audit committees 
are a mature corporate governance mechanism (Vanasco, 1994; Carson, 2002). 
Moreover, Anglo-Saxon countries represent an institutional context with high lev-
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els of coercive pressure to disclose an audit committee charter. In continental Eu-
rope, in turn, establishing audit committees was not a standard board practice 
until the Eight EU Company Law Directive came into effect in 2006. In addition, 
most firms with a primary listing in continental Europe, can decide whether to 
place an audit committee charter on the public record, or not. Hence, our sample 
allows to study the interplay between the scope of responsibilities disclosed in 
audit committee charters and actual activity across geographic regions that vary in 
regulatory structure and in maturity of the audit committee concept. 
 By carrying out our study in an international context, we also aim to address 
the numerous calls that have been raised by the academic community to study 
audit committees not only in jurisdictions which follow the Anglo-Saxon model of 
corporate governance (e.g., Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Carcello et al., 2011). As-
suming that interdependencies between firms and diverse environments can lead 
to variations in the effectiveness of different governance practices, it is important 
to test our hypotheses in corporate governance domains portrayed as fairly di-
chotomous by extant literature (Letza et al., 2004; Aguilera et al., 2008). 
 To address our research question and hypotheses in a continental European 
context, we initially chose the constituents of the FTSE EURO 100 index. For our 
Anglo-Saxon sample, we selected the largest corporations in terms of market capi-
talization from Australia, the UK, and US. We selected the ASX20 constituents, the 
30 largest companies in terms of market capitalization on the LSE and the 50 larg-
est companies on the NYSE. However, a considerable number of firms in the FTSE 
EURO 100 index did not disclose a complete audit committee charter at the time of 
this study (January 2010). 
 In order to increase the number of useful observations from continental Eu-
rope, we subsequently chose the following six country indices: BEL20 (Belgium), 
CAC40 (France), DAX30 (Germany), FTSE MIB40 (Italy), IBEX35 (Spain), and 
AEX25 (The Netherlands). Thus, our final sample includes 202 observations, 
thereof 102 from continental Europe.28 Out of the 190 observations from the six 
indices, we subsequently excluded six firms with dual listings in the abovemen-
tioned country indices. All remaining 184 continental European sample firms had 
established an audit committee as required by the Eight EU Directive on Company 
Law (2006). However, merely 102 (55%) disclosed an audit committee charter by 
January 2010. Thus, our final sample includes 202 observations, thereof 102 from 
continental Europe. Table 3.1 summarizes the final sample per country, whether 
the respective country has enforced an audit committee charter disclosure regime, 
the level of coercive pressure, and the corresponding percentage of firms disclos-
ing an audit committee charter. 
 
                                                                  
28 We limit this study to this sample size due to: (1) the labor intensiveness of analyzing audit commit-
tee charters (2) the difficulty of obtaining information about board of directors/supervisory boards of 
European firms, which was not readily available in a canned dataset and needed to be hand-collected. 
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Table 3.1: Sample overview 
  Anglosphere Continental Europe 
Country  AU  UK US BE DE ES FR  IT  NL 
        
Disclosure regime for AC 
chartera (disclosure 
required or 
recommended) 
 √  √ √ √  √     √ 
Level of coercive 
pressureb  2  2 3 1 0 1 0  0  2 
Sample (stock exchange / 
index)  ASX  LSE NYSE BEL DAX IBEX CAC  MIB  AEX 
Initial sample  20  30 50 20 30 35 40  40  25 
Less dual-listed companies 
(DLCs)     (1)   (1)  (1)  (4) 
Less firms not disclosing an 
AC charterc  (0)  (0) (0) (2) (26) (6) (22)  (22)  (3) 
% of firms disclosing an 
AC charter  100%  100% 100% 90% 13% 83% 44%  44%  86% 
Effective final sample per 
country  20  30 50 17 4 29 17  17  18 
Effective final sample per 
CG domaind    100        102 
Notes: This table summarizes the sample per country and corporate governance domain. 
a AC = audit committee 
b 0 = no requirement or recommendation; 1 = recommended (no explanation), 2 = comply or explain, 3 
= required. 
c For the purpose of this study, we only include firms that disclosed a separate document called audit 
committee ‘charter’, ‘bylaws’, ‘terms of reference’, ‘regulations’, or ‘rules’ on their corporate Web site or 
attached to the annual reporting documents by January 2010. 
d Final sample/disclosure rate per level of coercive pressure: 0 = 38/35% (DE, FR, IT); 1 = 46/85% (BE, 
ES); 2 = 68/96% (AU, NL, UK); 3 = 50/100% (US) 
3.4.2 Content analysis of audit committee charters 
In order to study the determinants of audit committee scope and its impact on 
audit committee activity, we apply content analysis techniques to audit committee 
charters.29 Thereby, we aim to assign a numerical value to audit committee scope 
and subsequently test the hypotheses outlined in the previous section. The analy-
sis of the charters followed the standard protocols of the content analysis method 
of formal coding based on a codebook and inter-rater agreement (Krippendorff, 
2004). Two raters independently coded the responsibilities disclosed in the 202 
                                                                  
29 The objective of content analysis is to reduce the amount of data in a text by classifying words, sen-
tences, and paragraphs into a smaller number of ‘content categories’ (Weber, 1990). Content analysis is 
a research method suited to elaborate theories of organizations (Sonpar and Golden-Biddle, 2008). 
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sample charters. For this purpose, both followed a deductive-inductive procedure 
by adding new responsibilities to the list established by Wolnizer (1995). As sug-
gested by Gaumnitz and Lere (2004), the raters selected audit committee tasks as 
their unit of analysis, and subsequently categorized individual tasks along broader 
responsibility schemes. The coding scheme was pre-tested on two sub-samples of 
30 charters, after which the raters came to an agreement about the final set of 
items (see also Pugliese et al., 2009). Before coming up with the final codebook, 
two experts from the practitioner field – i.e. an audit committee member of an AEX 
constituent and a senior manager of a Big 4 audit firm – checked the set of items on 
the basis of exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories. In total, over 100 sepa-
rate audit committee tasks were identified and subsequently categorized among 
33 responsibilities. The Appendix outlines the final categorization scheme. 
 For readability purposes, we assigned the 33 responsibilities to five fields of 
activity: (1) financial reporting and disclosure; (2) external audit matters; (3) in-
ternal audit matters; (4) business control environment; (5) corporate governance, 
compliance, and other matters. Regarding the reliability of our coding, a two-
person inter-rater agreement statistic (K, Kappa) is calculated with a 95% confi-
dence interval (Fleiss et al., 2003). The value obtained for K is 0.85. Thus, the 
strength of the inter-rater agreement can be considered very good (Altman, 1991). 
3.4.3 Analytical approach 
Our dependent variable ACSCOPE is calculated as the number of responsibilities set 
forth in audit committee charters (Eaton and Nocinero, 2000). To test the determi-
nants of ACSCOPE, we use the following Negative Binomial count model. We em-
ploy this procedure instead of OLS, because our dependent variable is non-
negative count data. Our choice for a binomial instead of a Poisson model is due to 
overdispersion in ACSCOPE (Prob > chi2 = .01).30 
ACSCOPE = f{SIZE, INDUSTRY, LOSS, LEVRG, BLOCK, BSTRENGTH, DUALITY, 
DREGIME, COMMITTEES, ACROLE, MULTLIST, TWOTIER}. (1) (2) 
Based on this equation and in order to test H1, we establish two slightly different 
count models with essentially the same independent variables, but taking different 
approaches to calculating the dependent variable. In Model 1, we calculate 
ACSCOPE as the number of distinct responsibilities set forth in audit committee 
charters. In Model 2, we calculate ACSCOPE as the difference between the number 
of responsibilities disclosed in the audit committee charter of a given firm, and the 
minimum number of responsibilities disclosed in the respective country sample. 
Due to this modification, we eliminate the effect of inter-country differences in the 
                                                                  
30 The binomial count model is suitable for a discrete dependent variable that takes small values and 
has a variance that is higher than its average value (Cameron and Trivedi, 1990). 
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number of “baseline” responsibilities – i.e. those responsibilities to be addressed 
by all audit committees in a certain country due to country-specific regulation – 
within the Anglo-Saxon and continental European sample. Thus, in Model 2, our 
dependent variable ACSCOPE is a count of the responsibilities disclosed above a 
minimum threshold in the respective country. 
 To test H2, i.e. the association between ACSCOPE and actual audit committee 
activity, we use the number of audit committee meetings held in 2010 as our de-
pendent variable (ACMEET). Audit committee meeting frequency is commonly 
used as a proxy for audit committee diligence in empirical research (Xie et al., 
2003), also because it is the only publicly available quantitative signal about the 
diligence of audit committees (Raghunandan and Rama, 2007). 
ACMEETINGS = f{ACSCOPE, SIZE, INDUSTRY, LOSS, LEVRG, BLOCK, BSTRENGTH, 
DUALITY, DREGIME, COMMITTEES, ACROLE, MULTLIST, 
TWOTIER}.  (3) 
The next section reports our empirical results. Given that the objective of this 
study is to investigate the determinants and implications of the scope of responsi-
bilities set forth in audit committee charters in institutional settings characterized 
by different audit committee charter disclosure regimes, we report descriptive 
statistics for the Anglo-Saxon and for the continental European sample firms. Fur-
ther, we run all models separately for the Anglo-Saxon (Model 1A-3A) and for the 
continental European sample (Model 1B-3B). 
3.5 Empirical results 
3.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.2 shows that in countries without a disclosure regime (France, Germany, 
Italy), we find that merely 35% of the sample firms voluntarily disclosed a charter 
at the time of this study. Once disclosing an audit committee charter is recom-
mended (Belgium, Spain), this figure jumps to 85%, and in countries with a com-
ply-or-explain provision (Australia, Netherlands, UK), to 96%. As expected, all US 
listed firms in our sample disclosed an audit committee charter. 
 Panel C shows the Pearson correlation coefficients among our dependent and 
explanatory variables for the Anglo-Saxon and continental European sample firms. 
Both tables show significant correlations between ACSCOPE and several explanato-
ry and control variables. Panel C of Table 3.2 also reveals significant and positive 
correlations between ACSCOPE and ACMEET in the Anglo-Saxon context (p < 0.01) 
and an absence thereof in the continental European sample. Further, a positive 
correlation between DREGIME and ACSCOPE is reported for both corporate gov-
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ernance domains (p < 0.01).31 In the continental European context, ACSCOPE is also 
positively related to BSTRENGTH and MULTILIST (both p < 0.01). 
 
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics, variable definitions, and correlations 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Total sample  Anglo-Saxon sample Cont. European sample  
 Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev. Mean Median St. dev 
ACSCOPE  18.75  20 5.84 22.26*** 23 3.60 15.30 15  5.56 
ACSIZE 4.24  4 1.16 4.45*** 4 1.19 4.03 4  1.09 
ACMEET 7.25  7 3.07 7.87*** 8 3.21 6.65 6  2.82 
SIZE  23.43  23.56 1.45 4.37*** 24.40 1.04 22.51 22.30  1.18 
INDUSTRY 0.22 0 0.41 0.24 0 0.43 0.20 0  0.40 
LOSS 0.19 0 0.39 0.15 0 0.36 0.23 0  0.42 
LEVRG 0.65  0.64 0.20 0.64 0.6 0.21 0.66 0.70  0.19 
BLOCK  23.70  16.27  23.57 15.19 6.3 20.57 32.04*** 30.7  23.43 
BSTRENGTH 2.40 2 1.08 2.36 2 1.11 2.26 2  1.00 
DUALITY 0.43 0 0.50 0.40 0 0.49 0.45 0  0.50 
COMMITTEES 3.86 4 1.33 4.58*** 5.0 1.11 3.16 3.0  1.14 
DREGIME 2  0.25 0 0.43 0.50 0.5 0.50 - - - 
DREGIME 1 0.56 1 0.50 0.50 0.5 0.50 0.63 1  0.49 
ACROLE 0.19 0 0.39 0.15 0 0.36 0.23 0  0.42 
MULTLIST 0.26 0 0.44 0.30 0 0.46 0.23 0  0.42 
TWOTIER 0.12 0 0.32 - - - 0.24 0  0.43 
 
  
                                                                  
31 None of the VIF values exceeds three, which indicates that multicollinearity is not expected to pose a 
material problem in the estimation of our models (Maddala, 1992).  
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Panel B: Variable definitions 
ACSCOPE 
 
ACSIZE 
ACMEET 
SIZE 
INDUSTRY 
 
LOSS 
 
LEVRG 
BLOCK 
BSTRENGTH 
 
 
DUALITY 
COMMITTEES 
DREGIME 2 
DREGIME 1 
 
ACROLE 
MULTLIST 
TWOTIER 
The number of distinct responsibilities set forth in a firms’ audit committee charter 
(January 2010). 
The number of directors serving on the audit committee (financial year 2010-2011). 
The number of meetings held by the audit committee (financial year 2010-2011). 
The natural logarithm of market capitalization. 
A binary variable equal to one for firms from the financial sector (GICS 40), zero 
otherwise. 
A binary variable equal to one if a firm reported consecutive losses in 2008-2010, zero 
otherwise. 
The ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 
The cumulative percentage of shareholders with more than 5% ownership. 
A composite score comprising board size, proportion of independent board members, 
board tenure, board meetings, and outside board membership: range = 0 (weak) to 5 
(strong). 
A binary variable coded one if the roles of CEO and COB are combined, zero otherwise. 
The number of board committees established. 
Coded one if a firm is required to disclose an audit committee charter, zero otherwise. 
Coded one if a firm is recommended to disclose an audit committee charter, zero 
otherwise. 
A binary variables equal to one if the audit committee has a dual name, zero otherwise. 
A binary variable equal to one if a firm is listed in two or more countries, zero otherwise. 
A binary variable equal to one if a firm has a two-tier board system, zero otherwise.  
*** indicates significant effects of a two-tailed test at the 1% level. The differences in means are calcu-
lated between the Anglo-Saxon and continental European sample firms. If not otherwise indicated, all 
firm-specific variables are taken from the respective 2010 annual reports. 
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3.5.2 Determinants of audit committee scope 
Table 3.3 presents the results of Models 1A-2B that test the hypothesized determi-
nants of ACSCOPE for the Anglo-Saxon and continental European sample firms. In 
both institutional settings we document significant relations between ACSCOPE 
and explanatory variables. For the Anglo-Saxon sample and Model 1A, we find 
positive associations between the scope of responsibilities set forth in audit com-
mittee charters (ACSCOPE) and the variables SIZE (p < 0.01), INDUSTRY (p < 0.10), 
and LOSSES (p < 0.05). We also document a positive impact of the coercive pres-
sure enacted by the prevalent disclosure regime DREGIME (p < 0.01). 
 For Model 2A, we find once more a robust and positive association between 
ACSCOPE and SIZE as well as LOSSES (both, p < 0.05). Table 4 also shows a margin-
ally significant association to INDUSTRY as well as BSTRENGTH (both, p < 0.10). 
The significance of DISREGIME in Model 1A indicates that firms listed on US ex-
changes set forth more responsibilities in their audit committee charters than Aus-
tralian and UK listed firms. When controlling for country effects in Model 2A, mov-
ing from a comply-or-explain to a mandatory disclosure regime has no impact on 
cross-sectional variation in audit committee scope. This suggests that the impact of 
DISREGIME on ACSCOPE in Model 1 is driven by cross-country differences in the 
scope of responsibilities to be addressed by audit committees and not by a disclo-
sure regime effect. 
 In the continental European context and Model 1B, we also document a posi-
tive association between ACSCOPE and SIZE (p < 0.05), INDUSTRY (p < 0.05) as well 
as DREGIME (p < 0.01). Further, Table 3.3 shows that even after controlling for 
country effects DREGIME is still positively related to ACSCOPE in Model 2B (p < 
0.01), which suggests that cross-sectional differences in ACSCOPE across continen-
tal Europe are not only related to different national recommendations on the num-
ber of responsibilities to be addressed by audit committees, but also to a disclosure 
regime effect. The positive coefficient of DREGIME in Model 2B indicates that, 
against our expectation, coercive pressure to disclose an audit committee charter 
had a positive impact on cross-sectional differences in ACSCOPE. 
 Collectively, these results show that there are significant and systematic differ-
ences in the scope of responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters and 
that this holds in settings with comparatively low levels of institutional pressure to 
disclose an audit committee charter (continental Europe), but also in settings with 
more stringent disclosure regimes (Anglosphere). More specifically, our results 
indicate that the demand for audit committee scope may be related to firm size, the 
type of industry, and firm profitability (all H1). In contrast to H3 and what has 
been predicted by the HLR, the absence of a negative coefficient for the variable 
DREGIME in Models 2A and 2B, as well as the overall results obtained for the An-
glo-Saxon and the continental European samples do not support H3 – i.e. that high-
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er levels of institutional pressure to disclose an audit committee charter iron out 
cross-sectional differences in audit committee scope.32 
3.5.3 Audit committee scope and audit committee activity 
Table 3.4 presents the results of OLS regressions with the number of audit commit-
tee meetings (ACMEET) as the dependent variable. Based on the premise that pub-
licly available audit committee charters are also used to determine the internal 
work programs of audit committees, H2 suggests that the number of audit commit-
tee meetings is positively related to ACSCOPE. In line with this prediction and in 
the Anglo-Saxon sample, we find that the coefficients of ACSCOPE are positive and 
significant in Model 3A as well as in Model 4A (both, p < 0.05). Furthermore, we 
document a positive relation between our proxies for audit committee activity and 
LEVERAGE as well as for the DREGIME (p < 0.01). 
 In contrast, for the continental European sample firms, we find no association 
between the scope of responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters and 
our proxies for the level of actual audit committee diligence. Instead, we document 
a negative relation to the reporting of consecutive losses (p < 0.05) and a positive 
association between ACMEET and BSTRENGTH (p < 0.05). Finally, as expected, our 
analysis shows a positive and negative association between the variables 
MULTLIST and TWOTIER, on the one hand, and the level of audit committee activi-
ty, on the other hand (p < 0.01 and p < 0.05, respectively). 
 Overall, the results provided in Table 3.4 give evidence to support H2 and to 
refute H3. In contrast to our expectations formulated by H3 and prior literature 
(HLR, 2003; Forster et al., 2009; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012), we document 
positive associations between the nominal scope of responsibilities set forth in 
audit committee charters and measures of actual committee activity precisely in 
institutional settings characterized by more stringent disclosure regimes concern-
ing audit committee charters, and an absence thereof in voluntary settings. We will 
next summarize our main findings and discuss implications for policy makers and 
researchers in the concluding section of this chapter. 
  
                                                                  
32 If the disclosure regime and level of coercive pressure would lead to isomorphism in ACSCOPE, then 
we would expect to observe a negative coefficient of the explanatory variable DREGIME in Model 2A and 
2B. Additionally, we would expect to find more significant explanatory variables in Model 2B than in 2A.  
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Table 3.3: Binomial count model for audit committee scope 
   Anglo-Saxon setting Cont. European setting 
Hypotheses, variables  Sign Model 1A Model 2A Model 1B Model 2B 
H1 SIZE  + 0.037*** 0.085** 0.061 ** 0.116 **
   (2.55) (2.28) (1.93)  (1.79) 
 INDUSTRY  + 0.049* 0.124 * 0.125 ** 0 .224 **
   (1.48) (1.40) (2.07) (1.75) 
 LOSSES  + 0.045* 0.133** -0.010  0.020 
   (1.54) (1.69) (-0.14 )  (0.15) 
 LEVERAGE  + -0.004 -0.017 0.088  0.119 
   (-0.05) (-0.07) (0.54)  (0.34) 
 BLOCK  +/- -0.001 -0.000 -0.002  -0.004 
   (-0.65) (-0.03) (-1.24)  (-1.13) 
 BSTRENGTH  + -0.020* -0.062 * 0.053*  0.096* 
   (-1.41) (-1.63) (1.63)  (1.56) 
 DUALITY  - 0.008 0.034 -0.046  0.015 
   (0.87) (-0.25) (-0.72)  (0.11) 
H3 DREGIME  - 0.150*** -0.060 0.402 *** 0.356 ***
   (3.44) (-0.46) (6.87) (3.01) 
 COMMITTEES  - 0.019* 0.053 * -0.007  -0.013 
   (1.57) (1.63) (-0.24)  (-0.22) 
 ACROLE  + 1.066** 0.166** -0.019  0.005  
   (1.76) (1.70) (-0.26)  (0.03) 
 MULTLIST  + -0.010 -0.026 0.164*  0.275 * 
   (-0.31) (-0.30) (1.65)  (1.33) 
 TWOTIER  - 0.023  -0.382 **
   (0.26)  (-1.92) 
 CONSTANT   2.053*** -0.143 0.927  -0.994 
   (5.55) (-.15) (1.30)  (-0.68) 
Prob > chi2: (1A) = .00, (2A) = .03, (1B) = .00, (2B) = .00
Log-likelihood: (1A) = -268.91, (2A) = -252.60; (1B) = -306.02 (2B) = -294.28
Number of observations: Anglo-Saxon sample (N = 100), continental European sample (N = 102) 
This table reports the binomial count models that test determinants of the number of distinct responsi-
bilities disclosed in audit committee charters (ACSCOPE). The following model is used: ACSCOPE = 
f(SIZE, INDUSTRY, LOSSES, LEVERAGE, BLOCK, BSTRENGTH, DUALITY, DREGIME, COMMITTEES, ACROLE, 
MULTILIST, TWOTIER). The difference between model 1 and 2 is the calculation of the dependent varia-
ble ACSCOPE. In model 2, we adjust for country effects within the Anglo-Saxon and continental Europe-
an setting by calculating AC Scope as the difference from the minimum value obtained for ACSCOPE 
within each country. The table shows the coefficients (z-value). The variables are defined in Panel B of 
Table 3.2. We also ran each model using the five factors comprising BSTRENGTH, however, we do not 
document significant results between individual board measures and ACSCOPE. ***, **, *indicate signifi-
cance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 level, respectively (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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Table 3.4: OLS regression for audit committee activity 
   Anglo-Saxon setting Cont. European setting 
 
Hypotheses, variables 
  
Sign 
Model 3A 
(ACMEET) 
Model 3B  
(ACMEET) 
 H2 ACSCOPE   + 0.127** 0.025 
   (2.03) (0.42) 
 SIZE  + -0.043 -0.201 
   (-0.20) (-0.66) 
 INDUSTRY  + 0.253 0.942* 
   (0.46) (1.48) 
 LOSSES  + 0.727 -1.454** 
   (1.04) (-2.28) 
 LEVERAGE  + 3.054*** 1.538 
   (2.84) (0.92) 
 BLOCK  +/- 0.015 -0.008 
   (1.15) (-0.69) 
 BSTRENGTH  + 0.087 0.570** 
   (0.40) (1.96) 
 DUALITY  - -0.026 0.729 
   (-0.04) (1.25) 
H3 DREGIME  + 4.764*** -0.844 
   (6.61) (-1.15) 
  COMMITTEES  - -0.222 0.080 
   (-1.16) (0.31) 
 ACROLE  + 1.193** 0.426 
   (2.12) (0.58) 
 MULTLIST  + 1.152** 2.282*** 
   (2.08) (2.58) 
 TWOTIER  - -1.852** 
   (-2.63) 
 CONSTANT   -5.114 8.664 
   (-0.99) (1.26) 
 N   100 102 
 Adjusted R2   55.28% 20.54% 
 F-statistic   7.89*** 3.05*** 
This table reports determinants of audit committee meeting frequency for 2010. The following model is 
used: ACMEET = f(ACSCOPE, SIZE, INDUSTRY, LOSSES, LEVERAGE, BLOCK, BSTRENGTH, DUALITY, 
DREGIME, ACROLE, MULTILIST, TWOTIER). We also ran an OLS regressions using ACSIZE as the depend-
ent variable with insignificant results and low model fit (Adjusted R2 < 5%). Further, we performed 
additional tests by disentangling BSTRENGTH into its five components. We find no significant results for 
Model 3B (Adjusted R2 stays constant). For Model 3A, we find significant results for board size (t = 1.84, 
p < 0.10) and board meetings (t = 3.03, p < 0.01). ***, **, * indicate significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 
levels, respectively (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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3.6 Discussion and conclusion 
Regulators and standard setters across different counties have embraced the con-
cept of publicly available charters as a means for informing legitimate interest 
groups about the audit committees’ role and responsibilities and for improving 
audit committee effectiveness at the firm level. However, theoretical reasoning and 
empirical evidence has been provided suggesting that audit committee charters of 
different firms are boilerplate copies of each other, and that firms deliberately 
decouple actual committee practices from the content of their charters (Holder-
Webb and Cohen, 2012). Further, it has been argued that the level of isomorphism 
and decoupling related to corporate narrative documents that fulfill the dual pur-
pose of external organizational information provision and internal direction provi-
sion will increase with the level of institutional pressure exerted on firms to dis-
close such documents (Harvard Law Review, 2003). If these concerns were justi-
fied, publicly available audit committee charters would constitute perilous or at 
best meaningless documents perversely in those institutional settings character-
ized by a stringent disclosure regime, such as the US.33 
 The empirical evidence presented in this chapter shows, however, that audit 
committee charters differ systematically in content from one firm to another and 
that this holds in institutional settings characterized by low as well as by high lev-
els of coercive pressure exerted on firms to publicly disclose an audit committee 
charter. Thus, our results do not corroborate previously raised concerns that pub-
licly available audit committee charters are boilerplate copies of each other and 
that a disclosure regime fuels isomorphism in charter content across firms vis-à-
vis voluntary disclosure settings (HLR, 2003; Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012). 
 Further, we do not find empirical evidence in favor of the supposition that 
institutional pressure exerted on firms to place an audit committee charter on the 
public record will increase the probability that firms decouple actual audit com-
mittee practices from the charters content. On the contrary, we show evidence 
suggesting that in countries where the regulatory setting is more stringent (Anglo-
Saxon countries), the professed activities of audit committees are more closely 
related to their actual work, relative to voluntary disclosure settings (continental 
Europe). This also indicates that audit committee charters are adopted for efficien-
cy and not purely for legitimacy reasons and that it might well be worthwhile for 
legitimate interest groups (e.g., investors) to read and compare audit committee 
charters of firms listed in countries with a stringent disclosure regime. 
                                                                  
33 If investors would become aware of elevated isomorphism in audit committee charters, they would 
be unlikely to compare charters between firms or even read them (Holder-Webb and Cohen, 2012). In 
this scenario, these charters would constitute meaningless documents. In case audit committee charters 
differ in content, but remain decoupled from actual practice, on the other hand, investors might form 
unreasonable expectations about what audit committees can be expected to accomplish. 
74 
The intended purpose of audit committee charters is not only to inform investors, 
but also to provide authority, direction and discipline to audit committee members 
(BRC, 1999). Kalbers and Fogarty (1998) point out that effective audit committees 
require a strong organizational charter, institutional support and diligence. Ac-
cording to Cohen et al. (2010; 2012) and DeZoort et al. (2008), audit committees 
have become more active, diligent, and powerful in the US following the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act. We partly attribute this development to the requirement to formalize 
the responsibilities of the audit committee in a written charter, which is disclosed 
to the outside world. Beasley et al. (2009), for example, found that agendas of US 
audit committees are often tailored to the audit committee charter. 
 On the other hand, our study casts doubt on whether audit committee charters 
that are being voluntarily disclosed should matter to investors. The presented 
results show that – in voluntary disclosure settings – publicly available audit com-
mittee charters may not hold in store substantive information about actual audit 
committee practices. Hence, in this context, audit committee charters may function 
primarily as vehicles to gain external legitimacy via front-stage impression man-
agement, but not as a means for informing legitimate interest groups about the 
committees’ actual responsibilities, nor as an instrument for providing authority, 
direction, and discipline to audit committee members. Voluntary disclosure may 
serve as a symbol of legitimacy, which allows companies to gain access to re-
sources (Spira, 1999; Chen and Li, 2013). However, audit committee charters that 
are being voluntarily disclosed do not appear to strengthen the effectiveness of 
audit committees from an agency theory perspective.  
 The findings of this study are subject to the following limitations that may 
provide opportunities for future research. First, we gathered our data on audit com-
mittee scope and audit committee activity from archival sources of information, 
which cannot proxy for the manner by which audit committee members construct 
meanings of effectiveness (Gendron and Bédard, 2006). Accordingly, our dependent 
variables do not capture the relative importance and effort that audit committee 
members devote to individual responsibilities inside and outside of formal meetings. 
They do also not capture the individual behaviors of audit committee members. As 
pointed out by Higgs (2003) and Spira and Bender (2004), the effectiveness of board 
committees in their assigned roles depends as much on their individual behaviors 
and relationships as the prescribed framework in which they operate. 
 Second, we have gathered data on audit committee scope using human-scored 
schemes. Even though this method typically scores high on validity in comparison 
with word-count systems and computerized methods, its labor intensity severely 
limits our sample size (Martson and Shrives, 1991). Future studies could use more 
cost-effective and sophisticated mixed-method techniques to study the content of 
audit committee charters (e.g., Grüning, 2011; Lewis et al., 2013). Third, this study 
is restricted to a subset of the largest economies by GDP, to large-cap firms and to a 
short period of observation, which may limit the generalizability of our findings. 
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 While keeping in mind the aforementioned limitations, different policy impli-
cations emerge from this study for the Anglo-Saxon and continental European 
context. One of the central measures for modernizing corporate governance in the 
European Union, set forth by the European Commission in 2003, was to reduce 
barriers to shareholders’ ability to evaluate the corporate governance practices of 
public interest entities in the EU. However, the presented results suggest that – as 
far as audit committees are concerned – the European Commission has not achieved 
this objective. Rather, our findings suggest that, introducing a more stringent dis-
closure regime on audit committee charters in the EU should be considered. 
 In the Anglo-Saxon context, in turn, the question emerges whether cross-
sectional differences in the scope of responsibilities set forth in audit committee 
charters actually lead to economic benefits for investors and financial markets. 
Recent first hand insights from audit committee members in North America point 
out adverse consequences of increasing the scope of responsibilities assigned to 
the audit committee (Beasley et al., 2009; ICAA, FRC and ICAS, 2012). Specifically, 
audit committee members warned of creating unrealistic expectations about what 
audit committees can achieve, and noted that assigning ever more responsibilities 
to the audit committee creates the risk of it becoming so burdened that it is unable 
to carry out its core functions effectively.34 Another potential unintended conse-
quences of a disclosure regime on audit committee charter is that this could deter 
potential audit committee members due to liability concerns (Rowland, 2002). 
 Against this background, future research could study the relationship between 
the scope of responsibilities inscribed in audit committee charters and measures of 
audit committee performance in institutional settings characterized by a stringent 
disclosure regime. Given that audit committees face constraints in terms of, inter 
alia, expertise, resources and diligence when faced with an increasing number of 
responsibilities (Whiteoak, 2007) an important avenue for future research is to 
examine the impact of increasing audit committee scope on composite and indi-
vidual measures of audit committee effectiveness. 
 In turn, in situations where organizations seem to decouple audit committee 
charters from actual audit committee activity to gain external legitimacy, longitu-
dinal studies can explore how investors react to this form of impression manage-
ment (Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2011), and whether, as predicted by Suchman 
(1995), such a legitimacy façade leads to a loss of external legitimacy in the long 
run. Affirmative evidence in conjunction with the findings presented here could 
encourage firms to couple actual organizational practices to the content of their 
charters and vice versa. 
                                                                  
34 According to Olson (1999: 1102), overloading audit committee members with too many responsibili-
ties can have three adverse impacts: (1) committee effort and energy may be dissipated in so many 
directions that audit committees become ever more busy but ever less effective; (2) good directors may 
decline to take on the burden of serving on the committee (3) those who do serve may face the risk of 
personal liability or a greater chance of being named as defendants in shareholder lawsuits. 
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Appendix: Audit committee scope categorization scheme 
Theme: 
Oversight responsibilities 
Statement: 
Corresponding tasks set out in audit committee charters 
Frequency counts
(n = 202)
1. Financial disclosure
1.1 Financial statements Review integrity of financial statements, audit adjustments, going-concern 
assumption, Recommend financial statement for board approval 
100%
1.2 Accounting policies Review compliance with accounting standards and policies, Recommend changes 
in accounting policies, Advise board on emerging practices 
97%
1.3 Accounting practices Review accounting estimates and management judgments, the accounting 
treatment for unusual transactions  
70%
1.4 Press releases  Review earnings press releases & analyst presentations 45%
1.5 Financial reporting
       process 
Review the effectiveness of the financial reporting system and processes, the 
CEO/CFO certifications of financial statements 
41%
2. External auditing  
2.1 Appointment  (re-)Appoint and replace the external auditor / Recommend appointment 97%
2.2 External audit findings Review the results of the external audit plan, the adequacy of corrective actions 
taken by management, any audit problems and reservations 
95%
2.3 Independence  Evaluate the independence of the EA, Ensure the EA/lead auditor rotation 88%
2.4 Audit plan and fees Review and approve the annual audit plan 86%
2.5 Performance review Review the quality of the services provided by the EA, the cost effectiveness  70%
2.6 Service provision Resolve disagreements between EA, the IA and management, Coordinate the 
work of the EA with other parties, Monitor the progress against plan 
69%
2.7 Non-audit services Determine categories of non-audit services to be provided by the EA, Pre-approve 
non-audit services, Ensure disclosure of non-audit services  
69%
2.8 Hiring former employees Recommend a policy for hiring EA employees, Monitor the compliance  37%
3. Internal auditing  
3.1 Internal audit findings Review the internal audit findings and management response 79%
3.2 Internal audit plan Determine the focal points of the internal audit, Approve annual audit plan 77%
3.3 Performance review Evaluate the quality of the services provided by the IA, the performance 
of the head of IA, the possibility to outsource the IA 
68%
3.4 Organisational set-up Review the organisational structure of the IA, Approve the IA charter 58%
3.5 Budget Approve the internal audit budget and that adequate resources are available 54%
3.6 Service provision Coordinate the work of the IA with other parties, Monitor the IA progress 33%
3.7 Objectivity Review the objectivity of the IA 29%
4. Business control  
4.1 Internal control Review the internal control report, material weaknesses of internal control  93%
4.2 Risk management Review risk management governance (guidelines & policies), Oversee 
the management of risks, the insurance cover and plans 
91%
4.3 Whistleblowing Establish whistleblowing procedures, Monitor compliance therewith 63%
4.4 Fraud Review the processes for detecting fraud, fraud report, exposure to fraud 25%
4.5 Related-party transactions Approve related-party transactions 20%
4.6 IT/IS security Review IT/IS security 13%
4.7 Officer expenses Review the expense report of executives and officers 6%
5. Corporate governance  
5.1 Regulatory compliance Review regulatory compliance (e.g., accounting, environmental, listing rules) 80%
5.2 Internal compliance Review compliance with code of conduct/ethics 56%
5.3 Financial management Review capital raising, investment activities, treasury policies 20%
5.4 Tax matters Review tax planning, compliance, reporting 18%
5.5 CG guidelines & policies Review CG documents, board charters, Advise board on emerging CG issues 15%
5.6 Other responsibilities Review acquisitions and Joint Ventures, management succession planning  24%
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CHAPTER 4 Audit Committee Oversight of 
Enterprise Risk Management 
and Firm Performance during 
the 2007-2011 Financial Crisis 
Abstract: Is there a relationship between firm performance during a period of 
economic distress and the characteristics of independent audit committees? This is 
an important question, given the persistence and severity of the recent financial 
crises and the importance attributed to audit committees in corporate governance 
research and practice. This study documents positive relationships between the 
extent of audit committee authority for overseeing enterprise risk management 
(ERM) and the subsequent performance of S&P 500 firms during the 2007-2011 
global financial crisis. We also find that audit committees with longer tenure direc-
tors and multiple directorships are more likely to be associated with better firm 
performance during a financial crisis. To substantiate these findings, we provide 
further evidence which indicates that those firms where substantial authority for 
overseeing risk management rests with an independent audit committee are more 
likely to exhibit lower performance variability during a crisis period. The study at 
hand contributes to research and practice in two major ways. First, our results 
suggest that independent audit committees are well positioned in the corporate 
governance mosaic to assume substantial authority for overseeing risk manage-
ment. Second, formal designation of authority for overseeing ERM and the degree 
of firm-specific and governance expertise that audit committee members bring to 
the table seem to be important determinants for audit committee effectiveness in 
terms of safeguarding firm performance in periods of economic distress.  
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4.1 Introduction 
The first decade of the 21st century marked a comparatively volatile economic 
environment with two periods of severe economic distress - namely, the early 
2000s recession (2001-2003) and the global financial crisis that took hold in 2007 
(2007-2012). At the same time, the role of audit committees in the US corporate 
governance system expanded substantially as a direct result of the recommenda-
tions given by the Blue Ribbon Committee (1999) and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
(2002). Interestingly, a number of studies now report affirmative evidence for 
systematic associations between the characteristics of US audit committees and 
firm performance during the early 2000s recession and the subsequent global 
financial crisis (Chan and Li, 2008; Yeh et al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 2012). 
 A closer look at existing audit committee literature reveals that the aforemen-
tioned studies have one thing in common that differentiates them from prior re-
search which reported no relationship between audit committees and firm per-
formance outcomes (Daily 1996; Ellstand et al., 1998; Klein, 1998). All of them rely 
on empirical data gathered in times of economic distress. This suggests that sys-
tematic associations between audit committees and firm performance indicators 
tend to surface during significant adverse economic events. In line with this propo-
sition, Yeh et al. (2011) find significant associations between audit committee 
characteristics and firm performance proxies during a period of economic distress 
(2007-2008) and an absence thereof in an ordinary period (2005-2006). 
 The factor which is seemingly driving the audit committees-firm performance 
association during a period of economic distress, according to agency theory (Jen-
sen and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983) and existing literature (Chan and 
Li, 2008; Yeh et al., 2011) is the degree of audit committee independence from 
management and from the company. More specifically, it has been argued, based 
on agency theory and evidence from the market for outside directors (Gilson, 
1990; Yermack, 2004; Fich and Shivdasani, 2007), that independent directors on 
audit committees have strong incentives to curb excessive risk-taking and to pro-
vide their expert prestige and monitoring power in a crisis period. Excessive risk-
taking may thus be prevented by increasing the independent directors on the audit 
committee, leading in turn to lower losses and better firm performance during a 
period of economic distress, such as the recent financial crisis (Yeh et al., 2011). 
 In the US, however, listed firms have been required to establish an audit com-
mittee made up exclusively of independent directors since 2002, in accordance 
with Section 301 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX). Since the Securities and Ex-
change Commission (SEC) issued a rule that firms will be de-listed if they fail to 
comply with SOX, it is reasonable to assume that US audit committees were staffed 
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with directors who possessed a sufficient degree of independence several years 
before and during the global financial crisis (henceforth GFC) took hold in 2007.35 
 However, relatively little is known about the factors that determine the effec-
tiveness of independent audit committees to impact firm performance during a 
crisis period. Much of the existing literature consists of empirical research that 
links cross-sectional variations in audit committee independence to the quality of 
financial reporting and external auditing (Bédard and Gendron, 2010). While the 
evidence provided in this body of literature underscores the merit of setting strin-
gent standards regarding audit committee independence, it does not offer many 
theoretical insights or much empirical evidence regarding factors that determine 
the effectiveness of fully independent audit committees to safeguard firm perfor-
mance during a crisis period. It is important to address this gap because enhancing 
the effectiveness of independent audit committees is a central issue confronting 
corporate governance scholars and practitioners (Carcello et al., 2011). 
 To fill this void, it has been suggested to draw from the rich literature on team 
effectiveness published in the realm of organizational studies and social psycholo-
gy (Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Payne et al., 2009). In this study, we apply a three-
dimensional framework established by Hollenbeck et al. (2012) to the audit com-
mittees of S&P 500 firms during the 2007-2011 GFC. This framework encompasses 
three dimensions: authority differentiation, skill differentiation, and temporal 
stability. In light of the existing audit committee literature and for the purpose of 
this study we operationalize these dimensions as cross-sectional differences in (1) 
the degree to which audit committees are charged with authority to oversee ERM, 
(2) the financial, governance and firm-specific expertise of committee members, 
and (3) the temporal stability in audit committees. We deliberately limit this study 
to US listed firms in order to study audit committee effectiveness in a context 
where all members are supposedly independent. 
 This study contributes to the literature in two major ways. First, our study 
adds to mounting empirical evidence which suggests that independent audit com-
mittees can safeguard firm performance during periods of economic distress. Sec-
ond, the main significance of our study is to show that formal designation of au-
thority for overseeing risk management, board tenure and multiple directorships 
can be important determinants of audit committee effectiveness in the context of 
safeguarding firm performance during significant adverse economic events. Policy 
makers should take note of these findings, due to the increasing importance at-
tributed to risk oversight in the wake of the GFC (OECD, 2009). 
                                                                  
35 An alternative explanation would be that non-executive directors “officially” designated as independ-
ent were in fact not free from undue influence. Given the stringent post-SOX independence require-
ments for audit committee members in the US, however, we assert that the vast majority of audit com-
mittee members were sufficiently independent before and during the financial crises (Rupley et al., 
2011). 
80 
This chapter starts with a discussion of the findings presented by Yeh et al. (2011) 
and the conceptual framework of Hollenbeck et al. (2012). Next, we develop hy-
potheses concerning the impact of audit committee authority differentiations, skill 
differentiation, and temporal stability on firm performance outcomes during the 
GFC. Subsequently, we present our research design, empirical results, and the con-
clusions of the study at hand. 
4.2 Research background 
4.2.1 Audit committees and firm performance during a crisis period 
In a special issue of the journal Corporate Governance: An International Review, 
dedicated exclusively to the role of corporate governance in precipitating or exac-
erbating the 2007-2011 GFC, empirical evidence is provided by Yeh et al. (2011), 
which suggests that the independence of directors on audit committees affected 
the level of risk-taking and the subsequent performance of large financial institu-
tions from G8 countries. The study of Yeh et al. holds in store three important find-
ings that provide the theoretical and motivational point of departure for the study 
at hand. We shall discuss each of them in turn. 
 First, audit committees may impact firm performance outcomes. This is a 
noteworthy finding, because the first wave of audit committee-firm performance 
research carried out in the 1990s failed to provide evidence for a relationship be-
tween audit committees and firm performance (Daily et al., 1998; Ellstand et al., 
1998; Klein, 1998; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1998). More recent studies, including 
Chan and Li (2008), Aldamen et al. (2012) and Bolton (2014), however, seem to 
square with the results presented by Yeh et al. Table 4.1 lists ten empirical studies 
of the audit committee-firm performance link published between 1996 and 2014. 
The table shows four papers published between 1996 and 1999 that find no asso-
ciation between audit committees and firm performance, whereas five out of six 
studies published between 2008 and 2014 document evidence for systematic rela-
tionships between firm performance and audit committee characteristics.36 
 Second, systematic associations between audit committee characteristics and 
firm performance indicators tend to surface in periods of economic distress. Yeh et 
al. find statistically significant associations between audit committee characteris-
tics and firm performance proxies during a period of economic distress (2007-
2008), and an absence thereof in a non-distress period (2005-2006). In fact, all 
studies depicted in Table 4.1 that document statistically significant associations 
                                                                  
36 Hence the percentage of papers reporting affirmative evidence on the audit committee-firm perfor-
mance link has risen from quasi zero to over 80%. We attribute this trend primarily to two factors: (1) 
the expanding role of audit committees in the US system of corporate governance, resulting from the 
BRC (1999) and SOX (2002), and (2) the contextual focus of recent research (crisis period setting). 
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between audit committees and firm performance rely on data gathered in times of 
economic distress. Hence, there is evidence to suggest that audit committees can 
contribute to safeguarding firm performance during periods of adverse economic 
events. Intuitively, the question emerges: which factors determine the effective-
ness of audit committees in safeguarding performance in times of economic dis-
tress? We deem this an important question to be studied in light of the persistence 
of periods of crisis for corporate America during the past decades.37  
 Third, according to Yeh et al. (2011) and as predicted by agency theory (Jensen 
and Meckling, 1976; Fama and Jensen, 1983), the factor seemingly driving the au-
dit committee-firm performance relationship during a period of crisis is the pro-
portion of independent directors serving on the audit committee. According to Yeh 
et al., financial institutions with more independent audit committees performed 
better during 2007-2008, because independent directors – supposedly due to ca-
reer and reputation concerns – have incentives to curb excessive managerial risk-
taking and to provide their expert prestige and monitoring power during a crisis. 
In this context, Gilson (1990) and Fich and Shivdasani (2007) show that directors 
sitting on the boards of firms in trouble are less likely to receive new appoint-
ments. Yermack (2004), in turn, documents considerable wealth consequences for 
outside directors if the respective firm performs well. Recent reviews of the empir-
ical audit committee literature show that independence is the factor most fre-
quently associated with different dimensions of audit committee effectiveness 
(Bédard and Gendron, 2010).  
  
                                                                  
37 Figure 1 shows five years with a negative change in total annual return: the savings and loan crisis of 
1990 (-3%), the early 2000s recession (-9%, -12%, and -22%), and the late 2000s financial crisis (-
37%). This means that five years in this 20-year period can be considered to be within a period of crisis.  
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Figure 4.1 S&P 500 total annual return changes between 1988 and 2011.
 
However, a closer look at the descriptive statistics on audit committee independ-
ence for the sample firms and time period studied by Yeh et al. reveals that at the 
outset of the GFC, approximately 97 percent of the directors serving on the audit 
committees of the largest financial institutions from the G8 countries were classi-
fied as being independent according to prevalent standards. In four of the eight 
countries featured in the study of Yeh et al., namely, Canada, Germany, the UK, and 
the US, the percentage of independent directors serving on the audit committees of 
the 20 largest financial institutions between 2005-2008 exceeded 99 percent.38 As 
far as the US is concerned, this does not come as a surprise, since Section 301 of 
the Sarbanes-Oxley-Act of 2002 mandates that US-listed firms maintain an audit 
committee made up entirely of independent directors. To enforce this, the SEC 
issued a rule that firms be delisted if they failed to comply with Section 301 of SOX. 
 The fact that US-listed firms were already required to maintain a fully inde-
pendent audit committee according to SOX casts doubt on the finding of Yeh et al. 
(2011) that audit committee independence moved the needle on cross-sectional 
differences in firm performance outcomes during the GFC. At the same time, a 
number of prior studies show that not all fully independent audit committees are 
equally effective in their monitoring efforts (e.g. Hoitash et al., 2009; Dhaliwal et 
al., 2010; Carcello et al., 2011). These considerations lead us to formulate two re-
search questions, which are the focus of the present study: First, which factors may 
explain cross-sectional differences in the effectiveness of fully independent audit 
committees in safeguarding firm performance during periods of economic dis-
tress? Second, are cross-sectional differences along these characteristics associat-
ed with better firm performance during the GFC, as suggested by recent evidence? 
                                                                  
38 When assuming that on average four directors serve on an audit committee, then the sample studied 
by Yeh et al. contains about 480 audit committee members, thereof circa 19 non-independent directors. 
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4.2.2 What makes fully independent audit committees effective? 
Drawing on agency theory, the empirical audit committee literature consists to a 
large extent of studies that link cross-sectional variations in audit committee inde-
pendence to several dimensions of audit committee effectiveness, While the evi-
dence provided in this body of literature shows positive associations between 
audit committee independence and effectiveness, it offers limited insights regard-
ing the factors that enhance audit committee effectiveness in a context where firms 
are required to maintain fully independent audit committees. It is important to 
address this gap, given that most countries require listed firms to set up and main-
tain an audit committee composed of a majority or entirely of independent direc-
tors. Furthermore, corporate governance scholars have outlined that board of di-
rectors and audit committees cannot be understood from a single theoretical lens, 
and that agency theory alone may be insufficient to explain cross-sectional varia-
tions in their effectiveness (Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Carcello et al., 2011) 
 One field of research that could provide valuable insights is literature on the 
effectiveness of different types of teams that has been published outside the corpo-
rate governance and audit committee domain. After all, the main difference be-
tween the audit committee and team effectiveness literature is the focus of the 
former on agency theory and independence as primary dimensions of effective-
ness. In a setting like the US, where all audit committee members are supposed to 
be independent, this difference diminishes. What remains is the question: what 
makes fully independent audit committees effective? 
 To provide an answer to this question, we first scanned seminal papers on the 
determinants of team effectiveness published in the realm of organizational sci-
ences and social psychology (e.g. Sundstrom et al., 1990; Milliken and Martins, 
1996; Cohen and Bailey, 1997; Mathieu et al., 2008). However, the tricky part of 
this exercise – i.e. applying evidence on the antecedents of team effectiveness pub-
lished outside the realm of corporate governance research to audit committees – is 
to make sure that the dimensions studied are relevant in the context of audit com-
mittees. After all, the predominant position in academic literature seems to be that 
the relation between team characteristics and team performance is contingent on 
the type of team studied (Stewart, 2006; LePine et al., 2008). 
 However, Hollenbeck et al. (2012) suggest differently. In a paper published in 
the Academy of Management Review, the authors show that by and large the same 
underlying dimensions have been used in academic literature to study different 
kinds of teams (e.g., management teams, product development teams, project 
teams, or crews). According to Hollenbeck et al. (2012: 84), “the literature on 
teams proposes a dizzying array of different team types, even though the number 
of actual underlying dimensions used as building blocks to differentiate teams is 
limited”. By reviewing 42 seminal papers published on different team types in high 
impact journals included in the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), Hollenbeck et 
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al. develop a framework to differentiate and study teams along three dimensions: 
(1) authority differentiation; (2) skill differentiation; and (3) temporal stability.39 
 When conferring the aforementioned dimensions on audit committees, they 
can be defined as follows: authority differentiation refers to the degree to which 
specific oversight responsibilities are vested in the audit committee; skill differen-
tiation is the degree to which audit committee members have specialized 
knowledge or capabilities that may enhance their effectiveness; and temporal sta-
bility refers to the degree to which audit committee members have a history of 
working together and an expectation of working together in the future.40 In the 
following we shall consider each dimension and explain in what way they might 
contribute to the effectiveness of independent audit committees to impact firm 
performance during a crisis period. Thereby, we aim to enrich the existing litera-
ture on audit committees with insights provided by the team effectiveness litera-
ture and merge two strands of research that have hitherto been largely undertaken 
in isolation from each other. 
4.3 Hypothesis development 
4.3.1 Audit committee authority differentiation 
Studies concerning the role of boards of directors during the GFC suggest that in-
ter-firm differences in board oversight of enterprise risk management (ERM) may 
help to explain why some firms maneuver better through a financial crisis than 
others (Brown et al., 2009; Erkens et al., 2012; Francis et al., 2012).41 In this con-
text, it has been argued – based on the experiences from previous periods of crisis 
– that a board’s inability to monitor firm risk-taking is the major cause of financial 
crises in the first place (Greenspan, 1999; Mitton, 2002; Dobbin and Jung, 2010). 
Hence, it is easy to see why there is tremendous interest among regulators, practi-
                                                                  
39 As pointed out by Hollenbeck et al., (2012: 84), these dimensions were chosen for conceptual and 
practical reasons. Conceptually, 38%, 55%, and 57% of the 42 papers reviewed by Hollenbeck et al. 
invoke authority differentiation, skill differentiation and temporal stability, respectively. On the practi-
cal side, they reflect the dimensions that go into the construction of organization charts in terms of the 
vertical dimension (authority), the horizontal dimension (skills) and names (temporal stability). 
40 Independence may constitute a fourth dimension in Hollenbeck et al.’s framework when studying 
teams in the context of corporate governance. Since the audit committees of US-listed firms are re-
quired to be staffed entirely with independent directors, we disregard this dimension in this study. 
41 According to the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission (COSO), en-
terprise risk management deals with risks and opportunities affecting value creation or preservation 
and can be defined as “a process, effected by an entity’s board of directors, management and personnel, 
applied in strategic setting and across the enterprise, designed to identify potential events that may 
affect the entity, and manage risks to be within its risk appetite, to provide reasonable assurance re-
garding achievement of objectives” (COSO, 2004: 2).  
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tioners and academics to better understand the structural relationships between 
board oversight of ERM and firm performance during periods of crisis. 
 However, boards of directors are not the sole bodies responsible for oversee-
ing risk management. According to US regulation, boards of directors are required 
to delegate authority to oversee risk matters to an independent audit committee. 
The following passage from the New York Stock Exchange corporate governance 
rules outlines the designated role of audit committees of firms listed on that stock 
exchange with respect to risk oversight: 
“While it is the job of the CEO and senior management to assess and 
manage the company’s exposure to risk, the audit committee must dis-
cuss guidelines and policies that govern the process by which this is han-
dled. The audit committee should discuss the company’s major financial 
risk exposures and the steps management has taken to monitor and con-
trol such exposures. The audit committee is not required to be the sole 
body responsible for risk assessment and management, but, as stated 
above, the committee must discuss guidelines and policies to govern the 
process by which risk assessment and management is undertaken. Many 
companies, particular financial companies, manage and assess their risks 
through mechanisms other than the audit committee. The process these 
companies have in place should be reviewed in a general manner by the 
audit committee, but they need not be replaced by the audit committee”   
 (NYSE corporate governance rules, 2003, 2011). 
We draw two conclusions from the above-stated NYSE provisions. First, the boards 
of directors of US-listed firms were already required to assign the task of discuss-
ing guidelines and policies for risk assessment and management to their respective 
audit committees several years before the GFC took hold in October 2007. Second, 
the NSYE governance rules grant considerable leeway to boards of directors to 
determine whether the audit committees’ role with respect to risk oversight 
should be strictly procedural and indirect (limited to oversight of guidelines and 
policies) or more substantial and direct (more extensive oversight of ERM, e.g. 
levels of risk exposure and processes for managing risk). 
 With this as a background, it does not come as a surprise that a survey among 
281 US audit committee members conducted between January 2007 and Novem-
ber 2008 by the audit firm KPMG shows substantial differences in the level of risk 
oversight assumed by audit committees in the US at the outset of the GFC.42 This 
intuitively raises the question of whether there is an association between the ex-
tent of audit committee authority to oversee ERM and firm performance during the 
                                                                  
42 According to KPMG (2008: 6), merely 17 percent indicated that their audit committee has primary 
responsibility for the oversight of significant nonfinancial reporting risks, while 56 percent said such 
responsibility rests with the full board, and 18 percent said it rests with various board committees. 
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GFC. In other words: are audit committees charged with substantial oversight of 
ERM more likely to prevent firm performance dips related to unexpected and sig-
nificant adverse economic events, such as the GFC, than those charged with limited 
oversight of ERM? In the academic literature, the aforementioned research ques-
tions remain largely unexplored (Turley and Zaman, 2004). The professional liter-
ature, on the other hand, provides some arguments against, but even more in favor 
of delegating substantial authority for overseeing risk management to the audit 
committee. 
 On the one hand, it has been argued that due to the already lengthy list of audit 
committee responsibilities related to financial reporting and the external/internal 
audit function, adding oversight of risk exposure and the management thereof to 
the committee agenda will lead to audit committee overload (Beasley et al., 2008). 
In a rather critical paper, Burton (2008: 3) stresses that “audit committees are 
constantly being charged with ever greater responsibilities and that authoritative 
bodies seem to think that the audit committee is the appropriate entity for what-
ever additional responsibility it wishes to place on listed firms”. Burton further 
outlines that the traditional role of audit committees, namely, to oversee financial 
reporting and auditing, is neither prospective nor managerial, and therefore large-
ly incompatible with oversight of ERM. Based on this line of reasoning, it has been 
suggested that separate standing committees of the board, exclusively responsible 
for ERM oversight, be formed, instead of placing additional duties on already 
overworked audit committees (Fraser and Henry, 2007; Burton, 2008). 
 In direct response to the aforementioned concerns, several papers advocate 
that audit committees are ideally positioned in the corporate governance mosaic to 
oversee the assessment and management of risk exposure and financial matters 
and that audit committee effectiveness is also a matter of setting priorities and 
therefore not threatened by “crowded agendas” per se (e.g., KPMG, 2009; Sherman 
et al., 2009; NACD, 2010; IIA, 2011). First, audit committees may be in a good posi-
tion to assume substantial authority related to risk and financial oversight, given 
their involvement in many of a firm’s core governance activities and interaction 
with the major players in the corporate governance mosaic (NACD, 2010; IIA, 
2011). Second, and in direct response to the “crowded agenda argument”, Sherman 
et al. (2009) argue that audit committees should move more critical business is-
sues like overseeing strategy, risk management, and financial management, to the 
top of their agenda, instead of focusing primarily on compliance and financial re-
porting matters (KPMG, 2011).43 
                                                                  
43 A survey among US audit committee members by the audit firm KPMG and the NACD (2011) reinforc-
es this proposition. When asked to which areas of oversight audit committees would like to devote the 
most time, “risk management” and “corporate strategy” ranked among the top three answers. The 
survey further shows that in order to enhance audit committee effectiveness, audit committee members 
plan to better link strategy and risk and prioritize the committee’s agenda to focus on the most im-
portant issues. 
88 
The global financial crisis constitutes an interesting natural experiment for testing 
the economic consequences of charging audit committees with substantial authori-
ty to oversee ERM on firm performance outcomes. Due to the empirical evidence 
provided by Yeh et al. (2011), Aldamen et al. (2012), and Bolton (2014), and the 
importance attributed to ERM for safeguarding firm performance during periods of 
economic distress, such as the GFC (Erkens et al., 2012; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 
2012), we formulate the following hypothesis:  
H1: The effectiveness of independent audit committees to impact firm performance 
during a period of crisis is contingent on the extent of audit committee author-
ity to oversee risk management. 
4.3.2 Audit committee skill differentiation 
We define audit committee skill differentiation as the degree to which audit com-
mittees are composed of directors who have specialized knowledge and/or capa-
bilities which may contribute to their effectiveness. In contrast to authority differ-
entiation, there is no shortage of empirical and experimental evidence for an asso-
ciation between the skills and capabilities of audit committee members and audit 
committee effectiveness (e.g., DeZoort, 1998; Hoitash et al., 2009; Dhaliwal et al., 
2010). Reviews of the empirical audit committee literature even show that, next to 
independence, audit committee skill differentiation constitutes the factor that has 
been found to be most frequently correlated with different proxies of audit com-
mittee effectiveness (Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Lin and Hwang, 2010). 
 Regarding the implementation of the expertise required of audit committee 
members, US policymakers have focused primarily on financial competencies in 
their attempts to improve audit committee effectiveness (Krishnan and Lee, 2009). 
US stock exchange rules and the SOX have institutionalized a minimum threshold 
of financial competencies for the audit committees of US-listed firms by requiring 
every audit committee member to be “financially literate” and that firms disclose 
whether at least one audit committee member can be classified as an “audit com-
mittee financial expert” (SEC, 2003).44 Despite this stringent requirement of the 
SEC, it has been pointed out that audit committee effectiveness may be further 
enhanced along the dimension of skill differentiation in at least three distinct ways 
(DeZoort and Salterio, 2001; Bédard and Gendron, 2010; Dhaliwal et al., 2010). 
 First, prior research demonstrates that financial expert directors differ from 
financially literate directors in terms of their oversight judgments (McDaniel et al., 
2002). Even though the audit committee literature reveals some controversy re-
garding the desirability of financial expertise over financial literacy (Kirk, 2000), it 
                                                                  
44 A discussion of the requirements for designating an audit committee member a ‘financial expert’ is 
beyond the scope of this study. For further information, please refer to: http://www.sec.gov/rules/ 
final/33-8177.htm. 
89 
is generally hypothesized in extant studies that increasing the number or propor-
tion of audit committee members who can be classified as financial experts beyond 
the minimum threshold of one member will contribute to audit committee effec-
tiveness (see e.g., Krishnan, 2005; Zhang et al., 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 
2008). Bédard and Gendron (2010) show that this hypothesis is confirmed by the 
majority of empirical audit committee studies published between 1994 and 2008.  
 Second, prior research drawing from the resource-based view of the firm (Pfef-
fer and Salancik, 1978) asserts that a main asset that outside directors bring to the 
board of a given firm – in addition to an independent view – is their body of 
knowledge and experiences gained at other firms, e.g., in the form of holding addi-
tional directorships (Hillman and Dalziel, 2003). Several studies confirm that hold-
ing additional directorships may contribute to audit committee effectiveness. Bé-
dard et al. (2004) and Yang and Krishnan (2005), for example, find that the likeli-
hood of aggressive earnings management is negatively related to the governance 
expertise of audit committee members. Hoitash et al. (2009), in turn, document a 
significant and positive relation between the supervisory expertise of audit com-
mittee members and the quality of internal control. Hence, we posit that expertise 
in governance may also be an important precursor for the audit committee-firm 
performance link in a period of crisis.  
 Third, it has been suggested that the effectiveness of independent directors is 
also contingent on their knowledge of the respective firm and industry (e.g., 
Beasley, 1996; Yang and Krishnan, 2005; Ghosh et al. 2010; Cohen et al., 2014). 
Audit committees staffed exclusively with recently appointed outside directors are 
likely to know little about the industry dynamics and the underlying business 
model of the respective firm. It is intuitive that a lack of firm- and industry-specific 
knowledge may create difficulties when carrying out complex tasks that require a 
solid understanding of the respective firms and industry, such as overseeing the 
way risks and financial matters are being managed (Zattoni and Cuomo, 2010). 
Accordingly, newly appointed independent directors might not be able to oversee 
and appraise managerial decisions – let alone stand up to management in case of 
disputes on risk management topics (Mueller-Kahle and Lewellyn, 2011). In this 
context, Bacon and Brown (1973) and Kesner (1998) argue that it takes at least 
three to five years for independent directors to gain a solid understanding of large 
and complex firms. 
 In sum, the existing corporate governance and audit committee literature pro-
vide theoretical reasoning and empirical evidence that the degree to which an 
audit committee is composed of members possessing financial competencies, gov-
ernance expertise and firm-specific knowledge can make a difference in audit 
committee effectiveness. More recently, Aldamen et al. (2012) provide evidence 
that audit committees with more experience and financial expertise were more 
likely to be associated with the positive firm performance of S&P 300 firms during 
the 2008-2009 GFC period. With this as a background, we hypothesize that firm 
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performance during a crisis period is positively related to increasing levels of audit 
committee skill differentiation in terms of financial, governance and firm-specific 
expertise: 
H2: The effectiveness of independent audit committees in impacting firm perfor-
mance during a crisis period is contingent on the skill differentiation of com-
mittee members in terms of financial, governance and firm-specific expertise. 
4.3.3 The Temporal (in)stability of audit committees 
The third dimension in Hollenbeck et al.’s framework is that of the temporal stabil-
ity of a team. At the time of this writing, there is no requirement in the US regard-
ing the temporal stability or instability of audit committees in terms of the mini-
mum-maximum period that directors should serve on the audit committee of a 
given firm. It also remains unclear in the literature, whether and how the stability 
of board committees may impact their effectiveness. 
 On the one hand, it has been argued in corporate governance literature that 
temporal stability in teams that perform a monitoring role vis-à-vis management 
may lead presumably independent directors to entrench management due to the 
development of social ties, and that this may impair their monitoring effectiveness 
(Vafeas, 2003). The organizational literature presents additional benefits associat-
ed with unstable teams, including: more frequent displacement of poor performing 
team members; frequent infusion of new knowledge; and higher levels of intra-
group communication and motivation (e.g., Katz, 1982; Staw, 1980). 
 In contrast, several studies show that stable teams outperform unstable ones 
in several kinds of settings (Ton and Huckman, 2008; Van der Vegt et al., 2010), 
and that high turnover among groups may be harmful for organizations (Glebbeck 
and Bax, 2004). Staw (1980) points out that operational disruption and the de-
moralization of team membership are drawbacks associated with high turnover 
groups. Van der Vegt et al. (2010), in turn, motivates that social integration, team 
learning behavior, and task flexibility suffer when team membership is unstable. In 
a similar vein, it has been pointed out that the frequent assimilation of newcomers 
can negatively impact team performance and prevent groups from reaching higher 
levels of social identity and performance (Guzzo and Dickson, 1996). Due to differ-
ent perspectives on the impact of temporal stability on audit committee effective-
ness we test the following non-directional hypothesis in this study: 
H3: The effectiveness of independent audit committees in safeguarding firm per-
formance during a crisis period is related to their temporal stability. 
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4.4 Research design 
4.4.1 Sample and timeline 
In order to test the hypothesized relationships between the authority, expertise 
and temporal stability of fully independent audit committees, on the one hand, and 
firm performance during a crisis period, on the other hand, we select the constitu-
ents of the S&P 500 index as our sample.45 Furthermore, we focus our study on the 
time period between 2007 and 2011, which has been considered by leading econ-
omists to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s 
(Reuters, 2009). The GFC provides an interesting natural experiment for the pur-
pose of this research, due to: (1) the importance attributed to the effective over-
sight of enterprise risk management and the financial policies for firm perfor-
mance during this period; (2) the involvement of audit committees in the afore-
mentioned oversight areas; and (3) existing evidence that the magnitude of the 
audit committee-firm performance association should be amplified during periods 
of exogenous shocks (Mangena et al., 2012; Ferrero-Ferrero et al., 2012). 
 One of the main considerations in firm performance studies is the appropriate 
time lag for properly evaluating the influence of corporate initiatives on firm per-
formance outcomes (Day and Lord, 1988). As pointed out by Ellstrand et al. (1999) 
choosing an appropriate time lag between firm performance and explanatory vari-
ables is especially relevant to corporate governance studies, since director influ-
ence on corporate decisions take time to be realized. In order to take into account 
(i.e. empirically examine) potentially time lagged effects between audit committee 
characteristics and firm performance outcomes, we constrain our analysis to those 
S&P 500 firms for which complete firm performance and audit committee data is 
available for the entire period of observation, i.e. from 2007 to 2011 (Baysinger 
and Butler, 1985). Even though this implies that an elevated number of firms have 
to be excluded from our final sample, the possibility of accounting for time lagged 
effects and two further aspects favor using balanced panel data sets for this study. 
 First, from the average yearly stock returns of the S&P 500 firms shown in 
Figure 4.1, it can be derived that the magnitude of the exogenous shocks differed 
significantly during the individual years of the GFC. While it is commonly recog-
nized that the GFC started in the latter part of 2007 (Allen and Staff, 2012), firm 
performance as measured by yearly stock returns really dipped in 2008 (-37.00 
percent), before bouncing back 26.46 percent in 2009 and dropping to 2.05 per-
cent in 2011. This suggests that the GFC can be separated into an early stage crisis 
period (2007-2008), followed by a period of recovery (2009), and a less severe late 
stage crisis period (2010-2011). Accordingly, it is interesting to study the hypothe-
                                                                  
45 Although this implies that our study is focused purely on large publicly traded firms, choosing the 
S&P 500 offers several advantages, including comparability of results, data availability, and selection of 
firms that have received the greatest scrutiny in term of governance practices (Ellstrand et al., 1999).  
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sized audit committee-firm performance linkages for the same set of firms over the 
entire GFC period, separately for the early and late stages of the crisis period, as 
well as for individual years. Second, data on audit committee authority, competen-
cies and temporal stability was not readily available in a canned data set at the 
time of this study. Hence, we constrain our study to those firms that were included 
in the S&P 500 index all the way from 2007 until 2011. 
 Table 4.2 presents an overview of our initial and final sample. From the 500 
firms that were listed in the S&P 500 index at year-end 2011 we dropped 28 firms 
that were not included in the S&P 500 during the entire period of observation. 
Next, we excluded 25 firms from our sample due to incomplete data on the direc-
tors serving on the audit committee, which we gathered from the RiskMetrics (ISS) 
Directors database. Since our measure of temporal stability draws on audit com-
mittee membership information before the outset of the GFC, we also excluded 
firms that were not listed in the S&P 500 and firms with incomplete data in the 
RiskMetrics Director database between 2004 and 2007. After accounting for a 
number of mergers and acquisitions between S&P 500 firms and other missing 
data, we arrive at a final effective sample of 351 firms and 1,755 firm-year obser-
vations. 
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Table 4.2: Sample overview 
 N of firms dropped Remaining firms 
Panel A: Sample Selection  
S&P 500 (year-end 2011) thereof: 500 
Firms not included in S&P 500 from 2007-2011 (28) 472 
Firms with missing director data 2007-2011 (25) 447 
Firms not included in S&P 500 from 2004-2007 (31) 416 
Firms with missing director data 2004-2007 (42) 374 
Missing data (other) (11) 363 
Mergers and Acquisitions (12) 351 
Effective final sample (149) 351 
 
Panel B: Samples by Industry Sector (GICS)  
Sector 10: Energy (12) 26 
Sector 15: Materials (6) 23 
Sector 20: Industrials (10) 48 
Sector 25: Consumer Discretionary (24) 54 
Sector 30: Consumer Staples (12) 29 
Sector 35: Health Care (19) 37 
Sector 40: Financials (35) 47 
Sector 45: Information Technology (19) 53 
Sector 50: Telecommunications Services (7) 5 
Sector 55: Utilities (5) 29 
 
The next paragraph presents the empirical models that were used to test the audit 
committee-firm performance link during the GFC along the dimensions of audit 
committee authority differentiation, skill differentiation and temporal stability. We 
also delineate in more detail the way we measure the variables of interest and the 
data collection procedures. 
4.4.2 Model specifications 
In line with prior studies on the associations between board committees and firm 
performance outcomes (Klein, 1998; Vafeas and Theodorou, 1999; Jackling and 
Johl, 2009), we use the following OLS regression estimation to gauge whether audit 
committee authority differentiation, audit committee skill differentiation, and au-
dit committee temporal stability can explain cross-sectional variation in S&P 500 
firm performance during the GFC: 
Performance Measure = AC Authority + AC Expertise + AC Stability + other Board 
of Director Controls + other Control Variables + error 
term. (1), (2), (3) 
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Model (1) and Model (2) analyze the audit committee-firm performance link dur-
ing the early (2007-2008) and late stage period of the GFC (2010-2011), respec-
tively. Model (3) covers the entire period of observation (2007-2011). 
4.4.3 Firm performance measures 
In this study, we use multiple firm performance measures to study associations 
between audit committee characteristics and firm performance outcomes during 
the GFC. In line with prior research (e.g., Klein, 1998; Yeh et al., 2011), we make 
use of both accounting- and market-based performance measures. It is commonly 
recognized in the firm performance literature that individual accounting- and mar-
ket-based measures are imperfect in the sense that they entail unique problems 
and deficiencies and that they in fact measure different aspects or dimensions of 
firm performance (Venkatraman and Ramanujam, 1986; Dalton et al., 1998). Sam-
barhya (2011) outlines that accounting measures are ex-post and internally ori-
ented and therefore reflect realized strategies and management performance, 
whereas market measures are future-oriented, reflecting investor expectations. 
 Following Premuroso and Bhattacharya (2007) and Yeh et al. (2011), among 
others, we use two accounting-based measures of firm performance, namely, re-
turn on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). ROA is measured by the ratio of 
net income to total assets, whereas ROE is measured by the ratio of net income to 
shareholders’ equity. In order to study the impact of audit committees on firm 
performance over multiple years (early stage, late stage, entire GFC period), we 
calculate average yearly figures for both performance measures, which we denote 
ROA/ROE0708, ROA/ROE1011, and ROA/ROE0711, respectively. ROA/ROE0711 captures 
firm performance from 2007 to 2011 with annual average ROE and ROE over this 
five-year period. Our performance measures for the early and late stage period are 
based on 2007-2008 and 2010-2011 firm performance data, respectively. All ac-
counting-based measures are obtained from the COMPUSTAT database. 
 We also employ market-based measures of firm performance, namely, stock 
returns (SR), which we calculate as the percentile change in share price over a 
specific time period.46 In line with the accounting-based performance measures, 
we calculate SR0708, SR1011 and SR0711 as the early, late and entire crisis period stock 
returns, using the same time horizons as outlined above. Hence, SR0708 is calculated 
as the difference in share price between January 2007 and December 2008, scaled 
to the share price in January 2007. We retrieved all share price data from the Cen-
ter for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). 
 For the purpose of the empirical analysis to be presented in Section 4.5.2, all 
performance measures are industry-adjusted by calculating the difference be-
tween a firm’s performance measure and the respective industry average, using 
the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) coding system. 
                                                                  
46 We use the following formula: stock returns = (Priceend - Pricebegin) / Pricebegin. 
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4.4.4 Measuring audit committee authority differentiation 
A major challenge for every study about boards of directors and board committees 
is that information about the backstage (actual) activities of these governance 
bodies is not publicly available. At the same time, few researchers have the oppor-
tunity to attend board or board committee meetings to directly observe actual 
practices (e.g., Gendron et al., 2004). Instead, researchers rely primarily on inter-
views with audit committee members (Spira, 1998; Beasley et al., 2009) and con-
tent analyses of audit committee charters (Carcello et al., 2002) when gathering 
information on what audit committees are responsible for and do. Bédard and 
Gendron (2010:20) outline that “written [audit committee] charters constitute 
relevant data for researchers since they provide a way of assessing whether re-
sponsibilities conferred to the audit committee beyond regulation are related posi-
tively with effectiveness”. 
 In this study we use publicly available audit committee charters of S&P 500 
firms in order to assess whether the respective audit committees had substantial 
authority to oversee risk management. More specifically, we conduct a content 
analysis of audit committee charters of the 351 firms in our sample at two points 
in time, namely, at the outset of the GFC (in 2007) as well as at a late stage crisis 
period (in 2010). Further, we measure audit committee authority differentiation in 
a binary way – 1 being substantial authority for risk oversight and 0, otherwise. 
 Audit committee charters delineate the authority of a firm’s audit committee in 
written form. These charters typically set forth: the main purposes or oversight 
areas of the audit committee; the scope of responsibilities delegated to the audit 
committee within the distinct oversight areas; and the concrete tasks addressed by 
the audit committee in carrying out their assigned responsibilities. We designate 
an audit committee as having substantial authority to oversee the management of 
risk and financial matters if one of the following two cases applies: (1) the commit-
tee is called audit & risk committee and/or (2) the audit committee charter and 
report delineate that one of the primary objectives of the committee is to oversee 
the management of risk matters. For the sake of clarity, the Appendix gives three 
textual examples from audit committee charters corresponding to the aforemen-
tioned cases (substantial authority) as well as an example of an audit committee 
without substantial authority to oversee the management of risk and financial 
matters. 
4.4.5 Measuring audit committee skill differentiation 
We measure audit committee skill differentiation along three dimensions. First, we 
use the proportion of audit committee members who are classified as financial 
experts to measure the degree of financial expertise resting with the audit commit-
tee of a given firm. Second, we proxy governance expertise by the average number 
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of other directorships held by audit committee members. Third, we measure firm 
expertise by the average number of years of board service of audit committee 
members (see Bédard et al., 2004). 
 We collected information on the number of financial experts on audit commit-
tees, the number of other directorships held by audit committee members and the 
number of years of board service from the RiskMetrics (ISS) Director database and 
its predecessor, the RiskMetrics - Directors Legacy Database.47 Both databases are 
part of Wharton Research Data Service (WRDS). The RiskMetrics Director database 
in WRDS contains director data on S&P 500 firms and provides three types of data 
for the present study: beginning year of board service, financial expert yes/no, and 
other directorships. With this information we are able to perform the calculations 
for our skill differentiation proxies. Alas, the WRDS database did not contain the 
required data for all S&P 500 firms and each year of observation. Consequently, we 
hand-collected the missing information from annual reports and proxy statements. 
Given the effort required to compile data on all three dimensions of audit commit-
tee skill differentiation, we gathered the respective data at two points in time and 
not for every year of the GFC. Specifically and in line with our measurement points 
for authority differentiation, we measure audit committee skill differentiation at 
the outset of the GFC (2007) and then again at a later stage (2010). 
4.4.6 Measuring audit committee temporal stability 
Team stability has been studied widely and different measures of team stability 
used in extant research include, inter alia, the proportion of team members no 
longer on a team after a certain time period (Wiersema and Bantel, 1983), the 
number of team entries and exits (Ton and Hackman, 2008), and team turnover, 
i.e. the number of team members who left the team during a certain period scaled 
by team size (Arrow and McGrath, 1995; Chang, 2011). In organizational literature, 
team turnover is generally considered the conventional way to measure team sta-
bility (Glebbeek and Bax, 2004). We follow this approach and use the number of 
directors leaving the committee between t1 and t2, scaled by committee size in t1, 
to measure the temporal stability of audit committees. 
In accordance with the measurement points defined for authority and skill differ-
entiation, we measure the temporal stability of S&P 500 audit committees at two 
points in time, namely in 2007 and in 2010. Audit committee stability at the outset 
of the GFC (temporal stability0407) is calculated by audit committee turnover be-
tween 2004 and 2007, whereas late stage audit committee stability (temporal sta-
bility0710) is calculated as audit committee turnover between 2007 and 2010. Thus, 
                                                                  
47 The RiskMetrics Directors database includes a range of variables related to individual board directors 
(e.g., name, age, tenure, gender, committee memberships, independence classification, primary employ-
er and title, number of other public company boards serving on, shares owned, etc.). This data collec-
tion began in 1996 and is updated annually (see http://www.lib.utexas.edu/). 
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we measure audit committee turnover over a four-year period. This time horizon 
is in line with prior empirical research about team turnover in business and organ-
izational studies (e.g., Jackson et al., 1991). Our implicit assumption here is that a 
four-year window represents a long enough period for sufficient turnover to occur 
within the audit committee, yet is short enough to see the effects of audit commit-
tee turnover on committee effectiveness (Wiersema and Bantel, 1983). 
 We gathered data on audit committee size and directors’ exits from audit 
committees during 2004-2007 and 2007-2010 by using the RiskMetrics Director 
database. After downloading the names for all directors serving on the boards of 
directors of S&P 500 firms between 2004 and 2010, we filtered for audit commit-
tee members and then programmed Microsoft Excel in such a way as to compute 
the number of audit committee members who left the committee of a given sample 
firm during the indicated time periods. 
4.4.7 Control variables 
Our choice for control variables is motivated by their relevance as documented in 
extant literature (Klein, 1998; Vafeas, 1999; Brick and Chidambaram, 2010). As 
shown in Model (1), we use two types of control variables, namely, board and oth-
er firm-specific control variables. Regarding the former, we control for board size, 
board diligence, the percentage of outside directors on the board, director owner-
ship, and the formation of a dedicated risk committee of the board of directors. 
 Regarding board size a number of studies suggest that larger boards face coor-
dination and communication problems and document a negative relation between 
board size and firm performance (Yermack, 1996). To control for a possible rela-
tion between board diligence and firm performance (Vafeas, 1999), we use the 
total sum of yearly board and board committee meetings (Brick and Chidambaram, 
2010). Further, we control for board independence by the proportion of outside 
directors and for director ownership (Klein, 1998). Finally, we include the variable 
risk committee to take account of firms that establish a dedicated risk committee. 
 Other control variables included in this study are firm size measured by total 
assets, the debt to total assets ratio (leverage), sales growth in the preceding three-
year period (growth), and the volatility of monthly stock returns over the preced-
ing five years as a proxy for firm risk (volatility). Firm size is included as a standard 
control variable and leverage because the GFC is more likely to impact firms which 
are highly leveraged (Aldamen et al., 2012). Even though the GFC constitutes an 
unexpected exogenous force on the performance of S&P 500 firms, we include the 
variables growth and volatility to capture the impact of a firms’ past performance 
and risk profile on the dependent variables (see Wintoki et al., 2012). We also con-
trol for industry fixed effects with n – 1 dummy variables, since prior studies show 
that the GFC impacted some sectors more than others (Aldamen et al., 2012). 
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4.5 Empirical results 
4.5.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics and variable definitions for our final 
sample. As expected, the minimum and maximum values reported for the firm 
performance measures used in this study indicate substantial variation in firm 
performance across our sample, both for the early as well as late stages of the GFC. 
The mean values for ROE and ROA remain pretty constant. In line with Figure 4.1, 
we find a sizeable dip in SR during the early GFC. 
 As far as the explanatory variables are concerned, Table 4.3 presents a number 
of interesting insights on the cross-sectional audit committee differences of S&P 
500 firms during the GFC along the dimensions of authority differentiation, skill 
differentiation and temporal stability. In 2007, 42 out of the 351 sample firms 
studied (ca. 12%) had established an audit committee with substantial authority to 
oversee risk management. By 2010, this number had increased substantially to 
148 out of 351 sample firms studied (around 42%). In line with Dellaportas et al. 
(2012) we interpret this development as an indication that the role of independent 
audit committees with respect to overseeing risk management has expanded as a 
direct result of the 2007-2008 plunge in firm performance attributable to the GFC. 
 Table 4.3 also shows some interesting insights regarding the skill differentia-
tion of audit committee members in the S&P 500. Both in 2007 and in 2010, slight-
ly more than half of the audit committee members in our sample were designated 
financial experts. We do find some variation between firms when it comes to finan-
cial expertise. Although this is not shown in Table 4.3, we find that 171 firms had 
established an audit committee where only one audit committee member classified 
as a financial expert by 2007.48 Three out of those firms had formed an audit com-
mittee with seven members; thus the reported minimum percentage of financial 
experts is reported as 14 percent. At the same time, we find 87 firms with an audit 
committee composed only of financial experts. We find that on average audit 
committee members held slightly more than one other directorship. Here again, 
cross-sectional differences are reported by the range of governance expertise 
(ranging from an average of zero to around three other directorships per commit-
tee member). On average the audit committee members in our sample had served 
on the respective board for nearly eight years. The statistics on audit committee 
expertise presented here are in accord with those reported in previous studies 
(e.g., Bédard et al., 2004). 
 Next to authority and skill differentiation, we also gathered data on audit 
committee turnover over a four-year pre-GFC period (stability407), and again before 
the late stage GFC period (stability0710). For stability407 we find mean, minimum and 
maximum values of 50, zero, and 175 percent, respectively. For stability710 we find 
                                                                  
48 The average audit committee size in our sample is 4.1 in 2007 and 4.3 in 2010. 
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values of 34, zero, and 200 percent, respectively. This implies that our sample con-
tains both stable audit committees (no turnover before and during the GFC) and 
unstable audit committees (those that renewed themselves twice during a period 
of four years). 
 Collectively, these descriptive statistics indicate sufficient cross-sectional dif-
ferences in firm performance as well as explanatory variables, calling for further 
investigation of the hypothesized associations between inter-firm differences in 
audit committee design and firm performance during the GFC. The full correlation 
matrixes are not reported here, given the large number of variables employed 
across all regression models.49 The next section starts with a recap of the empirical 
models and main variables featured in this study, followed by the empirical results. 
4.5.2 Audit committees and firm performance during the GFC 
In order to analyze the audit committee-firm performance association during the 
financial crisis, we establish three empirical models. Model 1 analyses the relation-
ship between audit committee characteristics and firm performance during the 
early years of the financial crisis (2007-2008). Model 2 looks into the aforemen-
tioned relationship during the late stage of the crisis (2010-2011), and model 3 
covers the entire period of observation (2007-2011). Ordinary least square results 
are presented in Table 4.4. The key variables of interest are the degree of audit 
committee authority for risk oversight, the skill differentiation of audit committee 
members as measured by financial expertise, governance expertise, and firm exper-
tise, and the temporal stability of the audit committees under observation. 
 We find significant and positive associations between the extent of audit com-
mittee authority to oversee risk management and firm performance during the 
financial crisis. More specifically, we document marginally significant results be-
tween risk oversight at the outset of the crisis and firm performance between 2007 
and 2008 (model 1, all p < .10). We also show positive associations between the 
extent of audit committee risk oversight going into 2010 and subsequent firm per-
formance measured by ROE1011 and ROA101. Finally, the coefficients for risk over-
sight are significant when using ROE0711 and ROA0711 as dependent variables (model 
3, both p < .05). Collectively, these results provide support for hypothesis 1 pre-
dicting that the effectiveness of audit committees in safeguarding firm perfor-
mance in a crisis is contingent on their authority to oversee risk management. 
 Regarding audit committee skill differentiation, we document positive and 
significant relationships between firm expertise of independent audit committees 
and firm performance during the financial crisis. As shown in Table 4.4, we find 
significant associations between average board tenure of audit committee mem-
bers at the outset of the crisis and ROA0708 and ROA0711. Marginally significant re-
                                                                  
49 All correlations are below 0.50. Accordingly, the correlations among explanatory variables are not 
large enough to prohibit the use of multivariate regression analysis. The highest VIF score is 3.01. 
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sults are obtained for firm expertise when using ROE and Stock Returns as explan-
atory variables. Furthermore, we show positive and significant coefficients for 
governance expertise when measuring firm performance by ROA0711 and ROE1011. 
Finally, we find a positive association between financial expertise and Stock Re-
turns0711. These results seem to confirm hypothesis 2 predicting that the effective-
ness of independent audit committees in safeguarding firm performance during is 
contingent on the degree to which independent audit committee members have 
specialized knowledge or capabilities that may enhance their effectiveness. 
 With one exception, the models presented in Table 4.4 have considerable ex-
planatory power for a study using firm performance as the dependent variable in a 
crisis period setting. The obtained adjusted R2 statistic ranges between 10 and 30 
percent. In the case of the models using ROA, we obtain adjusted R2 statistics rang-
ing from 22 to 27 percent for the three time periods studied. These results are 
comparable to prior firm performance studies (Carter et al., 2010; Yeh et al., 2011). 
4.5.3 Audit committees and firm performance variability 
To substantiate our analysis of the relationship between audit committee authority 
to oversee enterprise risk management and firm performance during the GFC, we 
ran an additional analysis looking into the performance variability of our sample 
firms from 2007-2011. In the literature, business risk is commonly defined in 
terms of uncertainty in firm outcomes as reflected in the variability of firm per-
formance indicators (Boubaker et al., 2012). Prior literature, including Pathan 
(2009), Minton et al. (2010) and Yeh et al. (2011), provide theoretical reasoning 
and empirical evidence for a negative relation between corporate risk-taking be-
havior and the degree of board (committee) independence. Accordingly, we reason 
that fully independent audit committees charged with substantial oversight of risk 
management limit firm performance variability (risk) in a crisis period. 
H4: Firm performance variability during a period of economic crisis is negatively 
related to the extent of audit committee authority for overseeing ERM. 
Following Cheng (2008) and Faccio et al. (2011), we measure performance varia-
bility by the industry-adjusted five-year standard deviation of yearly ROE 
(σROE0711), ROA (σROA0711), and Stock Returns (σSR0711). This so-called within-firm 
over-time performance variability approach collapses our performance data into a 
single cross-section, whereby all control variables are averaged (Nakano and Ngu-
yen, 2012). With the industry adjustment using the GICS two-digit coding system, 
we aim to take out the variation in performance over time common to an industry. 
Hence, we focus on measures of the idiosyncratic volatility of firm performance. 
We then run the following cross-sectional regression: 
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Performance Variability = AC Authority + AC Expertise + AC Stability + other Board 
of Director Controls + other Control Variables + error 
term. (4) 
Table 4.5 presents the empirical results related to Model (4). As predicated by 
Hypothesis 4, we find a significant and negative association between the extent of 
audit committee authority for overseeing risk management at the outset of the GFC 
in 2007 and firm performance variability measured by σROE0711 and σSR0711 (both 
p < 0.05). Furthermore, our results suggest a negative relation between the firm 
expertise of audit committee members and our market-based firm performance 
measure σSR0711 (p < 0.05). In slight contrast to the results presented in Table 4, we 
find a negative coefficient for governance expertise07 for both accounting-based 
performance measures (σROE0711, p < 0.01; σROA0711, p < 0.10). In line with Cheng 
(2008) and Nakano and Nguyen (2012), we document a negative relation between 
board size07 and outside directors07 and performance variability as measured by 
σSR0711 (p < 0.05). As expected, the coefficients for volatility307 and growth0407 in 
Model (4) are both significant and positive across the performance measures used 
here. For the three measures in Model (4), the Adjusted R2 ranges between 16 and 
21 percent. 
4.5.4 Endogeneity concerns 
Empirical corporate governance research is susceptible to endogeneity and omit-
ted variable concerns (Schultz et al., 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012). Regarding the 
latter, our results remain unchanged after controlling for additional board and 
committee characteristics, including CEO duality, audit committee size and meet-
ing frequency. While the results presented in Table 4.4 and 4.5 suggest a causal 
relationship between audit committee characteristics and firm performance, these 
findings could also be subject to reverse causality – boards of directors and board 
committees are endogenously determined (e.g. Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998, 
2003). As far as this study is concerned, the endogeneity issue is whether firm 
performance drives the audit committee structure or whether some other variable 
(e.g. the CEO) drives both, instead of audit committees having an impact on firm 
performance (Aldamen et al., 2012). While endogeneity is present in much empiri-
cal research, it may lead to biased estimators, reducing the confidence in the con-
clusions we can draw from our analysis (Chenhall and Moers, 2007; Lent, 2007). 
 We believe that our research design should limit endogeneity in two primary 
ways. First, we address the endogeneity concern by replacing a firm’s average 
value for the corporate governance measures employed in this study by the firm’s 
first valid value in the period of observation. Accordingly, 2007 for Model (1), (2) 
and (4) and 2010 for Model (3). This method should mitigate the concern that 
performance (variability) leads to changes in audit committee and board of direc-
102 
tor characteristics (Cheng, 2008). A further aspect which should mitigate endoge-
neity concerns in our analysis, is that the GFC represents an unexpected external 
shock to firm performance. By choosing an exogenous and unexpected event, we 
assess the audit committee-firm performance relationship before firm perfor-
mance can affect the design of the audit committees under study. These are our 
research design controls for the implicit endogenous relationship (Aldamen et al., 
2012). 
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics and variable definitions 
  Model 1 
Early stage financial 
crisis (2007-2008) 
Model 2
Late stage financial   
crisis (2010-2011) 
Model 3 
Total period of 
observation (2007-2011) 
Variable  Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. Mean SD Min. Max. 
       
ROE  .13 .17 -.29 .46 .14 .13 -.14 .44 .14 .14 -.16 .47 
ROA  .06 .07 -.18 .27 .06 .06 -.09 .21 .06 .06 -.12 .25 
Stock returns  -.39 .25 -.88 .28 .14 .34 -.61 1.10 -.09 .46 -.88 1.41 
      
Risk oversight  .12 .33 .00 1.00 .42 .50 .00 1.00 .27 .34 .00 1.00 
Financial expertise  .56 .30 .14 1.00 .58 .30 .14 1.00 .57 .28 .14 1.00 
Governance 
expertise 
 1.31 .69 .00 3.33 1.18 .58 .00 3.00 1.25 .57 .00 2.69 
Firm expertise  7.60 4.00 .00 23.00 7.86 3.64 1.00 22.00 7.73 3.46 1.50 22.50 
Temporal stability  .50 .34 .00 1.75 .35 .31 .00 2.00 .86 .47 .00 2.75 
      
Board size  10.89 2.29 5.00 20.00 10.92 2.09 5.00 19.00 10.80 2.08 5.00 18.00 
Board diligence  32.70 9.87 13.00 69.00 32.53 10.53 14.00 89.00 32.62 9.35 13.00 74.00 
Outside directors   .80 .10 .44 .96 .83 .09 .33 .95 .82 .09 .40 .95 
Director 
ownership 
 .04 .07 .00 .70 .03 .06 .00 .53 .03 .06 .00 .59 
Risk committee  .05 .23 .00 1.00 .20 .40 .00 1.00 .13 .27 .00 1.00 
      
Firm size  9.55 1.42 6.68 14.54 9.70 1.39 6.72 14.60 9.62 1.40 6.69 14.52 
Leverage  .21 .15 .00 1.00 .21 .13 .00 .76 .21 .14 .00 .88 
Volatility  .10 .06 .03 .76 .11 .10 .04 1.41   
Growth  .11 .12 -.21 .86 .01 .10 -.33 .45    
Notes: This table reports the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the empirical analyses of 
the study at hand. All performance and firm control variables are calculated as yearly averages. The 
reported audit committee and board of director control variables for models 1 and 2 are taken at one 
point in time, while temporal stability, volatility and growth are calculated over multiple years preced-
ing the respective performance period. ROE is net income divided by shareholders’ equity and ROA is 
net income divided by net assets. Stock returns is the percentage change in share price. Risk oversight is 
a binary variable equal to one if the audit committee has substantial authority to oversee the manage-
ment of risk and financial matters, and zero otherwise. Financial expertise is the percentage of audit 
committee members classified as financial experts. Governance expertise is the average number of other 
directorships held by audit committee members. Firm expertise is the average years of board service of 
audit committee members. Temporal stability is the number of directors leaving the audit committee 
between t1 and t2, scaled by audit committee size at t1. Board size is the number of directors serving on 
the board. Board diligence is the sum of yearly board and board committee meetings. Director ownership 
is the percentage of total common equity owned by all directors. Risk committee is a binary variable 
equal to one if the firm has established a dedicated risk committee, zero otherwise. Leverage is the ratio 
of debt to total assets. Volatility is the standard deviation of monthly stock returns over the previous 
five years. Growth is calculated as the sales growth in the preceding three years. 
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Table 4.5: Audit committee characteristics and firm performance volatility  
Variables +/- σROE0711 σROA0711 σSR0711 
Risk oversight07 - -.08 * -.01 -.05 * 
 (.04) (.00) (.03) 
Financial expertise07 - -.04 -.01 .05 
 (.04) (.00) (.04) 
Governance expertise07 - .04 ** .01 † .01 
 (.02) (.00) (.02) 
Firm expertise07 - -.00 -.00 -0.01 * 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Temporal stability0407 +/- .02 .01 -.01 
 (.03) (.01) (.04) 
Board size07 - .00 -.00 -.02 * 
 (.01) (.00) (.01) 
Board diligence07 - .00 * .00 .00 
 (.00) (.00) (.00) 
Outside directors07 - -.06 -.01 -.26 * 
  (.12) (.03) (.14) 
Director ownership07 - -.01 .04 .02 
 (.18) (.04) (.21) 
Risk committee07 - -.02 -.01 -.05 
 (.05) (.01) (.06) 
Firm size0711 +/- -.01 -.01 † .03 * 
 (.01) (.00) (.01) 
Leverage0711 + .60 *** .03 † .19 * 
 (.09) (.02) (.10) 
Volatility0307 + .34 * .17 ** 1.33 *** 
 (.18) (.04) (.21) 
Growth0407 +/- .01 .01 .07 
 (.10) (.02) (.11) 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes 
Sample size 351 351 351 
Adjusted R2 .18 .16 .21 
F-test model fit 4.27 *** 3.96 *** 4.95 *** 
Notes: This table reports the results regarding the relation between audit committee characteristics 
and the within-firm over-time performance variability during the 2007-2011 financial crisis. Perfor-
mance variability is measured by the industry-adjusted standard deviation of yearly ROE, ROA and 
Stock returns. The table shows the coefficients (t-values). ***, **, *, † indicate signiϐicance at the .1%, 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively (one-tailed for predictions, two-tailed otherwise). 
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4.6 Conclusions 
This study finds systematic associations between firm performance and the char-
acteristics of independent audit committees during the 2007-2011 global financial 
crisis. Our results square with mounting empirical evidence linking audit commit-
tee oversight to firm performance outcomes during the financial crisis (cf. Yeh et 
al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 2012; Sun and Liu, 2014). The main contribution of this 
study, however, is to provide novel insights regarding the factors that may deter-
mine the effectiveness of audit committees staffed exclusively with independent 
directors to safeguard firm performance during a crisis period. 
 Drawing from the literature on team effectiveness, we provide theoretical rea-
soning and empirical evidence that formal authority is an important determinant 
of audit committee effectiveness. More specifically, we show systematic and posi-
tive associations between the scope of audit committee authority to oversee risk 
management and firm performance during a financial crisis. Formal delegation of 
authority is important in the context of audit committee effectiveness for two pri-
mary reasons. Firstly, without formal authority independent directors may lack the 
power to make and influence decisions, which can ultimately have an impact on 
firm performance (Kalbers and Fogarty, 1993; McNulty and Pettigrew, 1996; 
Payne et al., 2009). Secondly, a formal mandate provides direction and discipline to 
audit committees (SEC, 2000). This is in so far important, as committee members 
are unlikely to assume responsibilities which are not part of a formal mandate and 
lead to an extra-role activity on top of their usual work (Whiteoak, 2007). 
 We also find evidence that cross-sectional differences in audit committee effec-
tiveness can be explained by skill differentiation. Our analysis indicates that board 
tenure and multiple directorships can have a positive impact on the effectiveness 
of independent directors when it comes to overseeing risk matters. Other papers, 
in contrast, suggest that audit committee members serving on multiple boards may 
be too busy to effectively carry out their designated role and that longer tenure 
directors may not exercise independent judgment (Sharma and Iselin, 2012). In 
light of these seemingly conflicting findings, it is important to note that the majori-
ty of extant studies focus on individual dimensions of audit committee effective-
ness.50 Our study suggests that effective risk oversight requires a deeper under-
standing of the respective firm from audit committee members. Multiple director-
ships, in turn, seem to promote rather than constrain the ability of independent 
directors to spot and oversee risks (cf. Ferris et al., 2003; Field et al., 2013). 
 However, the results of the study at hand should be interpreted with caution, 
given that our research design opens the door to a selection and survivorship bias 
in our empirical results (see, e.g., Brown et al., 1992). Regarding the former, we 
limit our empirical analyses to a comparatively small number of large US firms. 
                                                                  
50 Lee and Stone (1997) point out that the skills and capabilities required of audit committee members 
can differ depending on responsibilities assigned the audit committee.  
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Furthermore, our results are prone to a survivorship bias, since in our analysis we 
include only those firms for which complete performance data is available for the 
entire period of observation from 2007 to 2011. S&P 500 firms that vanished dur-
ing the GFC are not included in our analysis. Consequently, we deem it interesting 
to extend our study design to non-US listed firms and to firms that did not survive 
a crisis. Finally, our findings are based on an analysis of one financial crisis and 
therefore cannot necessarily be extended to other periods of economic distress. 
 These limitations notwithstanding, we believe that the empirical results re-
ported in this study provide insights for several key players in the corporate gov-
ernance mosaic. For practitioners and policymakers alike, the question emerges 
whether it is not time to focus the scope of audit committees to a larger extent on 
risk oversight rather than on the more traditional roles of audit committees, such 
as overseeing the financial reporting and auditing process. In turn, the effective 
oversight of risk management may require formal designation of authority, and 
independent directors with a deeper understanding of the firm and a body of 
knowledge gained from discussions at other firms’ board of directors. 
 Given the severity and persistence of the most recent financial crisis, further 
examination of the evolving role and responsibilities of audit committees in the 
context of risk oversight constitutes an interesting and timely subject which com-
bines research and policy implications. While qualified, committed, independent 
and tough-minded audit committees were primarily seen as effective guardians for 
safeguarding the quality of external auditing and financial reporting in the 20th 
century, their role might well be evolving towards guarding the balance between 
risks and opportunities affecting value creation or the preservation of modern 
enterprises in the wake of the recent financial crisis. Therefore, we consider it 
important for future research to develop a more nuanced understanding of audit 
committee effectiveness, which takes into account audit committee authority dif-
ferentiation. 
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Appendix:  
Examples of Audit Committee Oversight of Risk Management 
Responsibilities of an Audit & Finance committee (AFC) 
Audit & finance committee charter of Allergan, Inc. 
In its role overseeing financial policy and strategy, the AFC shall be responsible for 
the review and oversight of the following areas: Capital structure; financial opera-
tions; banking; employee benefit plans assets and investment strategy; and finan-
cial operations. Capital structure: Review and recommend to the Board approval 
of the capital structure and the financing plan for the year including approval of 
short-term and long-term debt programs. Review dividend strategy. Review financ-
ing strategies in excess of $20 million. Review interest rate and currency exposure 
management and hedging strategies and monitor performance. Review and evalu-
ate financial management strategies designed to enhance stockholder value. Re-
view cash flow forecasts on a periodic basis. Review strategy for investment of cor-
porate funds and monitor performance. Review balance sheet performance. Review 
recommendations regarding stock splits and treasury share purchases. Review 
periodically the geographical source of the Corporation’s earning power and the 
location of the Corporation’s principal assets. Financial operations: Review long-
term tax strategy, the annual tax rate calculation and the repatriation of Corpora-
tion earnings. Monitor effects of US and international tax regulations. Review risk 
assessment, risk management and insurance programs. Banking: Review the ma-
jor commercial banking, financial consulting and other financial relations of the 
Corporation to ensure adequacy of coverage. Review on an annual basis with the 
Finance Department the fees paid to the Corporation’s bankers and banking advi-
sors....Financial Organization: Review and evaluate the Corporation’s financial 
organization, staffing thereof, and succession planning. 
 
Responsibilities of an Audit & Risk committee (ARC) 
Audit & risk committee charter of American Express Company 
The Committee is responsible for assisting the Board of Directors in its oversight 
responsibilities relating to (i) the integrity of the Company’s financial statements 
and financial reporting process; (ii) internal and external auditing, including the 
qualifications and independence of the independent registered public accounting 
firm and performance of the Company’s internal audit services function; (iii) the 
integrity of the Company’s system of internal accounting and financial controls, 
(iv) legal and regulatory compliance, (v) the assessment and management of the 
Company’s risk and capital. Risk Management Governance: Reviews the Compa-
ny’s organizational governance approach to risk management and its methods for 
identifying and managing risks. Approve the Company’s Enterprise-wide Risk Man-
agement Policy and risk management policies as appropriate. Risk Tolerance: 
Reviews the Company’s risk tolerance in the context of the Company’s business 
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strategy, financial resources and performance. Approves enterprise-level risk man-
agement objectives and monitors management’s execution of such objectives. Re-
views the Company’s risk escalation policies and thresholds. Risk Oversight: Re-
views with the Chief Risk Officer the risk profile of the Company, including signifi-
cant financial and other risk exposures, risk trends in the Company’s portfolios and 
major risk concentrations, and steps management has taken to monitor, control 
and report such risk exposures, trends and concentrations. Discuss with the Chief 
Risk Officer the Company’s risk management processes, controls and capabilities. 
 
Audit committee with a primary purpose to oversee risk and finance matters 
Adit committee charter of BMC Software, Inc. 
The Audit Committee is appointed by the Board of Directors of BMC Software, Inc. 
to assist the Board in fulfilling its oversight responsibilities with respect to: (i) the 
integrity of the Company’s financial statements, financial reporting process and 
systems of internal controls regarding finance and accounting, (ii) the Company’s 
legal and regulatory compliance, (iii) the quality and integrity of the Company’s 
risk management processes, (iv) the qualifications, engagement, compensation 
and independence of the independent auditors... (v) the performance of the Com-
pany’s internal audit function and independent auditors, (vi) the Company’s capi-
tal structure and financing activities. 
  
111 
 
CHAPTER 5 Conclusion 
This dissertation brings together three studies that provide new insights into audit 
committee design and effectiveness from an international perspective. I define 
audit committee design as the operationalizion and stipulation of audit committee 
characteristics that are thought to contribute to the committees’ effectiveness or 
legitimacy. Chapter 2 sheds light on the implementation of audit committee design 
standards in Europe by analysing the contents of the Eighth EU Directive on Com-
pany Law, national codes of governance and corporate audit committee charters. 
Chapter 3 investigates variations in audit committee scope as represented in pub-
licly available audit committee charters and corresponding levels of audit commit-
tee activity across geographic regions that vary in regulatory structure. Chapter 4, 
provides evidence on associations between audit committee characteristics and 
firm performance during the 2007-2011 financial crisis. In the following subsec-
tion, I will briefly summarize the main findings of each study presented in this 
dissertation, followed by a discussion of the main limitations. I then conclude my 
doctoral thesis by laying out implications and opportunities for future research. 
5.1 Summary of main findings 
In the first study, presented in Chapter 2, I shed light on the design of audit com-
mittees in continental Europe by analyzing and comparing the contents of the 
Eighth EU Directive on Company Law, national codes of governance and corporate 
audit committee charters. Specifically, I have conducted a content analysis of these 
documents along five factors: the responsibilities to be addressed by the audit 
committee, the expertise required of audit committee members, the required level 
of audit committee independence, the recommended size of the committee, and the 
number of meetings the committee should hold per year. 
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 In this manner, I provide evidence regarding: (1) the degree of isomorphism 
and differentiation in audit committee design standards across the EU; (2) whether 
coercive pressures to establish audit committee design standards enacted by the 
Eighth EU Company Law Directive have been implemented in national governance 
codes and corporate audit committee charters; and (3) whether audit committee 
charters contain boilerplate language as a proxy for mimetic isomorphism. The 
sample includes the corporate governance code from six European countries (Bel-
gium, France, Germany, Italy, Spain, and the Netherlands) and the audit committee 
charters of 157 corporations with a listing on the respective stock exchanges. 
 The results tabulated in Tables 2.2, 2.3, and 2.4 reveal noticeable differences in 
the implementation of audit committee design standards among EU member 
states. Foremost, these differences concern the scope of responsibilities assigned 
to audit committees, the competencies that committee members should possess, 
and the proportion of independent directors serving on the audit committee. 
Standards related to audit committee size and meeting frequency, in turn, are fairly 
isomorphic across our sample. Regarding coercive isomorphism, I show that the 
requirements of the Eighth Directive have been effectively implemented on the 
level of national codes. At the corporate level, I find high levels of implementation 
of the Eighth Directive in the national governance code in the Netherlands, inter-
mediate levels in Belgium and Spain, and low levels in France, Germany, and Italy. 
 I attribute these differences primarily to the fact that the corporate governance 
codes in the latter group of countries did not recommend or require the disclosure 
of audit committee charters at the time of this dissertation. The high disclosure 
and compliance rate found in the Netherlands, in turn, illustrates that one avenue 
for fostering compliance and transparency on audit committee design standards is 
to mandate the disclosure of complete audit committee charters. Nevertheless, 
regulators should carefully evaluate this step. Consistent with prior literature, I 
observe that regulatory pressure leads to an increase in the percentage of unorigi-
nal content in audit committee charters. By passing audit committee charters 
through the content analysis software SafeAssign, I find that the level of unoriginal 
content increases when firms are required to place a charter on the public record. 
 These results support the proposition that regulation can lead to ´copy-and-
paste´ approaches when developing publicly available corporate narrative infor-
mation. Furthermore, Forster et al. (2009) and Holder-Webb and Cohen (2012) 
provide evidence suggesting that actual (back-stage) organizational practices re-
main decoupled from publicly available (front-stage) information, perversely in 
those institutional settings characterized by a stringent disclosure regime. 
 In my second study, presented in Chapter 3, I directly address the aforemen-
tioned propositions by investigating variations in the scope of responsibilities set 
forth in publicly available audit committee charters and corresponding levels of 
audit committee activity across geographic regions that vary in regulatory struc-
ture. Thereby, I empirically examine whether audit committee charters of different 
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firms become boilerplate copies of each other, and whether actual committee prac-
tices remain decoupled from the charters’ content, when public disclosure turns 
from voluntary to coercive and then mandatory. Based on extant literature (Har-
vard Law Review, 2003; Okhmatovskiy and David, 2012), I predict that more de-
manding disclosure regimes are associated with higher levels of decoupling. How-
ever, the empirical results presented in Chapter 3 suggest differently.  
 By employing a negative binomial count model with the number of distinct 
responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters as the explanatory variable, I 
show that audit committee charters differ systematically in content from one firm 
to another. In contrast to what I expected, this holds in institutional settings char-
acterized by low as well as high levels of coercive pressure for the public disclo-
sure of an audit committee charter. My analysis suggests further that the scope of 
responsibilities formally assigned to the audit committee is a function of business-
related factors (firm size, industry, and profitability), the structure of the board 
and the prevalent disclosure regime on audit committee charters. 
 The second part of Chapter 3 contains an empirical analysis of the relationship 
between the nominal scope of responsibilities set forth in public charters and ac-
tual levels of audit committee activity. Conventional reasoning suggests a positive 
relationship between audit committee scope and diligence if actual audit commit-
tee activities are tied to the responsibilities set forth in the charters. The empirical 
results of an OLS regression show that levels of actual audit committee activity are 
significantly and positively related to the number of responsibilities set forth in 
audit committee charters in more stringent disclosure regimes (Anglo-Saxon coun-
tries). In institutional settings characterized by low levels of coercive pressure to 
disclose an audit committee charter (continental Europe), I find no association 
between audit committee diligence and the nominal scope of duties disclosed in 
audit committee charters. Chapter 3 suggests that in countries where the regulato-
ry setting is more stringent, the professed activities of audit committees are more 
closely related to their actual work, relative to voluntary disclosure settings. 
 In my third study, presented in Chapter 4, I empirically examine the question 
of whether there is a relationship between firm performance during a period of 
economic distress and the characteristics of independent audit committees. To 
address this question, I apply a three-dimensional framework established by Hol-
lenbeck et al. (2012) to audit committees of S&P 500 firms during the 2007-2011 
financial crisis period. This framework encompasses three dimensions: authority 
differentiation, skill differentiation, and temporal stability. Since data on inter-firm 
differences in audit committee authority to oversee risk was gathered via publicly 
available audit committee charters and reports, Chapter 4 can be seen as a natural 
extension of the first two chapters of my dissertation. 
 The empirical results presented in Chapter 4 show statistically significant and 
positive associations between S&P 500 firm performance during the global finan-
cial crisis – measured by return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE) and stock 
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returns (SR) – and the extent of audit committee authority to oversee enterprise 
risk management. I also document positive associations between firm performance 
during the crisis and audit committee skill differentiation in terms of firm-specific 
expertise as well as the governance expertise of audit committee members. No 
consistent relation is found between measures of financial expertise and the tem-
poral stability of audit committees and firm performance indicators. 
 To further substantiate these results and the proposition that independent 
audit committees can safeguard firm performance in a crisis period by overseeing 
risk management matters, I ran an additional analysis looking into the industry-
adjusted within-firm over-time performance variability during the global financial 
crisis as a proxy for the level of risk taking (Cheng, 2008, Nakano and Nguyen, 
2012). The empirical results show that firms where substantial authority for over-
seeing risk was assigned to an independent audit committee before the financial 
crisis took hold in 2007 exhibited lower performance variability during the 2007-
2011 period. I also document a negative relation between firm performance varia-
bility and the firm-specific expertise of audit committee members. These results 
indicate that the formal designation of authority to oversee risk management and 
the degree of firm-specific and governance expertise that audit committee mem-
bers bring to the table can be important determinants of audit committee effec-
tiveness in safeguarding firm performance in times of economic distress. 
5.2 Limitations 
The findings presented in the previous section are subject to a number of limita-
tions. First, the scope of all three studies is restricted to a subset of the largest 
economies by GDP, to large-cap firms and to short periods of observation, which 
may limit the generalisability of my findings. In addition, I see three inherent limi-
tations that I will subsequently discuss in more detail before outlining implications 
and opportunities for future research. First, it is important to note that the three 
studies presented in this dissertation rely on archival data. In particular, the analy-
sis of variations in audit committee scope is based on front-stage information set 
forth in publicly available charters that may not necessarily reflect the actual 
(back-stage) activities of audit committees. In spite of a number of informal con-
versations with audit committee members and the verification of my categoriza-
tion scheme with them, the analysis presented in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 would 
surely benefit from more direct observations of what audit committees are actually 
doing to address the various responsibilities set forth in their respective charters. 
 Second, my content analyses of audit committee charters and the construction 
of the audit committee scope measure in Chapter 3 are based on human-scored 
schemes. Extant literature generally distinguishes three types of content analysis 
approaches, namely, human-scored schemes, word-count approaches, and com-
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puterized methods (Morris, 1994). Human-scored approach to content analysis 
have limitations in comparison with computerized methods (Lewis et al., 2013). 
These limitations are primarily related to the labor intensiveness and subjectivity 
of human, self-constructed scoring schemes, which may limit the reliability and 
validity of my empirical analysis (Grüning, 2011). On the other hand, computerized 
methods may prevent the coder from detecting more sensitive rhetorical differ-
ences, such as the extent of audit committee oversight of risk management. 
 Third, the empirical results presented in Chapter 4 of this dissertation should 
be interpreted with caution, due to the small sample size and a possible survivor-
ship bias. Regarding the latter, my research design includes only firms for which 
complete performance data is available for the entire period of observation from 
2007 to 2011. Accordingly, firms that vanished as a result of the financial crisis are 
not included in my analysis. As a result, the findings provided in Chapter 4 might 
be overly optimistic and premature on the contribution of audit committees in 
safeguarding firm performance during a crisis period. Further research on the 
audit committee-firm performance link is surely warranted, paying particular at-
tention to firms that do not survive a period of economic downturn. Finally, it 
should be noted that the results presented in Chapter 4 rely on data gathered dur-
ing one crisis period. Notwithstanding these limitations, my research results have 
implications for practice and research, which I will discuss in turn. 
5.3 Implications and future research opportunities 
Publicly available audit committee charters serve two main purposes. They inform 
the investing public about the roles and responsibilities, composition, and opera-
tional standards of the audit committee of a given firm. At the same time, they 
specify standards that are thought to contribute to the committees’ effectiveness. 
Hence, the intended purpose of audit committee charters is twofold, namely, to 
strengthen investor confidence and to elevate audit committee effectiveness. With 
this background, it is easy to see that there are two main groups which are likely to 
benefit most from the insights presented in this dissertation. The first group is 
comprised of parties which have a say on the way audit committees are designed, 
including the public disclosure of audit committee charters and their content. In 
particular, regulators and corporate boards which aim to strengthen investor con-
fidence and increase audit committee effectiveness will benefit from the findings of 
my research. The second group is the investing public that has a legitimate interest 
in reliable information regarding the way audit committees are designed. I will 
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first discuss the implications for both groups before closing with suggestions for 
further research.51 
 According to the results presented in Chapter 2, regulators can foster the im-
plementation of audit committee design standards that strengthen audit commit-
tee effectiveness and corporate legitimacy by requiring firms to disclose an audit 
committee charter. I find three basic levels of pressure that regulators place on 
firms to disclose such a charter: recommended but voluntary (Belgium, Spain), 
comply or explain (Netherlands, UK), and mandatory (US). My analysis of the in-
terplay between the responsibilities disclosed in audit committee charters and 
audit committee diligence and effectiveness manifests two important messages. 
 First, moving from a voluntary to coercive and then regulatory disclosure re-
gime increases the implementation of audit committee standards at firm level but 
also the percentage of unoriginal content in audit committee charters. Second, 
despite an increase in the level of unoriginal language, audit committee charters 
seem to fulfill their designated purpose of providing authority, direction, and dis-
cipline to audit committee members in countries with a stringent disclosure re-
gime. The data presented in Chapter 3 show significant associations between 
measures of actual audit committee activity and the responsibilities set forth in 
audit committee charters in mandatory disclosure regimes and an absence thereof 
in voluntary settings. Chapter 4 then gives evidence that cross-sectional differ-
ences in the roles and responsibilities set forth in the audit committee charters of 
US-listed firm (mandatory disclosure regime) had a significant impact on measures 
of audit committee effectiveness (cf. Bédard et al., 2004; Abbott et al., 2007).  
 More specifically, the empirical results presented in Chapter 4 suggest that the 
effectiveness of independent audit committees in safeguarding firm performance 
during a crisis period is contingent on the formal designation of authority to over-
see risk management and the firm-specific and governance expertise that audit 
committee members bring to the table. Accordingly, the evidence presented in 
Chapter 4 adds to a body of literature which demonstrates that audit committees 
may safeguard firm performance during periods of economic distress (Yeh et al., 
2011; Aldamen et al., 2012; Bolton, 2014). To the best of my knowledge, however, 
this is the first study to provide evidence for associations between firm perfor-
mance during a crisis period and audit committee authority for overseeing risk and 
the firm-specific expertise of audit committee members. These results have several 
important implications for regulators, corporate boards and the investing public. 
 Post-Enron, policymakers and standard-setters on both sides of the Atlantic 
have placed substantial emphasis on implementing standards related to audit 
committee oversight of the financial reporting and auditing process and raising the 
bar on the financial expertise of audit committee members. Given the severity and 
                                                                  
51 Some of the implications discussed here may also apply to other corporate documents, which are 
publicly available and fulfill the dual purpose of providing both external organizational information and 
internal organizational direction (e.g. codes of conduct or ethics, board policies). 
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persistence of the recent global financial crisis and the role of audit committees in 
this context, it may be worthwhile to focus efforts to better clarify the role of audit 
committees in the context of overseeing risk management. Such efforts could, for 
example, come in the form of guiding principles such as the BRC (1999). The evi-
dence provided here suggests that the formal designation of authority and the 
firm-specific expertise of audit committee members are key topics in this context. 
 For boards of directors, the question emerges whether it is time to move the 
oversight of risk management to the top of the audit committee agenda and to 
firmly establish this responsibility in audit committee charters. A survey among 
audit committee members by KPMG and the NACD (2011) revealed that audit 
committee members would like to devote more time to oversee risk management. 
In this context, Sherman et al. (2009: 92) point out that “someone has to objective-
ly analyze the myriad risks facing businesses today” and that “audit committee 
members have limited time and attention with which to conduct in-depth risk 
analysis”. Given the audit committees’ involvement in many of the key governance 
processes (i.e. financial reporting, auditing, internal control) and corresponding 
insights into a firm’s operations, I tend to agree with Sherman et al. that audit 
committees are ideally positioned to assume substantial authority for overseeing 
risk. Accordingly, I would encourage boards to spell out the audit committees’ 
responsibilities with respect to risk oversight in the committees’ charter. 
 A number of implications for the investing public can be derived from my re-
search. First, the content of audit committee charters from firms listed in voluntary 
disclosure environments may contain more symbolic rather than substantial con-
tent, and therefore little information on the audit committees’ actual (back-stage) 
activities. In turn, in mandatory disclosure regimes on audit committee charters, it 
may well be worthwhile to read and compare the audit committee charters of dif-
ferent firm. Further, investors should keep an eye on the extent of authority dele-
gated to the audit committee for overseeing enterprise risk management and the 
tenure of board service of independent audit committee members as an indication 
of their firm-specific expertise. Both factors may contribute to the audit commit-
tee’s effectiveness in safeguarding firm performance against critical business risks. 
 Finally, I would like to point out three areas for further research on the topic of 
audit committee design and effectiveness. The first is related to the antecedents 
and economic consequences of risk oversight by independent audit committees 
during different economic cycles. Evidence is mounting that independent audit 
committees can mitigate the impact of significant adverse economic events such as 
the recent GFC on firm performance. I corroborate this stream of research and 
provide to the best of my knowledge the first empirical evidence that may explain 
how independent audit committees safeguard firm performance in a crisis period, 
namely by assuming substantial oversight of enterprise risk management. Howev-
er, ultimately it is the choice of regulators and boards of directors to provide the 
audit committee with the specific designated authority to assume substantial over-
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sight of risk matters. In line with agency theory, the evidence presented in Chapter 
4 suggests that fully independent audit committees may be better equipped to 
curtail excessive risk taking than the entire board. In this context, I see three re-
search opportunities. 
 First, evidence is needed to confirm that substantial authority for overseeing 
risk matters should rest with an independent audit committee rather than with the 
entire board or a dedicated risk committee. Second, evidence is needed to identify 
and/or confirm factors that enhance audit committee effectiveness in safeguarding 
firm performance in a crisis period. Formal delegation of authority and firm-
specific or industry expertise are two factors – others surely exist. Last but not 
least, delegating substantial oversight of risk matters to an independent audit 
committee might constrain firm performance in a period of economic growth. Ac-
cordingly, it is important to investigate the economic impact of charging audit 
committees with substantial oversight of risk matters in different economic cycles. 
 Second, further evidence is needed on the interplay between audit committee 
design and effectiveness in different institutional settings, specifically outside the 
Anglo-Saxon domain. In Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 I show substantial variation in 
audit committee design standards as defined by national governance codes and 
audit committee charters in continental Europe. As pointed out by Vanasco (1994) 
and Flesher et al. (2005), audit committees have historically been an Anglo-Saxon 
corporate governance mechanism and were extremely rare in continental Europe. 
However, since the turn of the century the audit committee concept has gained 
popularity among pan-European standard setters and national governance com-
mittees. Furthermore, despite the fact that audit committees have become a man-
datory corporate governance mechanism with the passage of the Eighth EU Di-
rective on Company Law, I show that key audit committee design standards re-
main largely differentiated among EU member states (cf. Collier and Zaman, 2005). 
I also provide evidence indicating that mandating the disclosure of a complete 
audit committee charter serves as one way to iron out these inconsistencies in 
audit committee design standards at country and firm level throughout the EU. 
However, before taking this step, further research is needed to better understand 
the factors that impede convergence of audit committee design standards 
throughout the EU and its 28 member states. In this context Yoshikawa and 
Rasheed (2009) outline a list of impediments to convergence, including multiple 
optima, complementarities, path dependence, rent seeking by national interest 
groups, and lack of consensus. The desirability of convergence in audit committee 
standards would then be driven by the degree of multiple optima and complemen-
tarities among EU member states. 
 Third, the question of what audit committees are responsible for and what 
they actually do should be focused on and explored in depth. Arguably, the existing 
audit committee literature is swamped by empirical studies that focus exclusively 
on the demographic characteristics of audit committees (i.e. independence, exper-
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tise, committee size) when studying audit committee effectiveness. The roles, re-
sponsibilities and concrete tasks of audit committees are rarely taken into account 
(DeZoort et al., 2002; Bédard and Gendron, 2010). The problem is that the exten-
sive use of demographic variables in audit committee research constrains not only 
our understanding of what determines their effectiveness, but also the level of 
practical insights that will benefit the end users of corporate governance research 
(Zona and Zattoni, 2007; Ahrens et al., 2011). Out of 103 audit committee studies 
published between 1994 and 2008, Bédard and Gendron (2010) find merely seven 
studies that have incorporated the responsibilities addressed by the audit commit-
tees under study into their analysis. Consequently, further research is needed to 
better understand what boards of directors and audit committees are responsible 
for and actually do, and how members of these groups construct meanings of effec-
tiveness. Promising works have been published by Gendron and Bédard (2006), 
Zona and Zattoni (2007), Beasley et al. (2009), and Schwartz-Ziv and Weisbach 
(2013) that offer interesting insights into the black box of boardroom dynamics by 
going beyond archival demographic board of directors information. 
 Given the severity and persistence of the most recent financial crisis, further 
examination of the evolving role and responsibilities of independent audit commit-
tees in the context of risk management constitutes an interesting and timely sub-
ject which combines research and policy implications. While qualified, committed, 
independent and tough-minded audit committees were primarily seen as effective 
guardians for safeguarding the quality of external auditing and financial reporting 
in the 20th century, their role might well be evolving towards guarding the balance 
between risks and opportunities affecting value creation or the preservation of 
modern enterprises in the wake of the global financial crisis. 
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 Valorization 
This dissertation is about audit committee design and effectiveness. Audit commit-
tees are specialized committees of the board of directors or supervisory board that 
oversee certain activities of a company or organization. The valorization adden-
dum of my dissertation is structured as follows. First, I point out why effective 
audit committees are important for society at large. Next, I outline how the re-
search results presented in my dissertation can contribute to society’s needs of 
having powerful and reliable audit committees. Subsequently, I provide recom-
mendations for the three parties that have a say on the way audit committees are 
designed, that is regulators, corporate boards and shareholders. I close this adden-
dum with pointing out the benefits and risks associated with implementing the 
audit committee design standards based on my research results. 
Audit committee oversight is important due to the agency problem, which Ad-
am Smith described in the Wealth of Nations (1776). According to Smith, profes-
sional managers of other people’s money and assets cannot be expected to watch 
over them with the same anxious vigilance with which they would watch over their 
own. Smith also predicted in 1776 that negligence and profusion will, therefore, 
always prevail when companies are run by managers rather than owners. Ever 
since the industrial revolution in the late 19th century, more and more companies 
have become to be operated by teams of salaried managers who have little or no 
equity in the firm. The vast majority of today’s owners (shareholders), though, do 
not have the experience, information, time, or power to oversee managerial activi-
ties. So, while the separation of control from ownership is a driver of capitalism 
and economic growth, it does not come without risks. Corporate scandals, such as 
the demise of Enron and Lehman Brothers, have revealed the costs associated with 
the agency problem and reinforce the important role of corporate governance. 
History has also shown that strong corporate governance is not only important 
for the shareholders of a given firm, but also for society at large. The revelation of 
one corporate scandal can lead to a domino effect where further scandals unfold in 
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a short period of time, posing a serious threat to corporate legitimacy and investor 
confidence. When current and potential investors come to the conclusion that re-
cent scandals present not just a few bad apples but rather the tip of an iceberg, the 
engine of modern capitalism and development starts to slow down. As pointed out 
by William J. Bernstein in The Birth of Plenty (2004) investor confidence in capital 
markets is a prerequisite for widely available sources of funding, which plays a key 
role in the evolution of capitalism and the prosperity of the modern world.  
Today, audit committees are widely considered to be central elements of good 
corporate governance. Their popularity among regulators can be gauged from the 
fact that their formation has become mandatory for publicly held firms in all of the 
30 largest economies by GDP. However, conventional reasoning suggests that 
merely setting up an audit committee is not enough. Critics of audit committee 
formation have pointed out that these committees are toothless tigers rather than 
effective guardians and that they act as ceremonial rubber stamps. It is important 
that regulators and corporate boards specify audit committee design standards 
that enhance audit committee effectiveness to prevent that these committees turn 
into toothless tigers that meet once in a while in a ceremonial setting.  
One practical way to strengthen the role of the audit committee is to formalize 
its responsibilities, membership requirements and operating principles in a char-
ter. Regulators in several countries have required firms to establish and publicly 
disclose a written charter for their audit committee. In this context, the expectation 
was raised that disclosing a formal written charter will prompt audit committees 
to articulate a clear mission, to establish appropriate practices, and to follow them. 
According to the US Blue Ribbon Committee (1999: 27), disclosure will guide audit 
committees to responsible practices, as sunlight generally does.  
In nutshell, the following practical recommendations can be drawn from the 
dissertation at hand: First, companies should be required to establish and publicly 
disclose a written charter for their audit committee. This will improve audit com-
mittee effectiveness. Second, audit committees should oversee enterprise risk 
management and this needs to be defined in audit committee charters. Third, it is 
important to have independent directors with firm-specific and governance exper-
tise on the audit committee. I will briefly elaborate on these recommendations. 
My research results show that it is important to define the responsibilities of 
the audit committee in a charter and to make this document publicly available. I 
present empirical evidence that audit committee diligence and effectiveness are 
positively related to the scope of responsibilities disclosed in the audit committee 
charter. There are two main explanations. First, the disclosure of a charter will 
decrease the probability that audit committees fulfill a ceremonial role. Second, a 
formal charter serves as a source of power for audit committees. Well-crafted char-
ters can provide audit committee members with the necessary direction and pow-
er to discharge their role effectively. I believe that committees in general tend to 
have limited authority, meet infrequently and represent for most members an 
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extra role activity that constitutes only a small portion of their usual work. As a 
consequence, I claim that (audit) committees will benefit more than other work 
groups from a formal mandate that promotes authority, direction, and discipline.  
However, it is important to make it mandatory for firms to place an audit 
committee charter on the public record. I have studied the interplay between the 
contents of audit committee charters and actual committee activity in different 
disclosure regimes. The results show that in countries where the regulatory setting 
is more stringent, the professed activities of audit committees are more closely 
related to their actual work, relative to voluntary disclosure settings. When being 
voluntarily disclosed, audit committee charters seem to function primarily as vehi-
cles to gain external legitimacy via front-stage impression management, but not as 
a means for providing authority, direction, and discipline to audit committee 
members. Thus, audit committee charters that are being voluntarily disclosed do 
not appear to strengthen the effectiveness of audit committees from an agency 
theory perspective. 
There is one caveat here: regulatory pressure leads to mimetic isomorphism 
due to ´copy-and-paste´ behavior between firms. As a result, audit committee char-
ters of different firms closely resemble each other. However, I do believe that the 
benefits of a disclosure regime outweigh the risks associated with isomorphism in 
audit committee design, because the actual activities of audit committees are more 
closely related to the charters contents in countries with a disclosure regime.  
Based on my research results, I recommend that independent audit commit-
tees oversee enterprise risk management and this needs to be defined in a charter. 
This recommendation is based on contemporary research on the role of audit 
committees during periods of economic distress. During a crisis period, the quality 
of a firm’s financial decision and risk-management process mitigates the adverse 
performance effects of exogenous shocks (Yeh et al., 2011; Aldamen et al., 2012). 
Consistent with this proposition, a number of studies have shown that effective 
audit committees can have a positive impact on firm performance during a period 
of economic downturn. My own research of 351 firms during the 2007-2011 finan-
cial crisis shows that those firms performed better where audit committees were 
charged with oversight of enterprise risk management. To substantiate this find-
ing, I provide evidence that firm performance variability was lower during the 
financial crisis (a proxy for effective risk management) when substantial oversight 
of risk management was inscribed in the audit committee charter.  
There are four reasons why audit committees should be given a strong man-
date to oversee enterprise risk management. First, most audit committees are 
composed almost exclusively or entirely of independent directors. Arguably, inde-
pendent directors are less susceptible to the agency problem. As a result they 
should have more objective views on the risk appetite of executives and on the way 
risks are being managed by them. Second, independent directors have incentives 
to prevent excessive risk-taking due to reputation and career concerns. Research 
136 
has shown, for example, that directors sitting on boards of firms in trouble are less 
likely to receive new appointments. Third, audit committees are involved in the 
core governance processes from financial reporting to external/internal auditing, 
and internal control. Fourth, audit committee members typically bring more finan-
cial and risk management expertise to the table compared to non-audit committee 
directors.  
However, audit committee members also need firm-specific and governance 
expertise to effectively oversee the management of risks. My research indicates 
that firm-specific expertise contributes to the ability of independent directors to 
effectively oversee risk management. More specifically, I find positive associations 
between the board tenure of independent directors on audit committees and firm 
performance during the financial crisis. Agency theory dictates that the tenure of 
independent directors should be limited due to the development of social ties with 
management. I would argue, though, that the degree of firm-specific expertise that 
independent directors should bring to the table depends on the role of the audit 
committee. Audit committees charged with oversight of risk management need 
firm-specific expertise and knowledge in order to effectively oversee and appraise 
managerial decisions and stand up to management in case of disputes on risk man-
agement topics. At present, there is no policy regarding the tenure of audit com-
mittee members and it is generally not implemented in audit committee charters. 
Kesner (1998) points out that it takes at least three to five years for independent 
directors to gain a solid understanding of large and complex firms. Therefore, I 
believe that it is important to ensure a reasonable tenure of audit committee 
members to ensure audit committees effectiveness, rather than limiting their ten-
ure to two to three years. 
The results presented in this dissertation also support the proposition that an 
asset that outside directors bring to the board of a given firm – in addition to an 
independent view – is their body of knowledge and experiences gained at other 
firms, e.g., in the form of holding additional directorships. Regulators have placed 
substantial emphasis on limiting the number of additional directorships of inde-
pendent directors. The main concern is that too many directorships impair the 
monitoring effectiveness of audit committee members because they become too 
busy. However, I find empirical evidence suggesting that additional directorships 
seem to promote rather than constrain the ability of independent directors to spot 
and oversee risks. Arguably, the question whether multiple directorships should 
be constrained depends, once again, on the responsibilities of the audit committee. 
In the case of overseeing risk management, though, I would challenge the approach 
to minimize the additional directorships of all audit committee members.  
Next, I will give more concrete recommendations for implementing audit 
committee design standards. Based on the outcomes of my research, I see different 
priorities for strengthening the role of audit committees in the US and continental 
Europe. For each setting, I point out specific recommendations as well as expected 
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benefits and risks that result from the implementation of audit committee design 
standards. For continental Europe, my primary recommendation is to place more 
coercive pressure on firms to place an audit committee charter on the public rec-
ord. The EU Eight Directive, which came into effect in 2006 requires firms to estab-
lish an audit committee. It also gives a number of audit committee design recom-
mendations. However, it remains silent on the topic of establishing and disclosing 
an audit committee charter. I would expect an audit committee charter disclosure 
regime to have a positive impact on audit committee effectiveness for three rea-
sons. First, important audit committee design standards will be effectively imple-
mented at firm level (which is currently not the case). Second, there will be less 
room for ceremonial type audit committees. Third, audit committees will be 
equipped with more power to effectively fulfill their important mandate.  
The main risk associated with implementing a disclosure regime on audit 
committee charters in Europe is that it will lead to isomorphism in audit commit-
tee design across firms. In other words, ´copy-and-paste´ type audit committee 
charters may lack firm- or industry-specific content. Since interdependencies be-
tween organizations and their environments may lead to variations in the effec-
tiveness of governance practices (Aguilera et al., 2008), it cannot be assumed with-
out further evidence that an effective audit committee should be designed in the 
same way in Germany, France, or Spain. I would argue, though, that as long as the 
EU Eight Directive sets minimum standards in terms of audit committees design, 
EU Member States and companies enjoy sufficient leeway to define audit commit-
tee standards that are sufficiently differentiated and fit for purpose.  
My recommendation for firms listed in the US, in turn, is to reinforce the role 
of audit committees with respect to overseeing risk management. The global finan-
cial crisis that took hold in 2007 has been described as the most serious financial 
crisis since the Great Depression. One of the central corporate governance lessons 
that can be drawn from the financial crisis is that risk management and govern-
ance systems need to be strengthened (Kirkpatrick, 2009). My dissertation sug-
gests that it is important to give independent audit committees the authority to 
assume substantial oversight of risk management. The recommended way to 
achieve this is through formalizing the responsibilities for risk oversight in the 
audit committee charter. Board of directors should be best equipped to do this. 
Shareholders, in turn, can use active engagement strategies, such as the filing of a 
shareholder proposal or private negotiations to strengthen the mandate of audit 
committees to oversee risk management. In case substantial oversight of enter-
prise risk management is assigned to the audit committee, my recommendation is 
to ensure that audit committee members have sufficient firm-specific expertise. I 
also suggest to build on the governance expertise of directors with multiple direc-
torships when it comes to overseeing risk matters. Once again, I see the board of 
directors in the driver seat to implement these recommendations.  
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My main concern is that expanding the scope of audit committee oversight in 
the area of risk management leads to audit committee overload. According to Ol-
son (1999), overloading audit committee members with too many responsibilities 
can have three unintended consequences: (1) committee effort and energy may be 
dissipated in too many directions that audit committees become ever more busy 
but ever less effective; (2) good directors may decline to take on the burden of 
serving on the committee (3) those who do serve may face the risk of personal 
liability or a greater chance of being named as defendants in shareholder lawsuits. 
Therefore, boards of directors need to be careful in expanding the mandate of au-
dit committees without de-prioritizing some other duties. Given the apparent ef-
fectiveness of audit committees when it comes to risk oversight, I recommend to 
prioritize rather than de-prioritize the role of audit committees in this context.  
The results presented in my dissertation can contribute to the difficult and im-
portant task of strengthening audit committee design and effectiveness. The way 
that I plan to disseminate my results and recommendations is by means of publish-
ing in academic and practitioner journals. Recent developments show that some of 
the recommendations given here are already being implemented. A global survey 
among 1,500 audit committee members by the audit firm KPMG (2014) shows that 
many audit committees today are already assuming primary responsibility for 
overseeing a host of business risks. 
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 Nederlandse samenvatting  
(Summary in Dutch) 
Dit proefschrift gaat over het ontwerp en de effectiviteit van de auditcommissies. 
Auditcommissies zijn gespecialiseerde commissies van de raad van bestuur of de 
raad van commissarissen van organisaties. Toezichthouders over de hele wereld 
beschouwen ze van het grootste belang voor de kwaliteit van corporate governan-
ce en het vertrouwen van beleggers in de financiële markten. Ze worden door 
sommigen zelfs beschouwd als "de meest betrouwbare hoeders van het algemeen 
belang" (Levitt, 1999). De vorming van een auditcommissie is verplicht voor 
beursgenoteerde bedrijven in vrijwel elk van de 30 grootste economieën op basis 
van BNP. De resultaten van eerder onderzoek bevestigen in grote lijnen een posi-
tieve invloed van de aanwezigheid van een auditcommissie op de kwaliteit van de 
jaarrekeningcontrole, de financiële rapportering, de interne controle, en meer 
recent ook op het vlak van risicomanagement. 
 Echter, de belangrijkste vraag waarmee toezichthouders, bestuursraden en 
investeerders momenteel worden geconfronteerd is niet de vraag of er een audit-
commissie moet worden opgericht, maar de vraag hoe een effectieve en efficiënte 
auditcommissie te ontwerpen. Het is van belang om deze vraag te beantwoorden, 
omdat auditcommissies zich in de ogen van de toezichthouders inmiddels hebben 
ontwikkeld tot een van de belangrijkste hoeders van het algemeen belang. Audit-
commissie worden verondersteld om de corporate governance te versterken en 
daarmee het vertrouwen van beleggers in de financiële informatie en markten te 
beschermen. Omdat het vertrouwen van beleggers in de kapitaalmarkten een 
voorwaarde is voor algemeen beschikbare financieringsbronnen en de evolutie 
van het kapitalisme en de welvaart, mag van beleidsmakers, bestuursraden en 
beleggers worden verwacht dat zij een grote belangstelling aan de dag te leggen 
voor de verdere ontwikkeling van normen en standaarden die de kracht en de 
effectiviteit van de auditcommissie verder versterken. 
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Eén manier voor toezichthouders om normen voor de inrichting van auditcommis-
sies vast te stellen, is bedrijven te verplichten een schriftelijk handvest met betrek-
king tot hun auditcommissie openbaar te maken. Dergelijke auditcommissie “char-
ters” zouden specifieke normen voor auditcommissies moeten aangegeven, zoals 
het vereiste niveau van deskundigheid en onafhankelijkheid van de leden van de 
auditcommissie. Het belangrijkste is echter dat dergelijke auditcommissie charters, 
de taken en verantwoordelijkheden van het auditcommissie bij een bepaalde on-
derneming in detail beschrijven. De regulerende invloed hiervan is tweeledig. Aan 
de ene kant worden beleggers geïnformeerd. Aan de andere kant bieden zij autori-
teit alsmede een richtinggevend en disciplinerend kader aan de leden van audit-
commissies. Met name het laatste punt is interessant. Door de openbaarmaking 
van een auditcommissie charter zullen deze commissies ertoe worden aangezet 
een duidelijke missie te verwoorden, daarbij passende gedragsregels vast te stel-
len, en deze vervolgens ook na te leven. 
 Er is echter relatief weinig bekend over de wisselwerking tussen de taken en 
verantwoordelijkheden zoals die zijn vastgelegd in auditcommissie charters en de 
effectiviteit van auditcommissies. Het is verrassend dat de resultaten van weten-
schappelijk onderzoek op dit gebied beperkt zijn, gezien het belang dat de toe-
zichthouders en deskundigen op het gebied van corporate governance toeschrijven 
aan deze charters, als instrument voor het verschaffen van autoriteit, richting en 
discipline aan de leden van auditcommissies en voor het informeren van relevante 
belangengroepen – met name de huidige en potentiële aandeelhouders, schuldei-
sers en regelgevende instanties - over de taken en verantwoordelijkheden van 
deze commissies op bedrijfsniveau. 
 Dit proefschrift brengt drie studies bij elkaar die nieuwe inzichten bieden in de 
opzet en de werking van auditcommissies vanuit een internationaal perspectief. 
Hoofdstuk 2 werpt licht op de uitvoering van de auditcommissie charters in conti-
nentaal Europa, waar de auditcommissie een relatief nieuw concept is. In 2006 
heeft de Europese Commissie de 8e EU-richtlijn aangenomen waarin voor de lid-
staten de verplichting is opgenomen om een auditcommissie verplicht te stellen 
voor beursgenoteerde ondernemingen. Echter, op het tijdstip van dit onderzoek 
waren de standaarden waarin de verplichtingen m.b.t. de inrichting van een audit-
commissie zijn vastgelegd verschillend per lidstaat. Een reden voor het gebrek aan 
standaardisatie binnen de EU op dit punt is dat de 8ste EU-richtlijn veel speelruim-
te geeft aan de lidstaten om dergelijke standaarden te definiëren. Hoofdstuk 2 laat 
zien dat het uitoefenen van druk op bedrijven om hun auditcommissie charter 
openbaar te maken, een effectieve manier is om de implementatie van auditcom-
missie charters te bevorderen. Echter, toezichthouders dienen een dergelijke stap 
zorgvuldig te overwegen. De resultaten van hoofdstuk 2 tonen aan dat het uitoefe-
nen van een dergelijke druk leidt tot een toename van het percentage van stan-
daard tekstpassages in auditcommissie charters, tot op het punt waar de audit-
commissie charters van verschillende bedrijven nog nauwelijks van elkaar te on-
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derscheiden zijn. Consistent met Institutionele theorie toont dit aan dat overmati-
ge regelgevende druk leidt tot mimetische isomporphism (DiMaggio en Powell, 
1991). Met andere woorden, regulering kan leiden tot 'copy-and-paste' of' ‘box-
ticking' benaderingen van corporate governance. 
 Een belangrijk probleem voor beleggers, toezichthouders en andere belang-
hebbenden is dat het vrijwel onmogelijk is om te observeren of de auditcommissie 
van een bepaalde onderneming ook daadwerkelijk uitvoering geeft aan de in het 
auditcommissie charter opgenomen verantwoordelijkheden. Als gevolg daarvan 
kunnen de werkelijke (back-stage) activiteiten van auditcommissies afwijken van 
de in auditcommissie charter opgenomen activiteiten (de frontstage) zonder dat 
dit tot consequenties leidt. Deze situatie kan leiden tot het optreden v an een zoge-
naamde ‘performance-expectation gap’ in het bijzonder in landen waar er een hoge 
druk op ondernemingen wordt uitgeoefend om de taken van de auditcommissie uit 
te breiden en deze taken vervolgens in een auditcommissie charter openbaar te 
maken. Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat in landen waar de regelgeving meer restrictief is 
(de VS), de in de charter vermelde activiteiten nauwer samenhangen met hun feite-
lijke werkzaamheden, in vergelijking met landen waar er sprake is van een meer 
liberaal regime (continentaal Europa). De openbaarmaking van auditcommissie 
charters heeft niet alleen tot doel om investeerders te informeren, maar ook om 
autoriteit, richting alsmede een disciplinerend kader te geven aan de leden van een 
auditcommissie (BRC, 1999). Kalbers en Fogarty (1998) wijzen er op dat een effec-
tieve auditcommissies gebaseerd is op een sterk organisatorisch kader, institutio-
nele steun en toewijding. Cohen et al. (2010; 2012) en DeZoort et al. (2008), laten 
zien dat in de VS auditcommissies aanzienlijk actiever en krachtiger optraden na 
de introductie van de Sarbanes-Oxley Act van 2002. We schrijven deze ontwikke-
ling deels toe aan de eis om de verantwoordelijkheden van het auditcommissie te 
formaliseren in een schriftelijk charter. Echter, de resultaten van onze studie tonen 
aan dat de waarde en relevantie van dergelijke charters afneemt wanneer zij op 
vrijwillige basis worden openbaar gemaakt. Hoofdstuk 3 laat zien dat - bij vrijwilli-
ge openbaarmaking - publiek beschikbaar charters minder informatie verschaffen 
over de daadwerkelijk uitgevoerde activiteiten van de auditcommissie. De vrijwil-
lige openbaarmaking van een auditcommissie charter heeft in veel gevallen slechts 
een symboolfunctie waar organisaties legitimiteit aan trachten te ontlenen, maar 
niet als een mechanisme om de effectiviteit van de auditcommissies te vergroten 
vanuit een agency perspectief. 
 Ongetwijfeld een van de meest interessante aspecten van het toezicht van au-
ditcommissies betreft enterprise risk management. In 2007 ontplooide zich in de 
VS een economische crisis, die wordt beschouwd als de ergste financiële crisis 
sinds de Grote Depressie van de jaren 1930. In de nasleep van deze crisis, is er een 
toenemende hoeveelheid bewijs dat de aanwezigheid van onafhankelijke audit-
commissies de gevolgen van deze crisis op de bedrijfsprestaties hebben gemiti-
geerd (Yeh et al, 2011; Aldamen et al, 2012). De in hoofdstuk 4 gepresenteerde 
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resultaten bevestigen deze bevindingen. De belangrijkste bijdrage van hoofdstuk 4, 
betreffen echter de inzichten in de factoren die de effectiviteit van een auditcom-
missie in de context van enterprise risk management bepalen. De eerste relevante 
factor is de toekenning van de formele bevoegdheid in het auditcommissie charter 
om substantieel toezicht op het risicobeheer te houden. Daarnaast dragen bedrijfs-
specifieke en governance deskundigheid bij de onafhankelijke leden binnen het 
auditcommissie in belangrijke mate bij aan de effectiviteit van het toezicht op het 
risicobeheer. 
 Deze resultaten hebben implicaties voor regelgevers, onderzoekers, raden van 
bestuur en het beleggend publiek. Post-Enron, hebben zowel beleidsmakers, regel-
gevers, als onderzoekers de nadruk gelegd op het belang van de auditcommissie bij 
het toezicht op de financiële verslaggeving en de controle van processen alsmede 
op het belang van het verhogen van het niveau van de financiële expertise van de 
leden van auditcommissies. Gezien de ernst en de hardnekkigheid van de recente 
wereldwijde financiële crisis en de rol van auditcommissies in deze context, kan 
het nuttig zijn om de focus te verleggen naar de rol en de effectiviteit van audit-
commissies in het kader van enterprise risk management. Terwijl gekwalificeerde, 
toegewijde, en onafhankelijke auditcommissies reeds worden gezien als een effec-
tieve bescherming voor het waarborgen van de kwaliteit van de externe controle 
en financiële verslaglegging in de 20e eeuw, zou hun rol vervolgens kunnen evolu-
eren in de richting van het bewaken van de balans tussen risico's en kansen die 
van invloed zijn op de waarde creatie en de continuïteit van moderne onderne-
mingen. 
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